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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen the rise of nation-state interference in elections across the globe, making
the ever-present need for more secure elections all the more dire. While certain common-sense
approaches have been a typical response in the past, e.g. “don’t connect voting machines to the
Internet” and “use a voting system with a paper trail”, known-good solutions to improving election
security have languished in relative obscurity for decades. These techniques are only now finally
being implemented at scale, and that implementation has brought the intricacies of sophisticated
approaches to election security into full relief.
This dissertation argues that while approaches to improve election security like paper ballots
and post-election audits seem straightforward, in reality there are significant practical barriers to
sufficient implementation. Overcoming these barriers is a necessary condition for an election to be
secure, and while doing so is possible, it requires significant refinement of existing techniques. In
order to better understand how election security technology can be improved, I first develop what it
means for an election to be secure. I then delve into experimental results regarding voter-verified
paper, discussing the challenges presented by paper ballots as well as some strategies to improve
the security they can deliver. I examine the post-election audit ecosystem and propose a manifest
improvement to audit workload analysis through parallelization. Finally, I show that even when
all of these conditions are met (as in a vote-by-mail scenario), there are still wrinkles that must be
addressed for an election to be truly secure.
Thesis Statement. Understanding the real-world complexities of administering elections is
necessary to create and implement practical defenses.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Democratic elections and the peaceful transfers of power they facilitate are the bedrock on
which many cultures and ways of life are built. In many countries, elections provide one of the
few touchstones for citizens to improve their government, and in doing so, their lives and the
lives of those around them. However, democracy is an ever-imperfect process, and effectively
carrying out its machinations is a very difficult task, even without undue interventions. A critical
piece of of the democratic process is the integrity of elections, which relies not just on active
and enthusiastic participation of the populace, but in the integrity of the systems by which people
participate. Typically, this means integrity of the ballot casting, collecting, and tabulation process.
The means by which this process can be protected are varied, and depend largely on the specifics
of a given election system. Voice-vote systems have a different threat model than mark-on-paper or
mark-on-computer systems, and so forth. As much of the world relies on secrecy of each individual
ballot, typical voting systems take the form of voter-marked paper or computers, which attempt
to preserve the anonymity of each voter while still collecting and counting votes as efficiently as
possible.
However, the systems by which people vote around the world have been routinely scruti-
nized in regards to the integrity and anonymity they can actually provide. Voting systems in the
Netherlands [105], Brazil [16], India [247], Australia [111], Estonia [211], Switzerland [110],
Norway [103], Canada [61], and the United States [18, 48, 67, 155, 160], to name a few, have all
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been found to severely underdeliver on the promise of a secure and correct election. This has lead
many experts the world over to analyze the problem of running a secure election, develop concepts
for what doing so requires, and build systems that can facilitate doing so.
However, despite having a well-stocked toolbox of techniques and policies to run secure
elections, we have only just begun to see these tools picked up and used in a real-world context.
In this dissertation, I examine some of these tools more closely: verifiable paper ballots, and
post-election audits. First, I develop what it means for an election to be secure and why these two
technologies are critical to election security. Then, I examine voter-verified paper ballots relying
on experimental data collected in a mock-election setting, finding that while voters do not default
to actually verifying their paper ballots, there appear to be strategies that can greatly improve the
proportion of voters who do. I construct a model of post-election audits, examining various types of
audits that have been proposed and implemented over the years, what factors impact the efficacy
and efficiency of a post-election audit, and comparing and contrasting the efficiency of types of
audits. Finally, I discuss how even if all of these technologies are deployed perfectly, as in the
vote-by-mail scheme I examine, the attack surface of elections is so broad that it is still possible to
have an insecure election with paper ballots and audits.
1.1 What Makes an Election Secure?
In order to rigorously examine election security technologies, it is first important to develop
key concepts in election security and what types of systems and policies implement those concepts.
Election security as a field has been developing for nearly forty years, with some of the earliest
concepts like rigorous post-election audits and verifiability maturing over that time.
The security problem for elections is a particularly wicked one. The primary goal for an election
is to select the most preferred candidate or choice amongst the electorate, however the secondary
(and almost as important) function is to convince the losing sides of an election that they really lost.
Providing this kind of assurance on its face is not that difficult: if everyone who votes can be tied to
their vote, then all voters are capable of making sure their choice was collected and counted in the
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outcome, including the losers.
However, democracies the world over rely on a second key property for their elections:
anonymity. If voters can reveal how they voted, they might become subject to undue influence over
how they should vote, being paid to vote a certain way or suffering acts of violence when they do
not vote a certain way. This type of undue influence is coercion, and is one of the main concerns
when constructing a secure election system.
One of the most significant developments in response to coercion was the secret ballot, wherein a
voter enters a private environment and marks a piece of paper with their intended selection. Provided
the voter does not mark the paper in a particularly identifiable way, once the ballot has been mixed
in with all of the other ballots in the election, it is essentially impossible to tie any one ballot back to
any one voter. This effectively defeats any possibility of coercion, thus making the election scheme
coercion resistant.
However, the introduction of paper ballots surfaces several other problems in running secure
elections: how should the paper be counted? How does a jurisdiction produce, organize, administer,
and collect paper ballots? What do voters who are unable to independently mark paper ballots do?
To address these concerns, computers were introduced in the 1960s as an integral part of the voting
process, ranging from electronic scanners that can process ballots more quickly and accurately than
human counting teams to vote-marking computers that can facilitate voters of all abilities to vote
independently and anonymously. The advent of computerized voting has even lead to the adoption
of fully paperless voting systems around the world, from the Netherlands to Brazil to India to the
United States.
1.1.1 Why Paper Matters
Election outcomes are subject to influence from all participants: candidates, parties, voters,
voting equipment vendors, election officials, and, perhaps most saliently in light of recent elections,
outside adversaries. Because of this, election systems need a sophisticated way to provide strong
evidence for their outcomes while also preserving anonymity. Essentially, elections that use
computers need a way to guarantee that their outcomes have not been influenced by any of the
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actors involved.
With computerized voting, the most essential weakness is undetected manipulation of the
election results by malicious software. I developed software that can achieve exactly this type of
manipulation by intercepting scanned images of ballots before they reach the tabulation software to
change the votes reflected on them. This attack works specifically on voter-marked paper ballots,
but similar attacks have been demonstrated on other computerized voting equipment like direct-
recording electronic voting machines [18, 48, 155]. Because software can introduce changes to
the election results, this study shows why it is absolutely crucial to maintain a robust paper trail
attesting to the will of the voters.
To date, voter-verified paper is the only known mechanism by which elections can provide strong
assurance to their results while also preserving anonymity in an environment where none of the
stakeholders are trusted. Such assurances can also provide the property of software-independence:
malicious or erroneous changes introduced by software which cause the election outcome to be
incorrect cannot go undetected provided the computer-produced results are checked against the
paper. However, “voter-verified” has proven to be an underdeveloped definition until recently.
1.2 Voter-verified Paper
The key idea of voter-verified paper is that once a voter marks their ballots, they can examine
the marks on the ballot prior to casting it to ensure that the choices they made are the ones they
intended. This way, truly voter-verified paper provides the property of cast-as-intended, one of the
three properties of ensuring end-to-end verifiability (E2E-V). E2E-V provides assurance that an
election outcome is correct from end-to-end, from when the ballot leaves the hands of each voter
up to when the election outcome is announced. Providing for the other two properties of E2E-V,
collected-as-cast and tallied as collected, requires a bit more work on the part of the election
system, but I defer that discussion to Section 1.3.
While in principle any paper-based voting system can provide the property of cast-as-intended,
it is important to note that it fundamentally requires on actions by the voters to do so. If no voter
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checks their ballot, then the election cannot provide end-to-end verifiability, as the paper trail may
have been manipulated without anyone noticing. This manipulation can take the form of misprinted
hand-marked paper ballots, or malicious changes to the ballots printed off by computerized ballot
marking devices (BMDs).
To better characterize whether voters actually verify paper ballots, I performed a study running
a mock election on BMDs in a realistic election environment. Every BMD was maliciously coded
to intentionally change the voter’s selections in controlled ways. With this control, I could vary
factors about the way the ballots were manipulated or how the election environment was set up to
ascertain what factors impact voters’ ability to detect and report errors.
Absent any interventions, the proportion of participants in the study who reported problems on
their ballots was dishearteningly low: fewer than 7% of participants found and reported errors, and
only 40% appeared to even examine their paper ballot. However, I designed several interventions
intended to improve both the review rates and the detection rates, and by asking voters to check their
ballots carefully against a provided list of candidates they were instructed to vote for, our review
rate approached 100% and the detection rate reached 62% (as high as 86% in one condition).
Therefore, it appears that it appears that voter-verified paper can deliver on its promise of
software-independence and cast-as-intended, however it requires sophistication in implementation
and design. Voters do not check their ballots on their own, and significant effort needs to be made
in system design and policy implementation to achieve acceptable rates of verification. To date, at
least two states have adopted my recommendations for use with their BMD systems.
1.3 Post-election Audits
Voter-verified paper is at the time of writing a necessary condition for secure elections, but it is
not sufficient. The complement to voter-verified paper is a robust paper trail. If the paper trail is well
preserved, i.e. there is significant evidence that voter-verified ballots have been transported, counted,
and stored in a manner that did not result in any of them being removed or any dubious ballots
being added, then a voting system can provide assurance to (but cannot guarantee) the property
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of collected-as-cast. Furthermore, if the paper trail is then audited against the reported election
results in a robust way, then the election attains the property of tallied-as-collected and therefore
approaches end-to-end verifiability.
Providing evidence to both a robust paper trail and a verified outcome can be achieved with
audits that are performed after the election. Process audits can attest that the paper trail has been
properly preserved. Tabulation audits can provide assurance that the paper trail affirms the reported
election outcome. The work I present here addresses tabulation audits.
Perhaps the most significant development in post-election tabulation audits is the risk-limiting
audit (RLA). The key idea is that a sample of paper ballots is retabulated by hand and compared
against the voting system’s reported outcome. This can be done at a macroscopic level, examining
batches of ballots, or at a microscopic level, examining individual ballots.
The three most prominent types of RLA are batch comparison audits, ballot-polling audits,
and ballot comparison audits. Each of these audits draw samples based only on the margin
reported in the election, and then hand-tabulate the physical paper ballots. A hypothesis test is used
to evaluate how likely it is that the reported election result is correct based on the sample.
RLAs are not the only type, or even the most commonly-used type of post-election tabulation
audit, however. Many jurisdictions in the United States rely on fixed-percentage audits, wherein
the jurisdiction retabulates some proportion of their paper trail, typically at a precinct-level, but
occasionally at a machine- or ballot-level. Not all of these retabulations are performed by hand,
either; many jurisdictions run their ballots through the same scanners that they used to tabulate the
ballots originally, while some use different scanners.
Fixed-percentage audits are not guaranteed to provide assurances of E2E-V or software-
independence, as the sample sizes they choose may be too small to do so with any statistical
confidence. However, if the sample size is larger than necessary to be risk-limiting and is drawn
uniformly at random, it is possible that these types of audits can provide security assurances. Never-
theless, they are not generally recommended as a security technique, as there is no way to guarantee
whether they can provide statistical power. Furthermore, an adversary manipulating vote totals can
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ensure that a fixed-percentage audit cannot provide statistical confidence by choosing a low margin.
Some jurisdictions do not even examine their paper trail (even fewer do not even have one),
they simply rerun the program that tabulated the outcome to verify that it is correct. This type of
“audit”, as it does not rely on any external evidence, can never provide any property of software-
independence or E2E-V, so I will disregard it.
1.3.1 Modeling Post-election Audits
A key problem with the myriad varieties of post-election audits is that it is difficult to compare
them. One of the most frequently asked questions by election officials considering implementing
audits is “how much will it cost?” While fixed-percentage audits will have fixed costs, RLAs funda-
mentally depend on the election results to determine how much work they will entail. Therefore, it
is not strictly possible to guarantee a given workload ahead of time.
However, it is possible to compare these methods for a given “average” election outcome. I
develop a model to do just that, examining which types of post-election audits are the most efficient
in which scenarios. I find that while certain audit methods like ballot comparison will always be
most efficient, batch comparison and ballot-polling have trade-offs as the margins get small. The
model I develop is fully generalizable to any post-election audit, and I validate it using data gleaned
from my participation in numerous RLA pilots.
1.3.2 A Manifest Improvement on an Existing RLA Technique
In developing this model, I also note that a significant feature of post-election audits is their
parallelizability, that many batches or ballots can be audited all at the same time. To that end, I
propose a reexamination of the most widely-adopted form of RLA, the ballot-polling audit, and
show that it is entirely possible to perform robust ballot sampling before the election results are
made available, which addresses workload concerns and ameliorates some of the challenges in
maintaining a paper trail.
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1.4 Perfect is the enemy of good
Even if an election system has voter-verified paper ballots and a robust post-election audit, there
are still means by which its result can be made incorrect. To demonstrate this, I examine a typical
vote-by-mail (VBM) scheme used in the United States. In principle, this system has voter-verified,
hand-marked paper ballots, and I assume that risk-limiting audits are performed. However, because
of inadequate authentication of voters, the election is vulnerable to fraud and voter coercion.
I introduce several practical improvements to the scheme that can be deployed with relatively
minimal changes to the election system. More robust authentication virtually eliminates the potential
for fraud. My proposed scheme does not provide perfect coercion-resistance, however I develop
a new concept of coercion-hardness, where a scheme permits some coercion but not enough to
change the election outcome.
Despite the existence of strong practical defenses, I show that there is no “perfect” solution to
election security. Even good defenses that are easy to deploy have important trade-offs that must be
weighed carefully. A system that is perfectly secure but unusable is not a secure system. A system
that is perfectly usable but cannot provide voters assurance to its correctness is not a usable system.
However, by focusing on the goal of delivering a system that preserves outcomes if not individual
votes, many improvements can be made over the status quo.
Thesis Statement. Understanding the real-world complexities of administering elections is
necessary to create and implement practical defenses.
Structure. I have demonstrated in this dissertation that while there are powerful strategies
for achieving more secure elections, their implementation is more nuanced and requires more
sophistication than obvious at first blush. In Chapter II, I establish some important definitions for
election security as well as some technologies that have been designed to meet those definitions.
In Chapter III, I provide a practical example of how violating some of the core assumptions of
those technologies can result in insecure elections. In Chapter IV, I explore voter-verified paper
and demonstrate that having paper alone does not guarantee that voters will check it, as well as
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providing some strategies to ensure that they do. In Chapter V I develop a generalized model of
post-election audits that rely on voter-verified paper, examining which types of audits are most
effective when. In Chapter VI I examine how one of the key lessons from my model can be applied
in practice by parallelizing an existing risk-limiting audit. In Chaper VII, I show that even with
perfect deployment of paper ballots and RLAs, voting systems still possess security holes, and
that defending these systems is fundamentally an act of compromise. Finally, in Chapter VIII, I
draw broader conclusions from the work presented here, as well as outline areas in which more
knowledge is needed to better inform election security technologies.
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CHAPTER II
What Makes an Election Secure?1
2.1 Introduction: What is the evidence?
It is not enough for an election to produce the correct outcome. The electorate must also be
convinced that the announced result reflects the will of the people. And for a rational person to be
convinced requires evidence. Modern technology—computer and communications systems—is
fragile and vulnerable to programming errors and undetectable manipulation. No current system that
relies on electronic technology alone to capture and tally votes can provide convincing evidence that
election results are accurate without endangering or sacrificing the anonymity of votes. Moreover,
the systems that come closest are not readily usable by a typical voter.
Paper ballots, on the other hand, have some very helpful security properties: they are readable
(and countable, and re-countable) by humans; they are relatively durable; and they are tamper-
evident. Votes cast on paper can be counted using electronic technology; then the accuracy of the
count can be checked manually to ensure that the technology functioned adequately well. Statistical
methods allow the accuracy of the count to be assessed by examining only a fraction of the ballots
manually, often a very small fraction. If there is also convincing evidence that the collection of
ballots has been conserved (no ballots added, lost, or modified) then this combination—voter-
verifiable paper ballots, a mechanized count, and a manual check of the accuracy of that count—can
1This chapter is based on “Public Evidence from Secret Ballots”, work in conjunction with Josh Benaloh, J. Alex
Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Philip B. Stark, Vanessa Teague, Poorvi L. Vora, and Dan S. Wallach
that appeared in Proceedings of the 2nd International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting [35]
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provide convincing evidence that announced electoral outcomes are correct.
Conversely, absent convincing evidence that the paper trail has been conserved, a manual
double-check of electronic results against the paper trail will not be convincing. If the paper trail
has been conserved adequately, then a full manual tally of the ballots can correct the electronic
count if the electronic count is incorrect.
These considerations have led many election integrity advocates to push for a voter-verifiable
paper trail (VVPAT).2 Other techniques like software independence and end-to-end verifiability can
offer far greater assurance in the accuracy of an election’s outcome, but these methods have not
been broadly applied.
2.1.1 Why so hard?
Several factors make it difficult to generate convincing evidence that reported results are correct.
The first is the trust model.
No one is trusted In any significant election, voters, election officials, and equipment and software
cannot necessarily be trusted by anyone with a stake in the outcome. Voters, operators, system
designers, manufacturers, and external parties are all potential adversaries.
The need for evidence Because officials and equipment may not be trustworthy, elections should
be evidence-based. Any observer should be able to verify the reported results based on trustworthy
evidence from the voting system. Many in-person voting systems fail to provide sufficient evidence;
and as we shall see Internet systems scarcely provide any at all.
The secret ballot Perhaps the most distinctive element of elections is the secret ballot, a critical
safeguard that defends against vote selling and voter coercion. In practical terms, voters should not
be able to prove how they voted to anyone, even if they wish to do so. This restricts the types of
evidence that can be produced by the voting system. Encryption alone is not sufficient, since the
voters may choose to reveal their selections in response to bribery or coercion.
The challenge of voting is thus to use fragile technology to produce trustworthy, convincing
2Voter-marked paper ballots or ballots marked using a ballot-marking device are preferable to VVPAT, a cash-register
style printout that the voter cannot touch.
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evidence of the correctness of the outcome while protecting voter privacy in a world where no
person or machine may be trusted. The resulting voting system and its security features must also
be usable by regular voters. The aim of this chapter is to explain the important requirements of
secure elections.
Prior to delving into our discussion, we need to make a distinction in terminology. Pollsite
voting systems are those in which voters record and cast ballots at predetermined locations, often in
public areas with strict monitoring. Remote voting refers to a system where voters fill out ballots
anywhere, and then send them to a central location to cast them, either physically mailing them in
the case of vote-by-mail, or sending them over the Internet in the case of Internet voting.
The next section provides definitions for election integrity, including a discussion of software
independence and end-to-end verifiability. Section 2.3 discusses how paper and ceremonies serve as
security processes, including a discussion of the role of post-election audits. Section 2.4 discusses
definitions of privacy and secrets, and Section 2.5 discusses miscellaneous definitions that help
compose the overall threat surface of elections. Finally, Section 2.6 looks ahead to the rest of this
dissertation and how the definitions here described factor into subsequent chapters.
2.2 Definitions of Integrity
For an election to be accepted as legitimate, the outcome should be convincing to all—and in
particular to the losers—leaving no valid grounds to challenge the outcome. Whether elections are
conducted by counting paper ballots by hand or using computer technology, the possibility of error
or fraud necessitates assurances of the accuracy of the outcome.
It is clear that a naive introduction of computers into voting introduces the possibility of
wholesale and largely undetectable fraud. If we can’t detect it, how can we prevent it?
In this section, I discuss several definitions and dimensions of secure elections, ranging from
broad concepts like software independence to specific ones, like collection accountability. Some of
these concepts frame secure elections in different and occasionally conflicting ways, but all rely on
concepts of evidence, verifiability, and integrity.
12
2.2.1 Software Independence
Rivest and Wack introduced a definition targeted specifically at detecting misbehavior in
computer-based elections:
Definition 1. [194] A voting system is software independent if an undetected change or error in
its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.
Software independence clearly expresses that it should not be necessary to trust software to
determine election outcomes, but it does not say what procedures or types of evidence should be
trusted instead. A system that is not software independent cannot produce a convincing evidence
trail, but neither can a paper-based system that does not ensure that the paper trail is complete and
intact, a cryptographic voting system that relies on an invalid cryptographic assumption, or a system
that relies on audit procedures but lacks a means of assuring that those procedures are properly
followed.
Rivest and Wack also define a stronger form of the property that includes error recovery:
Definition 2. [194] A voting system is strongly software independent if it is software independent
and a detected change or error in an election outcome (due to the software) can be corrected without
rerunning the election.
A strongly software-independent system can recover from software errors or bugs, but that
recovery in turn is generally based on some other trail of evidence.
A software independent system can be viewed as a form of tamper-evident system: a material
software problem leaves a detectable trace. Strongly software independent systems are resilient: not
only do material software problems leave a trace, the overall election system can recover from a
detected problem.
One mechanism to provide software independence is to record votes on a paper record that
provides physical evidence of voter’s intent, can be inspected by the voter prior to casting the vote,
and—if preserved intact—can later be manually audited to check the election outcome. However,
as discussed in Chapter IV, a “voter-marked” and “voter-verified” paper trail are not always the
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same thing. Risk-limiting audits can then achieve a pre-specified level of assurance that results are
correct; machine assisted risk-limiting audits [57], can help minimize the amount of labor required
for legacy systems that do not provide a cast-vote record for every ballot, linked to the corresponding
ballot (though caution here is also necessary, as I discuss in Chapter III).
2.2.2 End-to-end verifiability
The concern regarding fraud and desire for transparency has motivated the security and cryptog-
raphy communities to develop another approach to voting system assurance: end-to-end verifiability
(E2E-V). An election that is end-to-end verifiable achieves software independence together with
the analogous notion of hardware independence as well as independence from actions of election
personnel and vendors. Rather than attempting to verify thousands of lines of code or closely
monitor all of the many processes in an election, E2E-V focuses on providing a means to detect
errors or fraud in the process of voting and counting. The idea behind E2E-V is to enable voters
themselves to monitor the integrity of the election; democracy for the people by the people, as it
were. This is challenging because total transparency is not possible without undermining the secret
ballot, hence the mechanisms to generate such evidence have to be carefully designed.
Definition 3. (adapted from [31]) A voting system is end-to-end verifiable if it has the following
three kinds of verifiability:
• Cast as intended: Voters can independently verify that their selections are correctly
recorded.
• Collected as cast: Voters can independently verify that the representation of their vote is
correctly collected in the tally.
• Tallied as collected: Anyone can verify that every well-formed, collected vote is correctly
included in the tally.
If verification relies on trusting entities, software, or hardware, the voter and/or auditor should
be able to choose them freely. Trusted procedures, if there are any, must be open to meaningful
observation by every voter.
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Note that the above definition allows each voter to check that her vote is correctly collected,
thus ensuring that attempts to change or delete cast votes are detected. In addition, it should also
be possible to check the list of voters who cast ballots, to ensure that votes are not added to the
collection (i.e., to prevent ballot-box stuffing). This is called eligibility verifiability [133, 210].
2.2.2.1 Collection Accountability
In an E2E-V election protocol, voters can check whether their votes have been properly counted,
but if they discover a problem, there may not be adequate evidence to correct it. An election system
that is collection-accountable provides voters with evidence of any failure to collect their votes.
Definition 4. An election system is collection accountable if any voter who detects that her vote
has not been collected has, as part of the vote-casting protocol, convincing evidence that can be
presented to an independent party to demonstrate that the vote has not been collected.
Another form of evidence involves providing each voter with a code representing her votes,
such that knowledge of a correct code is evidence of casting a particular vote [66]. Yet another
mechanism is a suitable paper receipt. Forensic analysis may provide evidence that this receipt was
not forged by a voter [26, 29].
2.2.2.2 Dispute Resolution
While accountability helps secure the election process, it is not very useful if there is no way to
handle disputes. If a voter claims, on the basis of accountability checks provided by a system, that
something has gone wrong, there needs to be a mechanism to address this. This is known as dispute
resolution:
Definition 5. [126] A voting system is said to have dispute resolution if, when there is a dispute
between two participants regarding honest participation, a third party can correctly resolve the
dispute.
An alternative to dispute resolution is dispute-freeness:
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Definition 6. [128] A dispute-free voting system has built-in prevention mechanisms that eliminate
disputes among the active participants; any third party can check whether an active participant has
cheated.
2.2.3 From Verifiable to Verified
Constructing a voting system that creates sufficient evidence to reveal problems is not enough
on its own. That evidence must actually be used—and used appropriately—to ensure the accuracy
of election outcomes.
An election result may not be verified, even if it is generated by an end-to-end verifiable voting
system. For verification of the result, we need several further conditions to be satisfied:
• Enough voters and observers must be sufficiently diligent in performing the appropriate
checks.
• Random audits (including those initiated by voters) must be sufficiently extensive and unpre-
dictable that changes that affect election outcomes have a high chance of being detected.
• If checks fail, this must be reported to the authorities who, in turn, must take appropriate
action.
These issues involve complex human factors, including voters’ incentives to participate in veri-
fication. Existing work on this topic includes discussion of VVPAT systems [84, 104, 205] and
work I present in Chapter IV, which largely confirms the fears that not enough voters participate in
verifying paper trails.
A secure election system might give an individual voter assurance that her vote has not been
tampered with if that voter performs certain checks. However, sufficiently many voters must do
this in order to provide evidence that the election outcome as a whole is correct. Existing work
indicates that not enough voters do this [2, 3, 5, 87, 150, 151] Combining risk-limiting audits with
E2E-V systems can provide a valuable layer of protection in the case that an insufficient number
of voters participate in verification, although the difficulty of reconciling E2E-V systems with
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real-world election systems has thus far proven too difficult to find much success, except in limited
circumstances [60, 113].
Finally, another critical verification problem that has received little attention to date is how to
make schemes that are recoverable in the face of errors. We do not want to have to abort and rerun
an election every time a check a fails. Certain levels of detected errors can be shown to be highly
unlikely if the outcome is incorrect, and hence can be tolerated. Other types and patterns of error
cast doubt on the outcome and may require either full inspection or retabulation of the paper trail or,
if the paper trail cannot be relied upon, a new election.
Both Ku¨sters et al. [138] and Kiayias et al. [129] model voter-initiated auditing [28] and its
implications for detection of an incorrect election result. Both definitions turn uncertainty about
voter initiated auditing into a bound on the probability of detecting deviations of the announced
election result from the truth.
Wallach models the effect of election official-initiated auditing both before and during an elec-
tion [242], though Stark argues that such auditing will never be sufficient to provide assurance [218].
Appel, Demillo, and Stark develop notions of contestability, a stronger notion than software-
independence that requires that a system must produce public evidence that a change in software
has changed the outcome, and defensability, a stronger version of strong software-independence
that produces a public record attesting to its correctness [15].
2.3 The Role of Paper and Ceremonies
Following security problems with direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs) [18, 48,
155, 241], many parts of the U.S. returned to the use of paper ballots. If secure custody of the paper
ballots is assumed, paper provides durable evidence required to determine the correctness of the
election outcome. For this reason, when humans vote from untrusted computers, cryptographic
voting system specifications often use paper for security, included in the notions of dispute-freeness,
dispute resolution, collection accountability and accountability [137] (all as defined in Section 2.2).
Note that the standard approach to dispute resolution, based on non-repudiation, cannot be
17
applied to the voting problem in the standard fashion, because the human voter does not have the
ability to check digital signatures or digitally sign the vote (or other messages that may be part of
the protocol) unassisted. Dispute-freeness or accountability are often achieved in a polling place
through the use of cast paper ballots, and the evidence of their chain of custody (e.g., wet-ink
signatures). However, this notion does not capture the full picture, as voters may not pay close
enough attention, or if a computer system intervenes and marks their ballot incorrectly. Recent
work by Appel, DeMillo, and Stark [15] argues that this prevents computer-marked ballots from
providing any dispute resolution or freeness, as a voter may not be able to demonstrate the malicious
change without compromising their secret vote. I discuss this further in Chapter IV
Paper provides an interface for data entry for the voter—not simply to enter the vote, but also to
enter other messages that the protocol might require—and data on unforgeable paper serves many
of the purposes of digitally signed data. Thus, for example, when a voter marks a Preˆt a` Voter [198]
or Scantegrity [66] ballot, she is providing an instruction that the voting system cannot pretend
was something else. The resulting vote encryption has been physically committed to by the voting
system—by the mere act of printing the ballot—before the voter “casts” her vote.
Physical ceremony, such as can be witnessed while the election is ongoing, also supports
verifiable cryptographic election protocols. Such ceremonies include the verification of voter
credentials, any generation of randomness if required for the choice between cast and audit, any
vote-encryption-verification performed by election officials, etc. Notably, these ceremonies are
the type relied upon by traditional election security techniques, for instance counting ballots in
public, sealing ballot containers, and so forth. The key aspect of these ceremonies is the chance for
observers to see that they are properly conducted.
2.3.1 Risk-Limiting Audits
Statistical post-election audits are ceremonies that provide assurance that a reported outcome
is correct, by examining some or all of an audit trail consisting of durable, tamper-evident, voter-
verifiable records. Typically the audit trail consists of paper ballots.
The outcome of an election is the set of winners. An outcome is incorrect if it differs from the
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set of winners output by a perfectly accurate manual tabulation of the audit trail.
Definition 7. An audit of an election contest is a risk-limiting audit (RLA) with risk limit α if it
has the following two properties:
1. If the reported contest outcome under audit is incorrect, the probability that the audit leads to
correcting the outcome is at least 1−α .
2. The audit never indicates a need to alter a reported outcome that is correct.
(In this context, “correct” means “what a full manual tally of the paper trail would show.” If
the paper trail is unreliable, a RLA in general cannot detect that. RLAs should be preceded by
“compliance audits” that check whether the audit trail itself is adequately reliable to determine who
won.) Together, these two properties imply that post-RLA, either the reported set of winners is the
set that a perfectly accurate hand count of the audit trail would show, or an event with probability
no larger than α has occurred. (That event is that the outcome was incorrect, but the RLA did not
lead to correcting the outcome.) RLAs amount to a limited form of probabilistic error correction: by
relying on appropriate random sampling of the audit trail and hypothesis tests, they have a known
minimum probability of correcting the outcome. They are not designed to ensure that the reported
numerical tally is correct, only that the outcome is correct. As we shall see in Chapter VII, lowering
the burden of proof on election evidence in this way is a powerful means of improving election
security in a practical way.
The following procedure is a trivial RLA: with probability 1−α , perform a full manual tally of
the audit trail. Amend the outcome to match the set of winners the full hand count shows if that set
is different.
The art in constructing RLAs consists of maintaining the risk limit while performing less work
than a full hand count when the outcome is correct. Typically, this involves framing the audit as a
sequential test of the statistical hypothesis that the outcome is incorrect. To reject that hypothesis is
to conclude that the outcome is correct. RLAs have been developed for majority contests, plurality
contests, and vote-for-k contests and complex social choice functions including D’Hondt and other
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proportional representation rules—see below. RLAs have also been devised to check more than one
election contest simultaneously [217]. I discuss RLAs is significantly more detail in Chapter V.
2.4 Privacy, Receipt Freeness, and Coercion Resistance
In most security applications, privacy and confidentiality are synonymous. In elections, however,
privacy has numerous components that go well beyond typical confidentiality. Individual privacy
can be compromised by “normal” election processes such as a unanimous result. Voters may be
coerced if they can produce a proof of how they voted, even if they have to work to do so.
Privacy for votes is a means to an end: if voters don’t express their true preferences then the
election may not produce the right outcome. This section gives an overview of increasingly strong
definitions of what it means for voters to be free of coercion.
2.4.1 Basic Confidentiality
We will take ballot privacy to mean that the election does not leak any information about how
any voter voted beyond what can be deduced from the announced results. Confidentiality is not the
only privacy requirement in elections, but even simple confidentiality poses significant challenges.
It is remarkable how many deployed e-voting systems have been shown to lack even the most basic
confidentiality properties (e.g., [18, 48, 62, 111, 155]).
Perhaps more discouraging to basic privacy is the fact that remote voting systems (both paper
and electronic) inherently allow voters to eschew confidentiality. Because remote systems enable
voters to fill out their ballots outside a controlled environment, anyone can watch over the voter’s
shoulder while they fill out their ballot.
In an election—unlike, say, in a financial transaction—even the candidate receiving an encrypted
vote should not be able to decrypt it. Instead, an encrypted (or otherwise shrouded) vote must
remain confidential to keep votes from being directly visible to election authorities.
Some systems, such as code voting [65] and the Norwegian and Swiss Internet voting schemes,
defend privacy against an attacker who controls the computer used for voting; however, this
relies on assumptions about the privacy and integrity of a code sheet. Some schemes, such as
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JCJ/Civitas [125], obscure who has voted while providing a proof that only eligible votes were
included in the tally.
Several works [85, 138], following Benaloh [33] formalize the notion of privacy as preventing
an attacker from noticing when two parties swap their votes. Bernhard et al.3 performed an analysis
of game-based privacy definitions [34]
2.4.2 Everlasting Privacy
Moran and Naor expressed concern over what might happen to encrypted votes that can still
be linked to their voter’s name some decades into the future, and hence decrypted by superior
technology (similar to forward secrecy). They define a requirement to prevent this:
Definition 8. [158] A voting scheme has everlasting privacy if its privacy does not depend on
assumptions of cryptographic hardness.
Their solution uses perfectly hiding commitments to the votes, which are aggregated homomor-
phically. Instead of privacy depending upon a cryptographic hardness assumption, it is the integrity
of an election that depends upon a hardness assumption; and only a real-time compromise of the
assumption can have an impact.
2.4.3 Systemic Privacy Loss
We generally accept that without further information, a voter is more likely to have voted for a
candidate who has received more votes, but additional data is commonly released which can further
erode voter privacy. Even if we exclude privacy compromises, there are other privacy risks which
must be managed. If voters achieve privacy by encrypting their selections, the holders of decryption
keys can view their votes. If voters make their selections on devices out of their immediate control
(e.g. official election equipment), then it is difficult to assure them that these devices are not retaining
information that could later compromise their privacy. If voters make their selections on their own
devices, then there is an even greater risk that these devices could be infected with malware that
records (and perhaps even alters) their selections (see, for instance, the Estonian system [211]).
3A different Bernhard, somehow.
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2.4.4 Receipt-freeness
Preventing coercion and vote-selling was considered solved with the introduction of the Aus-
tralian ballot. The process of voting privately within a public environment where privacy can be
monitored and enforced prevents improper influence. Recent systems have complicated this notion,
however. If a voting protocol provides a receipt but is not carefully designed, the receipt can be a
channel for information to the coercive adversary.
Benaloh and Tuinstra [32] pointed out that passive privacy is insufficient for resisting coercion
in elections:
Definition 9. A voting system is receipt free if a voter is unable to prove how she voted even if she
actively colludes with a coercer and deviates from the protocol in order to try to produce a proof.
Traditional elections may fail receipt-freeness too. In general, if a vote consists of a long list of
choices, the number of possible votes may be much larger than the number of likely voters. This is
sometimes called (a failure of) the short ballot assumption [197]. Prior to each election, coercers
assign a particular voting pattern to each voter. When the individual votes are made public, any
voter who did not cast their pattern can then be found out. This is sometimes called the Italian
attack, after a once prevalent practice in Sicily. It can be easily mitigated when a vote can be broken
up, but is difficult to mitigate in systems like IRV in which the vote is complex but must be kept
together. Mitigations are discussed later on in Chapter V.
Incoercibility has been defined and examined in the universally composable framework in the
context of general multiparty computation [59, 228]. These definitions sidestep the question of
whether the voting function itself allows coercion (by publishing individual complex ballots, or
by revealing a unanimous result for example)—they examine whether the protocol introduces
additional opportunities for coercion. With some exceptions (such as [11]), they usually focus on a
passive notion of receipt-freeness, which is not strong enough for voting.
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2.4.5 Coercion Resistance
Schemes can be receipt-free, but not entirely resistant to coercion. Schemes like Preˆt a`
Voter [198] that rely on randomization for receipt-freeness can be susceptible to forced random-
ization, where a coercer forces a voter to always choose the first choice on the ballot. Due to
randomized candidate order, the resulting vote will be randomly distributed. If a specific group of
voters are coerced in this way, it can have a disproportionate impact on the election outcome. If
voting rolls are public and voting is not mandatory, this has an effect equivalent to forced abstention,
wherein a coercer refuses to let a voter vote. Schemes that rely on credentialing are also susceptible
to coercion by forced surrender of credentials.
One way to fully resist forced abstention is to obscure who voted. However, this is difficult to
reconcile with the opportunity to verify that only eligible voters have voted (eligibility verifiability),
though some schemes achieve both [109].
Moran and Naor [158] provide a strong definition of receipt freeness in which a voter may
deviate actively from the protocol in order to convince a coercer that she obeyed. Their model
accommodates forced randomization. A scheme is resistant to coercion if the voter can always
pretend to have obeyed while actually voting as she likes.
Definition 10. A voting scheme is coercion resistant if there exists a way for a coerced voter to
cast her vote such that her coercer cannot distinguish whether or not she followed the coercer’s
instructions.
Coercion resistance is defined in [125] to include receipt freeness and defence against forced-
randomization, forced abstention and the forced surrender of credentials. More general definitions
include [139], which incorporates all these attacks along with Moran and Naor’s notion of a coercion
resistance strategy.
Note that if the coercer can monitor the voter throughout the vote casting period, then resistance
is futile. For in-person voting, we assume that the voter is isolated from any coercer while she is in
the booth (although this is questionable in the era of mobile phones). For remote voting, we need
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to assume that voters will have some time when they can interact with the voting system (or the
credential-granting system) unobserved.
2.4.5.1 More Coercion Considerations
Some authors have tried to provide some protection against coercion without achieving full
coercion resistance. Caveat coercitor [107] proposes the notion of coercion evidence and allows
voters to cast multiple votes using the same credential. I develop a definition of coercion-hardness
in Chapter VII, where voters may be coerced, but not so much that it can overturn an election
outcome.
2.5 Other Security Considerations
Now that I have discussed what it means for elections to have integrity, verifiability, and privacy,
here I briefly cover some other facets that are just as important to carrying out a secure election.
Many of the topics discussed here are relatively understudied, and as we shall see in subsequent
chapters, these blind spots can have a dramatic impact on whether an election is secure in the real
world.
2.5.1 Voter Authentication
A significant challenge for election systems is the credentialing of voters to ensure that all
eligible voters, and no one else, can cast votes. This presents numerous questions: what kinds of
credentials should be used? How should they be issued? Can they be revoked or de-activated? Are
credentials good for a single election or for an extended period? How difficult are they to share,
transfer, steal, or forge? Can the ability to create genuine-looking forgeries help prevent coercion?
These questions must be answered carefully, and until they are satisfied for remote voting, pollsite
voting is the only robust way to address these questions—and even then, in-person credentialing
is subject to forgery, distribution, and revocation concerns (for instance, the Dominican Republic
recently held a pollsite election where voters openly sold their credentials [98]). In the U.S., there is
concern that requiring in-person credentialing, in the form of voter ID, disenfranchises legitimate
voters, and in recent years in vote-by-mail as well (which I discuss in Chapter VII).
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2.5.2 Availability
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is an ever-present threat to elections which can be mitigated but never
fully eliminated. A simple service outage can disenfranchise voters, and the threat of attack from
foreign state-level adversaries is a pressing concern. Indeed, one of the countries that regularly uses
Internet voting, Estonia, has been subject to malicious outages [225].
A variant of DoS specific to the context of elections is selective DoS, which presents a fun-
damentally different threat than general DoS. Voting populations are rarely homogeneous, and
disruption of service, for instance, in urban (or rural) areas can skew results and potentially change
election outcomes. If DoS cannot be entirely eliminated, can service standards be prescribed so that
if an outcome falls below the standards it is vacated? Should these standards be dependent on the
reported margin of victory? What, if any, recovery methods are possible? Because elections are
more vulnerable to minor perturbations than most other settings, selective DoS is a concern which
cannot be ignored.
2.5.3 Usability
A voting system must be usable by voters, poll-workers, election officials, observers, and so on.
Voters who may not be computer literate—and sometimes not literate at all—should be able to vote
with very low error rates. Although some error is regarded as inevitable, it is also critical that the
interface not drive errors in a particular direction. For instance, a list of candidates that crosses a
page boundary could cause the candidates on the second page to be missed [24]. Whatever security
mechanisms we add to the voting process should operate without degrading usability, otherwise the
resulting system will likely be unacceptable. A full treatment of usability in voting is beyond the
scope of this chapter. However, we note that E2E-V systems (and I-voting systems, even when not
E2E-V) add additional processes for voters and poll workers to follow. If verification processes
can’t be used properly by real voters, the outcome will not be properly verified. One great advantage
of statistical audits is to shift complexity from voters to auditors.
An historical example involves direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems, which were
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widely adopted by many voting jurisdictions in the United States after the year 2000 (and also
in places like India [247]). These systems are essentially computers that simulate a paper ballot
experience, allowing voters to make selections on a digital ballot. Everett et al. [96] showed that
“summary screens” with deliberately introduced errors are not noticed by greater than half of their
test subjects. If users’ attention to this detail were required in order to maintain system security,
then DRE summary screens cannot suffice. I discuss this further in Chapter IV.
2.5.4 Local Regulatory Requirements
A variety of other mechanical requirements are often imposed by legal requirements that vary
among jurisdictions. For example:
• Allowing voters to “write-in” vote for a candidate not listed on the ballot.
• Mandating the use of paper ballots (in some states without unique identifying marks or serial
numbers; in other states requiring such marks)
• Mandating the use of certain social choice functions (see 2.5.5 below).
• Supporting absentee voting.
• Requiring or forbidding “ballot rotation” (listing the candidates in different orders in different
jurisdictions).
• Requiring that voting equipment be certified under government guidelines.
2.5.5 Complex Election Methods
Many countries allow voters to select, score, or rank candidates or parties. Votes can then be
tallied in a variety of complex ways [50, 200]. None of the requirements for privacy, coercion-
resistance, or the provision of verifiable evidence change. However, many tools that achieve these
properties for traditional “first-past-the-post” elections need to be redesigned.
An election method might be complex at the voting or the tallying end. For example, party-
list methods such as D’Hondt and Sainte-Lague¨ have simple voting, in which voters select their
candidate or party, but complex proportional seat allocation. Borda, Range Voting, and Approval
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Voting allow votes to be quite expressive but are simple to tally by addition. Condorcet’s method
and related functions [204, 224] can be arbitrarily complex, as they can combine with any social
choice function. Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) are both
expressive and complicated to tally.
2.6 A Look Ahead
Now that we have examined some basic definitions of election security and the factors that
impact them, we can turn our discussion to practical examples. The key definitions that we will
examine in the rest of this work include software independence, verifiability, and coercion resistance.
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CHAPTER III
Why Paper Matters1
3.1 Introduction
As we have just discussed, elections that cannot provide sufficient evidence of their results
may fail to adequately gain public confidence in their outcomes. Numerous solutions have been
posited to this problem [35], but none has been as elegant, efficient, and immediately practical as
post-election audits [112, 143, 215]. These audits—in particular, ones that seek to limit the risk
of confirming an outcome that resulted from undue manipulation—are one of the most important
layers of defense for election security [160].
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) rely on sampling robust, independent evidence trails created by
voter-verified paper ballots. However, the practical constraints often faced in election jurisdictions,
coupled with the fact that the statistical knowledge required to implement RLAs correctly, make
implementing RLAs in a meaningful way difficult. Indeed, this has been borne out by the fact that
RLAs, though nearly fifteen years old at the time of writing, are only just now starting to gain
adoption in the U.S. and elsewhere.
However, other types of post-election audits have gained popularity in the marketplace in their
stead. In particular, Clear Ballot, an election technology vendor, pioneered audit software designed
to perform audits of images of ballots which have been scanned and tabulated, which we shall refer
1This chapter is based on “UnclearBallot: Automated Ballot Image Manipulation”, work in conjunction with
Kartikeya Kandula, Jeremy Wink, and J. Alex Halderman that appeared in International Joint Conference on Electronic
Voting [36]
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Figure 3.1: Attack overview — A voter’s paper ballot is scanned by a ballot tabulator, producing
a digital image. Malware in the tabulator—in our proof-of-concept, a microdriver that wraps the
scanner device driver—alters the ballot image before it is counted or stored. A digital audit shows
only the manipulated image.
to as “image audits”. Other vendors have adopted support for this kind of audit, and one U.S. state,
Maryland, relies on image audits to provide assurances of its election results [162].
While image audits can help detect human error and aid in adjudicating mismarked ballots, we
show that they cannot provide the same level of security assurance as audits of physical ballots.
Since ballot images are disconnected from the actual source of truth—physical paper ballots—
they do not necessarily provide reliable evidence of the outcome of an election under adversarial
conditions. To put it another way, as image audits fundamentally rely on software, they cannot
provide the software independence properties that audits of physical paper can.
In this chapter, we present UnclearBallot, an attack that defeats image audits by automatically
manipulating ballot images as they are scanned. This attack leverages the same computer vision
approaches used by ballot scanners to detect voter selections, but adds the ability to move marks
from one target area to another. The method is robust to inconsistent or invalid marks, and can be
adapted to many ballot styles.
We validate this attack against a corpus of over 180,000 ballot images from the 2018 election
in Clackamas County, Oregon, and find that UnclearBallot can move marks on 34% of the ballots
while leaving no visible anomalies. We also test the attack’s flexibility using six widely used styles
of paper ballots, and its robustness to invalid votes using an established taxonomy of voter marks.
As a proof-of-concept, we implement the attack in the form of a malicious Windows scanner driver,
which was tested using a commercial-off-the-shelf scanner certified for use in elections by the U.S.
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Election Assistance Commission.
UnclearBallot illustrates that post-election audits in traditional voting systems must involve
rigorous examination of physical ballots, rather than ballot images, if they are to provide a strong
security guarantee. Without an examination of the physical evidence, it will be difficult if not
impossible to assure that computer-based tampering has not occurred. Essentially this is a case-
study in how known election security techniques can be misapplied or misunderstood to provide
properties that they do not.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background on image
audits, ballot scanners, and image processing techniques used to implement the attack. Section 3.3
describes the attack scenarios against optical scanners and image audits. Section 3.4 explains the
methodology of the attack. In Section 3.5 we present data indicating that the attack can be robust to
various ballot styles and voter marks. Section 3.6 contextualizes our attack and discusses mitigations.
We conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Background
The attack takes advantage of two aspects of optical scanner image audits: the scanning and
image processing techniques used by scanners, and the reliance on scanned images by image audits
as the only source of truth. Here we provide a brief discussion of both.
3.2.1 Ballot Images
Jones [124] put forth an analysis of the way that ballot scanners work, particularly the mark-
sense variety that is most common today. All optical scanners currently sold to jurisdictions, as well
as the vast majority of scanners used in practice in the U.S., rely on mark-sense technology [234].
Scanners first create a high-resolution image of a ballot as it is fed past a scan head. Software then
analyzes the image to identify dark areas where marks have been made by the voter.2 Once marks
have been detected, systems may use template matching to translate marks into votes for specific
candidates, typically relying on a barcode or other identifier on the ballot that specifies a ballot style
2The details of how marks are identified vary by hardware and scanning algorithm. See [69] for an example.
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Figure 3.2: Terms for parts of a marked ballot, following Jones [124].
to match to the scanned image.
Detecting and interpreting voter marks can be a difficult process, as voters exhibit a wide
range of marking and non-marking behavior, including not filling in targets all the way, resting
their pens inside targets, or marking outside the target. The terms Jones developed to refer to
the ballot and marks are illustrated in Figure 3.2. Marks that adequately fill the target and are
unambiguously interpreted as votes by the scanner are called reliably sensed marks, and targets
that are unambiguously not filled and therefore not counted are reliably ignored marks. Marks of
other types are deemed marginal, as a scanner may read or ignore them. Moreover, whether a mark
should be counted as a vote is frequently governed by local election statute, so some marginal marks
may be unambiguously counted or ignored under the law, even if not by the scanner.
Bajcsy et al. [20] further develops a systematization of marginal marks and develops some
improvements on mark-detection algorithms to better account for them. An illustration of Bajcsy
et al.’s taxonomy is shown in Figure 3.3. Ji et al. [121] discuss different types of voter marks as
applied to write-in votes, as well as developing an automated process for detecting and tabulating
write-in selections.
3.2.2 Image Audits
Risk-limiting post-election audits rely on physical examination of a statistical sample of voter-
marked ballots [140, 142, 215, 217]. However, this can create logistical challenges for election
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Figure 3.3: Taxonomy of voter marks adapted from Bajcsy [20], including the five leftmost marks
that may be considered marginal marks.
officials, which has prompted some to propose relaxations to traditional audit requirements. To
reduce workload, canvass audits and recounts in many states rely on retabulation of ballots through
optical scanners (see the 2016 Wisconsin recount, for example [156]).
Some election vendors take retabulation audits a step further: rather than physically rescan
the ballots, the voting system makes available images of all the ballots for independent evaluation
after the election [73, 89, 226].3 While the exact properties of these kinds of image audits vary
by vendor, they typically rely on automatically retabulating all or some images of cast ballots, as
well as electronic adjudication for ballots with marginal marks. These “audits” never examine the
physical paper trail of ballots, which our attack exploits.
Several jurisdictions have relied on these image audits, including Cambridge, Ontario, which
used Dominion’s AuditMark [90], and the U.S. state of Maryland, which uses Clear Ballot’s
ClearAudit [153]. Maryland has also codified image audits into its election code, requiring that an
image audit be performed after every election [152].
3.3 Attack Scenarios
Elections in which voters make their selections on a physical ballot are frequently held as the
gold standard for conducting a secure election [160]. However, the property that contributes most to
their security, software independence [194], only exists if records computed by software are checked
against records that cannot be altered by software without detection. Image audits enable election
officials to view images of ballots and compare them with the election systems’ representation of
the particular ballot they are viewing (called a cast vote record or CVR). While these two trails
3While the review is made available to the public, the actual images themselves are seldom published in full out of
concern for voter anonymity.
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of evidence may be independent from each other (for example, Clear Ballot’s ClearAudit [73]
technology can be used to audit a tabulation performed by a different election system altogether),
they are not software independent. A clever attacker can exploit the reliance on software by both
evidence trails to defeat detection.
To successfully defend against an attack, an image audit must assume one of two things. If
ballot images are not considered the only source of truth for the election, and image audit must
assume an attacker cannot modify both the CVR (or other source of truth) and the ballot images in a
coordinated way. If, on the other hand, the ballot image is the sole source of truth, the image audit
must assume that ballot images cannot be altered in an undetectable way.
In either case, there are two outcomes an attacker can seek to achieve: changing the election
outcome to their preference, or disrupting the election from passing the audit without changing its
outcome. The latter requires the attacker to modify the election evidence trail in some way that is
detected by the audit, and such modification is a subset of the attack required to achieve the former.
As such, we will only focus on changing the election outcome.
An attacker can change the election outcome either with or without detection. In the case where
ballot images are the source of truth for an election, simply modifying the images to the attackers’
preferred outcome will be detected by the image audit and overturn the election result provided by
the tabulation software. The actions to achieve this are a subset of the actions required to change the
election outcome without detection, so we will only discuss ways to change the election outcome
without detection.
To surreptitiously change the outcome of the election in the presence of an image audit, the
attacker must alter both the tabulation result as well as the ballot images themselves. Researchers
have documented numerous vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker to infect voting equipment
and change tabulation results (see [18, 48, 155] among others), so we focus on the feasibility of
manipulating ballot images once an attacker has successfully infected a machine where they are
stored or processed.
The most straightforward attack scenario occurs when the ballot images are created by the
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same equipment that produces the CVR. In this case, the attacker can simply infect the scanner or
tabulator with malware that corrupts both the CVR and the images at the same time. The attack
could change the image before the tabulator processes it to generate the CVR, or directly alter both
sets of records.
In some jurisdictions, the ballot images that are audited are collected in a separate process
from tabulation—that is, by scanning the ballots again, as in Maryland’s use of ClearAudit from
2016 [153]. In this case, the adversary has to separately attack both processes, and has to coordinate
the cheating to avoid mismatches between the initial tally and the altered ballot images.
Depending on the timing of the audit, manipulation of ballot images need not be done on the fly.
For example, if the ballot images are created during tabulation but the image audit does not occur
until well after the election, an attacker could modify the ballot images while they are in storage.
For ease of explication, the discussion that follows assumes that ballot images are created at
the time of tabulation, in a single scan. The attack we develop targets a tabulation machine and
manipulates each ballot online as it is scanned.
3.4 Methodology
To automatically modify ballot images, an attacker can take a few approaches. One approach
would be to completely replace the ballot images with ballots filled in by the attacker. However,
this risks being detected if many ballots have the same handwriting, and requires sneaking these
relatively large data files into the election system without being detected. For these reasons, we
investigate an alternative approach: automatically and selectively doctoring the ballot scans to
change the vote selections they depict.
For the attack to work successfully, we need to move voter marks to other targets without
creating visible artifacts or inconsistencies. We must be able to dynamically detect target areas
and marks, alter marks in a way that is consistent with the voter’s other marks, and do so in a way
that is undetectable to the human eye. However, there is a key insight that works in the adversary’s
favor: an attacker seeking to alter election results does not have to be able to change all ballots
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undetectably, only sufficiently many to swing the result. This means that the attacker’s manipulation
strategy does not need to be able to change every mark—it merely has to reliably detect which
marks it can safely alter and change enough of them to decide the election result.
3.4.1 Reading the ballot
To interpret ballot information, we rely on the same techniques that ballot scanners use to
convert paper ballots into digital representations. Attackers have access to the ballot templates, as
jurisdictions publish sample ballots well ahead of scheduled elections. Using template matching, an
attacker does not have to perform any kind of sophisticated character recognition, they simply have
to find target areas and then detect which of the targets are filled.
Our procedure to read a ballot is illustrated in Figure 3.4. First, we perform template matching
to extract each individual race within a ballot. Next, we use OpenCV’s [49] implementation of the
Hough transform to detect straight lines that separate candidates and break the race into individual
panes for each candidate. Notably, the first candidate in each race may have the race title and extra
information in it (see Figure 3.4c), which is cropped out based on white space.
Target areas are typically printed on the ballot as either ovals or rectangles. To detect them, we
construct a bounding box around the target by scanning horizontally from the left of the race and
then vertically from the bottom up, and compute pixel density values. The bounds are set to the
coordinates where the density values first increase and last decrease. Once we have detected all the
target areas, we compute the average pixel density of the area within the bounding box to determine
whether or not a target area is marked. We then use our template to convert marks into votes for
candidates.
3.4.2 Changing marks
Once we have identified which candidate was marked by the voter, we can move the mark to
one of the other target locations we identified. If the vote is for a candidate the attacker would like
to receive fewer votes—or if it is not a vote for a candidate they would like to win—the attacker can
simply swap the pixels within the bounding boxes of the voter’s marked candidate and an unmarked
35
Figure 3.4: Ballot manipulation algorithm — First, (a) we apply template matching to extract the
race we intend to alter. Then, (b) we use Hough line transforms to separate each candidate. If the
first candidate has a race title box, (c) we remove it by computing the pixel intensity differences
across a straight line swept vertically from the bottom. For each candidate, (d) we identify the target
and mark (if present) by doing four linear sweeps and taking pixel intensity. Finally, (e) we identify
and move the mark. At each step we apply tests to detect and skip ballots where the algorithm might
leave artifacts.
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Figure 3.5: Automatically moving voter marks — UnclearBallot seamlessly moves marks to the
attacker’s preferred candidate while preserving the voter’s marking style. It is effective for a wide
variety of marks and ballot designs. In the examples above, original ballot scans are shown on the
left and manipulated images on the right.
candidate. By moving marks on each ballot separately, we ensure that the voter’s particular style
of filling in an oval is preserved and consistent across the ballot. Figure 3.5 shows some marks
swapped by our algorithm, and how the voters original mark is completely preserved in the process.
3.4.3 UnclearBallot
To illustrate the attack, we created UnclearBallot, a proof-of-concept implementation packaged
as a malicious Windows scanner driver, which consists of 398 lines of C++ and Python. We tested
it with a Fujistu fi-7180 scanner (shown in Figure 3.6), which is federally certified for use in U.S.
elections as part of Clear Ballot’s ClearVote system [231]. These scanners are typically used to
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Figure 3.6: The Fujitsu fi-7180 scanner we used
to test our attack has been certified by the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission for use in voting
systems. Our proof-of-concept implementation is
a malicious scanner driver that alters ballots on
the fly.
handle small volumes of absentee ballots, and must be attached to a Windows workstation that runs
the tabulation software.
The UnclearBallot driver wraps the stock scanner driver and alters images from the scanner
before they reach the election management application. We chose this approach for simplicity, as
the Windows driver stack is relatively easy to work with, but the attack could also be implemented at
other layers of the computing stack. For instance, it could be even harder to detect if implemented as
a malicious change to the scanner’s embedded firmware. Alternatively, it could could be engineered
as a modification to the tabulation software itself.
Once a ballot is scanned, the resulting bitmap is sent to our image processing software, which
manipulates the ballot in the way described in Section 3.4.1. Prior to the election, the attacker
specifies the ballot template, which race they would like to affect, and by how much. While ballots
are being scanned, the software keeps a running tally of the actual ballot results, and changes ballot
images on the fly to achieve the desired election outcome. To avoid detection, attackers can specify
just enough manipulated images so that the race outcome is changed.
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluated the performance and effectiveness of UnclearBallot using two sets of experiments.
In the first set of experiments, we marked different ballot styles by hand using types of marks
taxonomized by Bajcsy et al. [20]. In the second set of experiments, we processed 181,541 ballots
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from the 2018 election in Clackamas County, Oregon.
3.5.1 Testing Across Ballot Styles
In order for our application to succeed at its goal (surreptitiously changing enough scanned
ballots to achieve a chosen election outcome), it must be able to detect marks that constitute valid
votes as well as distinguish marks which would be noticeable if moved. The marks in the latter case
represent a larger set than just marginal marks, as they may indeed be completely valid votes, but
considered invalid by our mark-moving algorithm. For example, if we were to swap the targets on a
ballot where the user put a check through their target, we may leave a significant percentage of the
check around the original target when swapping. The same applies for marked ballots where the
filled in area extends into the candidate’s name, which could lead our algorithm to swap over parts
of the candidate’s name when manipulating the image.
To detect anomalies for invalid ballots, we leverage the same intensity checking algorithm that
first found the marked areas. The program checks if the width or height is abnormally large, which
would indicate an overfilled target, as well as if there are too few or too many areas of high intensity,
which would indicate no target or too many targets are filled out. If the program detects an invalid
ballot, it will not be modified by the program.
To show our attack is replicable on a variety of different ballot styles, we modified our program
to work on six different sample ballot styles, shown in Figure 3.7. The ballots we tested come from
the four largest election vendors in the U.S. (ES&S, Hart InterCivic, Dominion, and Clear Ballot),
as well as two older styles of ballots from Hart and Diebold.
Our first experiment was designed to characterize the technique’s effectiveness across a range of
ballot styles and with both regular and marginal marks. We prepared 720 marked contests, split
evenly among the six ballot styles shown in Figure 3.7. For each style, we marked 60 contests with
what Bajcsy [20] calls “Filled” marks, i.e. reliably detected marks that should be moved by our
attack. We marked another 60 ballots in each ballot style with marginal marks, ten each for the five
kinds of marginal marks shown in Figure 3.2 and ten empty marks.
Because the runtime of the template matching step of our algorithm is highly dependent on
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Figure 3.7: Ballots Styles — We tested ballot designs from five U.S. voting system vendors: Clear
Ballot, Diebold, Dominion, ES&S, and Hart (two styles, eScan and Verity).
customization for the particular races on a ballot, we opted to skip it for this experiment. Rather than
marking full ballots, we marked cropped races from each ballot style and then ran them through our
program. We then manually checked to ensure that the races the program moved were not detectable
by inspection. Results for these experiments are shown in Table 3.1.
Despite rejecting some valid ballots, our program is still able to confidently swap a majority of
valid votes. In a real attack, only a small percentage of votes would need to actually be modified, a
task easily accomplished by our program. Our program also correctly catches all votes that we have
deemed invalid for swapping. This would make it unlikely to be detected in an image audit.
Dominion ballots saw a much higher rate of invalid mark moving, and Diebold and Dominion
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Ballot Style
Invalid Marks Valid Marks
Time/Success
Skipped Success Failure Skipped Success Failure
Clear Ballot 55 5 0 26 34 0 25 ms
Diebold 60 0 0 6 54 0 11 ms
Dominion 38 22 0 7 53 0 30 ms
ES&S 52 8 0 29 31 0 54 ms
Hart (eScan) 60 0 0 38 22 0 46 ms
Hart (Verity) 60 0 0 27 33 0 21 ms
Table 3.1: Performance of UnclearBallot — We tested how accurately our software could manipu-
late voter marks for a variety of ballot styles using equal numbers of invalid and valid marks. The
table shows how often the system skipped a mark, successfully altered one, or erroneously created
artifacts we deemed to be visible upon manual inspection. We also report the mean processing time
for successfully manipulated races, excluding template matching.
ballots saw a much higher rate of valid mark moving. This is likely due to the placement of targets:
on the Dominion ballots, the mark is right justified, separating it significantly from candidate label
information, as can be seen in Figure 3.7. Similarly, the Diebold ballot provides more space around
the target and less candidate information that can be intercepted by marks, which would cause
Unclear Ballot to skip moving the mark.
In an online attack scenario (such as if a human is waiting to see the output from the scanner),
the attacker needs to be able to modify ballot scans quickly enough not to be noticed. Factors
which might affect how quickly our program can process and manipulate ballots include ballot style,
layout, and type of mark. During the accuracy experiment just described, we collected timing data
for successfully manipulated ballot, and report the results in Table 3.1. The results show that after
the target race has been extracted, the algorithm completes extremely quickly for all tested ballot
styles. We present additional timing data at the end of the following section.
3.5.2 Testing with Real Voted Ballots
To assess the effectiveness of UnclearBallot in a real election, we used a corpus of scans of
181,541 real ballots from the November 6, 2018, General Election in Clackamas County, Oregon,
which were made available by Election Integrity Oregon [93]. Like all of Oregon, Clackamas
41
Original Manipulated
Figure 3.8: Attacking Real Ballots — Using 181,541 images of voted ballots from Clackamas
County, Oregon, we attempted to change voters’ selections for the ballot measure shown above.
UnclearBallot determined that it could safely alter 34% of the ballots. For reference, Measure 102
passed by a margin of 5%, well within range of manipulation [70]. We inspected 1,000 of them to
verify that the manipulation left no obvious artifacts.
County uses vote-by-mail as its primary voting method, and votes are centrally counted using
optical scanners. All images were Hart Verity-style ballots, as shown in Figure 3.7.
We selected a ballot measure that appeared on all the ballots (Figure 3.8) and attempted to
change each voter’s selection. UnclearBallot rejected 20,117 (11%) of the ballots because it could
not locate the target contest. We examined a subset of the rejected ballots and found that they
contained glitches introduced during scanning (such as vertical lines running the length of the
ballot), which interfered with the Hough transform.
To simulate a real attacker, we configured UnclearBallot with conservative parameters, so that
it would only modify marks when there was high confidence that the alteration would not be
42
noticeable. As a result, it would only manipulate marks that were nearly perfectly filled in. In
most cases, marks that were skipped extended well beyond the target, but the program also skipped
undervotes, overvotes, or mislabeled scans. Under these parameters, the program altered the target
contest in 62,400 (34%) of the ballot images.
Two authors independently inspected a random sample of 1,000 altered ballots to check whether
any contained artifacts that would be noticeable to an attentive observer. Such artifacts might
include marks which were unnaturally cut off, visible discontinuities in pixel darkness (i.e. dark
lines around moved marks), and so on. If these artifacts were seen during an audit, officials might
recheck all of the physical ballots and reverse the effects of the attack. None of the altered ballots
we inspected contained noticeable evidence of manipulation.
We also collected timing data while processing Clackamas County ballots. Running on a system
with a 4-core Intel E3–1230 CPU running at 3.40 GHz with 64 GB of RAM, UnclearBallot took an
average of 279 ms to process each ballot. For reference, Hart’s fastest central scanner’s maximum
scan rate is one ballot per 352 ms [203], well above the time needed to carry out our attack.
These results show that UnclearBallot can successfully and efficiently manipulate ballot images
to change real voters’ marks. Moreover, the alterations likely would be undetectable to human
auditors who examined only the ballot images.
3.6 Discussion and Mitigations
UnclearBallot demonstrates the need for a software-independent evidence trail against which
election results can be checked. It shows that audits based on software which is independent from
the rest of the election system is still not software independent. To date, the only robust and secure
election technology that is widely used is optical-scan paper ballots with risk-limiting audits based
on a robust, well-maintained, physical audit trail. However, image audits are not useless, and here
we discuss uses for them as well as potential mitigations for our attack.
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3.6.1 Uses for image audits.
So long as image audits are not the sole mechanism for verifying election results, they do provide
substantial benefits to election officials. Using an image audit vastly simplifies some functions
of election administration, like ballot adjudication in cases where marks cannot be interpreted by
scanners or are otherwise ambiguous. Image audits can be used to efficiently identify and document
election discrepancies, as has occurred in Maryland where nearly 2,000 ballots were discovered
missing from the audit trail in 2016 [153]. Image audits also identified a flaw in the ES&S DS850
high speed scanner, where it was causing some ballots to stick together and feed two at a time [154].
Another way to utilize image audits is a transitive audit. Methods like SOBA [30] seek to
construct an audit trail using all available means of election evidence, rooting the audit in some
verification of physical record. By using physical records to verify other records, like CVRs or
ballot images, confidence in election outcomes can be transitively passed on to non-physical audit
trails. The drawback with this kind of audit is that it usually requires the same level of work as an
RLA, plus whatever work is needed to validate the other forms of evidence. However, since ballot
image audits already require a low amount of effort, they may augment RLAs and provide better
transparency into the auditing process.
Image audits are an augmentation and a convenience for election administration, however,
and should not be viewed as a security tool. Only physical examination of paper ballots, as in a
risk-limiting audit, can provide a necessary level of mitigation to manipulated election results.
3.6.2 End-to-end (E2E) systems.
Voting systems with rigorous integrity properties and tamper resistance such as Scantegrity [60]
and Preˆt a` Voter [198] provide a defense to UnclearBallot. In Scantegrity, when individuals mark
their ballots, a confirmation code is revealed that is tied to the selected candidate. This enables a
voter to verify that their ballot is collected-as-cast and counted-as-collected, as they can look up
their ballot on a public bulletin board. Since each mark reveals a unique code, moving the mark
would match the code with the wrong candidate, so voters would be unable to verify their ballots. If
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enough voters complain, this might result in our attack being detected.
Preˆt a` Voter randomizes the candidate order on each ballot, which creates a slightly higher barrier
for our attack, as an additional template matching step would be needed to ascertain candidate order.
More importantly, the candidate list is physically separated from the voter’s marks upon casting the
ballot, so malware which could not keep track of the correct candidate order could not successfully
move marks to a predetermined candidate. Since the candidate order is deciphered via a key-sharing
scheme, malicious software would have to infect a significant portion of the election system and
act in a highly coordinated way to reconstruct candidate ordering. Moreover, as with Scantegrity,
votes are published to a public bulletin board, so any voter could discover if their vote had not been
correctly recorded.
Other E2E systems which make use of optical scanning and a bulletin board, like STAR-
Vote [26], Scratch and Vote [8], and VeriScan [29], are similarly protected from attacks like
UnclearBallot.
3.6.3 Other mitigations.
Outside of E2E, there may be other heuristic mitigations that can be easily implemented even
in deployed voting systems to make our attack somewhat more difficult. As mentioned above,
randomizing candidate order on each ballot increases the computation required to perform our
attack. Voters drawing outside the bubbles can also defeat our attack, though this might also result
in their votes not counting and may be circumvented by replacing the whole race on the ballot
image with a substituted one. Collecting ballot images from a different source than the tabulator
makes our attack more difficult, as votes now have to be changed in two places. Other standard
computer security technologies, like secure file systems, could be used to force the attacker to alter
ballot images in a way that also circumvents protections like encryption and permissions.
3.6.4 Detection.
Technologies that detect image manipulation may also provide some mitigation. Techniques
like those discussed in [21–23, 213], among others, could be adapted to try to automatically detect
45
moved marks on ballots. However, as noted by Farid [97], image manipulation detection is a kind
of arms race: given a fixed detection algorithm, adversaries can very likely find a way to defeat it.
In our context, an attacker with sufficient access to the voting system to implant a manipulation
algorithm would likely also be able to to steal the detector code. The attacker could improve the
manipulation algorithm or simply use the detector as part of their mark-moving calculus: if moving
a mark will trip the detector, an attacker can simply opt not to move the mark.
While a fixed and automatic procedure for detecting manipulation can provide little assurance,
it remains possible that an adaptive approach to detection could be a useful part of a post-election
forensics investigation. However, staying one step ahead of sophisticated adversaries would require
an ongoing research program to advance the state of the art in detection methods.
A less costly and more dependable way to detect ballot manipulation detection would be to use
a software independent audit trail to confirm election outcomes. This can be accomplished with
risk-limiting audits, and the software independence enabled by RLAs provides other robust security
properties to elections, including defending against other potential attacks on tabulation equipment
and servers.
3.6.5 Future work.
We have only focused on simple-majority elections here, because those are the kinds of elections
used by jurisdictions that do image audits. Audits of more complex election methods, like instant-
runoff voting or D’Hondt, have been examined to some extent [202, 220], but future work is needed
into audits of these kinds of elections altogether. Because the marks made in these elections are
different than the kind we’ve discussed here, manipulation of these ballot images may not be able
to employ the same image processing techniques we have used. Additionally it may be difficult
for malware to know how many marks it needs to move, since margins in complex elections are
difficult to compute. We leave exploration of image manipulation of these elections to future work.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated an attack that defeats ballot image audits of the type performed
in some jurisdictions. We presented an implementation using a real scanner, and evaluated our
implementation against a set of real ballots and a set of systematically marked ballots from a variety
of ballot styles. Our attack shows that image audits cannot be relied upon to verify that elections are
free from computer-based interference. Indeed, the only currently known way to verify an election
outcome is with direct examination of physical ballots. In order to secure an election, physical paper
ballots are necessary.
We have also noted that the right election security tools, in this case auditing, can still go awry
when their motivations and requirements are not met. Image audits do in a sense rely on paper
ballots, but not in the right way. As we shall see in the next chapter, correctly using a paper ballot
is even more nontrivial than just auditing the physical paper. Having paper and auditing it is not
enough; ballots must also be voter-verified.
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CHAPTER IV
Voter-verified Paper1
4.1 Introduction
As we have just seen, paper ballots are essential to providing robust security for elections.
Recent threats of election hacking by hostile nations has prompted a major push to ensure that all
voting systems in the United States have voter-verifiable paper trails, a move recommended by
the National Academies [160], the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [227], and nearly all
election security experts. Guided by past research [26], some states and localities are implementing
paper trails by deploying ballot-marking devices (BMDs). In these systems, the voter makes
selections on a computer kiosk, which prints a paper ballot that the voter can review before inserting
it into a computer scanner to be counted [233]. BMDs have long been used as assistive devices for
voters with disabilities, and a growing number of jurisdictions are purchasing them for use by all
voters [99, 101, 161].
BMDs have the potential to provide better security than direct-recording electronic voting
machines (DREs), which maintain the primary record of the voter’s selections in a computer database
and often lack a voter-verifiable paper trail. Numerous studies have demonstrated vulnerabilities in
DREs that could be exploited to change election results (e.g., [18, 48, 131, 155]). In contrast, BMDs
produce a physical record of every vote that can, in principle, be verified by the voter and manually
1This chapter is based on “Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot-marking Devices?”, work in
conjunction with Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Kevin Chang, and J. Alex Halderman that
appeared in Proceedings of the 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [37]
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audited by officials to confirm or correct the initial electronic results.
However, BMDs do not eliminate the risk of vote-stealing attacks. Malware could infect the
ballot scanners and change the electronic tallies—although this could be detected by rigorously
auditing the paper ballots [215]—or it could infect the BMDs themselves and alter what gets printed
on the ballots. This latter variety of cheating cannot be detected by a post-election audit, since
the paper trail itself would be wrong, and it cannot be ruled out by pre-election or parallel testing,
though those techniques may provide some mitigation [218, 242]. Instead, BMD security relies on
voters themselves detecting such an attack. This type of human-in-the-loop security is necessary
in many systems where detection and prevention of security hazards cannot be automated [82].
However, as several commentators have recently pointed out [15, 86, 218], its effectiveness in the
context of BMDs has not been established.
Whether such a misprinting attack would succeed without detection is highly sensitive to how
well voters verify their printed ballots. Every voter who notices that their ballot is misprinted and
asks to correct it both adds to the evidence that there is a problem and requires the attacker to
change an additional ballot in order to overcome the margin of victory. Consider a contest with a
1% margin in which each polling place has 1000 voters. If voters correct 20% of misprinted ballots,
minimal outcome-changing fraud will result in an average of 1.25 voter complaints per polling
place—likely too few to raise alarms. If, instead, voters correct 80% of misprinted ballots, polling
places will see an average of 20 complaints, potentially prompting an investigation. (We model
these effects in Section 4.5.) Despite this sensitivity, voters’ BMD verification performance has
never before been experimentally measured.
In this chapter, we study whether voters can play a role in BMD security. We first seek to
establish, in a realistic polling place environment, the rates at which voters attempt to verify their
printed ballots and successfully detect and report malicious changes. To measure these rates, we
used real touch-screen voting machines that we modified to operate as malicious BMDs. We
recruited 241 participants in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and had them vote in a realistic mock polling
place using the ballot from the city’s recent midterm election. On every ballot that our BMDs
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printed, one race was changed so the printout did not reflect the selection made by the participant.
We found that, absent interventions, only 40% of participants reviewed their printed ballots at
all, only 6.6% reported the error to a poll worker, and only 7.8% correctly identified the error on
an exit survey. These results accord with prior studies that found poor voter performance in other
election security contexts, such as DRE review screens [6, 58] and voter-verifiable paper audit trails
(VVPATs) [205]. The low rate of error detection indicates that misprinting attacks on BMDs pose a
serious risk.
The risks notwithstanding, BMDs do offer practical advantages compared to hand-marked paper
ballots. They allow voters of all abilities to vote in the same manner, provide a more user-friendly
interface for voting, and more easily support complex elections like those conducted in multiple
languages or with methods such as ranked choice [185]. BMDs also simplify election administration
in places that use vote centers [233], which have been shown to reduce election costs and lower
provisional voting rates [120, 181], as well as in jurisdictions that employ early voting, which can
improve access to the ballot [127].
Given these advantages and the fact that BMDs are already in use, the second goal of our study
was to determine whether it might be possible to boost verification performance through procedural
changes. We tested a wide range of interventions, such as poll worker direction, instructional
signage, and usage of a written slate of choices provided to each voter.
The rate of error detection varied widely with the type of intervention we applied, ranging from
6.7% to 86% in different experiments. Several interventions boosted review rates and discrepancy
reporting. Verbally encouraging participants to review their printed ballot after voting boosted
the detection rate to 14% on average. Using post-voting verbal instructions while encouraging
participants to vote a provided list of candidates raised the rate at which voters reported problems to
73% for voters who did not deviate from the provided slate.
These findings suggest that well designed procedures can have a sizable impact on the real-world
effectiveness of voter verification. We make several recommendations that election officials who
already oversee voting on BMDs can employ immediately, including asking voters if they have
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reviewed their ballots before submission, promoting the use of slates during the voting process,
informing voters that if they find an error in the printout they can correct it, and tracking the rate of
reported errors. Our recommendations echo similar findings about the most effective ways to alert
users to other security hazards (i.e., in context [51] and with active alerts [92]) and redirect them to
take action.
Although our findings may be encouraging, we strongly caution that much additional research
is necessary before it can be concluded that any combination of procedures actually achieves high
verification performance in real elections. Until BMDs are shown to be effectively verifiable during
real-world use, the safest course for security is to prefer hand-marked paper ballots.
Road Map Section 4.2 provides more background about human factors and security and about
previous work studying the role of voter verification in election security. Section 4.3 describes
our experimental setup, voting equipment, and study design. Section 4.4 presents our results and
analyzes their significance. Section 4.5 provides a quantitative model for BMD verification security.
Section 4.6 discusses the results, avenues for future work, and recommendations for improving the
verifiability of BMDs. We conclude in Section 4.7.
4.2 Background and Related Work
4.2.1 Human-Dependent Security
Secret ballot elections fundamentally depend on having humans in the loop—as Stark [218]
notes, the voter is the only one who knows whether the ballot represents their intended vote—and
the success or failure of election security has the potential to have history-altering effects. The
type of risk posited by Stark, wherein voters do not check their paper ballots to ensure the BMD
has correctly represented their selections, is a post-completion error [55], in which a user makes a
mistake (or fails to verify the correctness of something) after they have completed the main goal of
their task. Voters who forget or do not know to verify the correctness of a paper ballot after they
have entered their selections on a BMD miss a critical step in ensuring the accuracy of their vote:
that it was cast-as-intended. We therefore explore how to communicate this risk to voters.
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Cranor [82] describes five ways that designers can communicate risk to a user who needs to
make security decisions:
1. Warnings: indication the user should take immediate action
2. Notices: information to allow the user to make a decision
3. Status indicators: indication of the status of the system
4. Training: informing users about risks and mitigations before interaction
5. Policies: rules with which users are expected to comply
Implementing indicators that reveal meaningful information to voters about the security status
of a BMD would be next to impossible, as security issues are often unknown or unforeseen to the
operators. Although voter education about the importance of verification might be an effective form
of training, significant coordination would be necessary to enact such a scheme at scale. Therefore,
we focus in this study on the effectiveness of warnings issued through poll worker scripts and
polling place signage.
A warning serves two purposes: to alert users to a hazard, and to change their behavior to
account for the hazard [246]. There are many barriers to humans correctly and completely heeding
security warnings. Wogalter proposes the Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP)
Model [245] to systematically identify the process an individual must go through for a warning to
be effective. The warning must capture and maintain attention, which may be difficult for voters
who are attempting to navigate the voting process as quickly as possible. Warnings must also be
comprehensible, communicate the risks and consequences, be consistent with the individual’s beliefs
and attitudes toward the risk, and motivate the individual to change—all of which are substantial
impediments in an environment with little to no user training and such a broad user base as voting.
To maximize effectiveness, warnings should be contextual, containing as little information
as necessary to convey the risk and direct individuals to correct behavior [51, 245]. Voters are
essentially election security novices; Bravo-Lillo et al. [51] found that, in the context of computer
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security, advanced and novice users respond to warnings differently. Most significantly, novice
users assessed the hazard after taking action, whereas advanced users assessed the hazard before
engaging in the activity.
There may be effective ways to improve voter verification performance. Many studies have
applied lessons from Cranor, Wogalter, and Bravo-Lillo et al. to help humans make secure choices in
different contexts, including phishing [92,180], browser warnings [9,187,221], app permissions [10,
179], and operating system interfaces [52]. In the context of phishing warnings, for example,
Egelman et al. [92] found that users were far more likely to heed an active warning, or a warning
that disrupted their workflow, than a passive warning. This suggests that similar interventions
applied in a polling place may have a significant effect on voters’ ability to review and verify their
BMD ballots.
Our study contributes to this literature by exploring the effects of several modalities of warnings
(oral and visual) on human detection of malicious ballot modification.
4.2.2 Usable Voting Systems
The usability of various kinds of election technology has been extensively studied, primarily
to determine how well voters can use voting equipment. Olembo and Volkamer [174] provide an
excellent overview of the space, along with recommendations for designing voting usability studies.
Quesenbery [184] also provided earlier guidelines for usability studies of voting equipment.
In 2003, Bederson et al. [24] studied the usability of deployed electronic voting systems in
Maryland via expert review and field study. Conrad et al. [78] later performed laboratory experiments
with six models of voting equipment. In the last decade, Byrne et al. performed multiple experiments
establishing baseline data for various types of voting systems [56], as did Greene et al. [106]. Everett
et al. assessed the usability of paper ballots [95] and electronic voting [96]. Herrnson et al. also
performed extensive analysis of the usability of electronic voting systems [116–119].
Most of these studies focus on in-precinct voting systems, which require a voter to vote in-
person. In addition, there are numerous works on the usability of end-to-end cryptographic voting
schemes [2, 3, 5] and Internet voting schemes [87, 150, 151]. Acemyan et al. [4] also performed
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usability studies of other parts of the voting process, like precinct layout, and Belton et al. [27]
examined the usability of ballot boxes. Acemyan et al. [5] examined the usability of STAR-Vote [26],
an academic effort to produce a secure and usable BMD.
4.2.3 Voter-Verifiable Paper and Ballot-Marking Devices
A guiding principle in election security is that voting systems should be software indepen-
dent [194]: that is, any software errors or attacks that change the reported election outcome should
be detectable. Bernhard et al. [35] note that elections backed by a voter-verifiable paper record are
currently the only known way to provide robust software independence. Like BMDs, voter-verifiable
paper audit trails (VVPATs) and hand-marked paper ballots are widely used in an attempt to achieve
software independence. However, each poses a different set of usability and accessibility challenges.
Hand-marked paper ballots record the voter’s selections without the risk of having a potentially
compromised computer mediating the process. However, voters can make mistakes when filling out
ballots by hand that can lead to them being counted incorrectly or ruled invalid [106]. Moreover,
many voters have difficulty marking a paper ballot by hand due to a disability or a language
barrier. Ballots in the U.S. are among the most complex in the world, further magnifying these
difficulties [164].
VVPAT technology also suffers from noted usability, privacy, and auditability problems [104].
Most implementations consist of clunky printer attachments for DREs that are difficult for voters to
read, record votes in the order in which they are cast, and use a fragile paper tape. In laboratory
studies, Selker et al. [205] and de Jong et al. [84] found that voters frequently did not review the
VVPAT, with Selker finding that only 17% of voters detected changes between the selections they
made on the DRE and those printed on the VVPAT. While there has been some criticism of Selker’s
findings and methodology [186, 206], their results broadly comport with work by Campbell et
al. [58] and Acemyan et al. [6] about voters’ ability to detect errors introduced in DRE review
screens. The latter found that only 12–40% of participants successfully detected such errors.
In part due to the concerns raised by these studies, BMDs have become a popular choice for new
voting system deployments in the United States. South Carolina and Georgia, together comprising
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nearly 9 million voters, recently adopted BMDs statewide [99, 101], as have several counties and
cities, including Los Angeles County, the largest single election jurisdiction in the U.S. [238].
There has been vigorous debate among election security experts as to whether BMDs can
provide software-independence and election security overall (e.g., [15, 86, 218, 242]). However, the
discussion has yet to be informed by rigorous experimental data. Our work seeks to fill that gap by
contributing the first human-subjects study to directly measure the verification performance of voters
using BMDs under realistic conditions and with a variety of potential procedural interventions.
After our work was published, Kortum, Byrne, and Whitmore publish results from a similar
study [132]. Their methodology differed in their experimental setup, as they relied on a laboratory
setting rather than a precinct-like environment we attempted to create. The ballot design and voting
interfaced used by Kortum et al. is likely more usable than our setup, as it was based on more
modern technology developed for L.A. County’s VSAP project [238], though they also tested a
ballot styled after the ES&S ExpressVote system, which may be less usable than the ballots we
tested. They examined a much longer ballot than ours, with 40 races, as well as a shorter ballot with
just five. Kortum et al. also varied the number of changes they made, ranging from one flip like our
study to flipping 40% of the ballot, as well as which part of the ballot the flips were located. They
also examined two different instruction sets for voters. Their results largely comport with ours, and
I note the relevant details below as applicable.
4.3 Materials and Methods
Our goals in this work were to empirically assess how well voters verify BMD ballots and
whether there are steps election officials can take that will enhance verification performance.
To these ends, we conducted a between-subjects study where we tested several hypotheses in a
simulated polling place, following the best practices recommended by Olembo et al. [174] for
election human-factors research. The study design was approved by our IRB.
We sought to answer several questions, all of which concern the rate at which voters are able to
detect that a BMD-printed ballot shows different selections than those the voter picked:
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Figure 4.1: Polling Place Setup. We established mock polling places at two public libraries in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, with three BMDs (left) and an optical scanner and ballot box (right). Library
visitors were invited to participate in a study about a new kind of election technology. The BMDs
were DRE voting machines that we modified to function as malicious ballot marking devices.
• What is the base rate of error detection?
• Is error detection impacted by:
– Ballot style?
– Manipulation strategy?
– The manipulated race’s position on the ballot?
– Signage instructing voters to review their ballots?
– Poll worker instructions?
– Providing a slate of candidates for whom to vote?
In order to answer these questions in an ecologically valid way, we attempted to create an
environment that closely resembled a real polling place. Nevertheless, it is impossible for any
experiment to fully recreate what is at stake for voters in a real election, and so study participants
may have behaved differently than voters do in live election settings. We went to extensive lengths
to mitigate this limitation, and we find some data to support that we did so successfully (see
Section 4.6.1). We used real (though modified) voting machines, printers and paper stock from
deployed BMD systems, a ballot from a real election, and ballot styles from two models of BMDs.
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We conducted the study at two city library locations, one of which is used as a polling place during
real elections.
4.3.1 The Polling Place
To provide a realistic voting experience, we structured our simulated polling place like a
typical BMD-based poll site. Three investigators served as poll workers, following the script in
Appendix 1.1. Library patrons who were interested in voting began at a check-in table, where they
were greeted by Poll Worker A and asked to sign an IRB-approved consent form. Participants were
told they would be taking part in “a study about the usability of a new type of voting machine” and
instructed on how to use the equipment, but they were not alerted that the study concerned security
or that the BMDs might malfunction.
Each participant received a voter access card with which to activate a BMD and was free to
choose any unoccupied machine. There were three identical BMDs, as shown in Figure 4.1. On the
last day of the study, one machine’s memory became corrupted, and it was removed from service;
all votes that day were recorded on the other two machines.
The BMDs displayed contests in a fixed order, and voters made selections using a touch screen
interface. After the last contest, the machines showed a review screen that accurately summarized
the voter’s selections and highlighted any undervotes. The voter could return to any contest to
change the selections. A “Print Ballot” button ended the voting session and caused a printer under
the machine to output the paper ballot.
Participants carried their ballot across the polling place to the ballot scanner station, where they
inserted them into an optical scanner that deposited them into a ballot box. Poll Worker B was
stationed by the scanner and offered instructions if necessary. Next, the poll worker collected the
voter access card and asked each participant to complete an exit survey using a laptop next to the
scanning station. The survey was anonymous, but responses were keyed so that we could associate
them with the voter’s on-screen selections, their printed ballot, and poll worker notes.
Poll Worker C, positioned separately from the other stations, acted as an observer. They verified
that participants moved through the polling place stations sequentially, noted whether they spent
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time reviewing their printed ballots, and recorded whether they appeared to notice any abnormalities.
The observer was also tasked with noting participant behavior, specifically how the participants
completed each step in the voting process and any comments they made. The observer was available
to answer participant questions and was frequently the poll worker participants approached upon
noticing a discrepancy.
Like in a real polling place, multiple participants could progress through the voting process
simultaneously. Occasionally a one- or two-person line formed as participants waited to use the
BMDs or the ballot scanner.
4.3.2 The Voting Machines
BMD voting systems are currently produced by several voting machine manufacturers, the
largest of which is ES&S. Over a six month period, we repeatedly attempted to engage ES&S in
discussions about acquiring samples of their equipment for this study. However, these attempts
were ultimately not fruitful.
Instead, we utilized AccuVote TSX DRE voting machines, which we purchased on eBay and
modified to function as BMDs. The TSX was first produced by Diebold in 2003 and is still
widely deployed today. At least 15 states plan to use it in at least some jurisdictions in November
2020 [234].
The TSX runs Windows CE and is designed to function as a paperless DRE or a VVPAT system.
We developed software modifications that allow it to print ballots in multiple styles using an external
printer. This effectively converts the TSX into a BMD—and one we could easily cause to be
dishonest—while preserving the original touch-screen interface used by voters.
In order to modify the machine, we built on techniques used by Feldman et al. [18]. We began
by patching the firmware so that, when the machine boots, it attempts to execute a program provided
on an external memory card. We used this functionality to launch a remote access tool we created,
which allowed us to connect to the TSX over a network and perform file system operations, run
applications, and invoke a debugger.
The TSXes in our polling place were connected to an Ethernet switch using PCMCIA network
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adapters. A Python program, running on a computer on the same network, used the remote access
tool’s API to poll each machine for newly voted ballots. Whenever a ballot was cast, the program
parsed the selections, generated a PDF file based on them, and sent it to a printer located underneath
the appropriate voting machine. The program could be configured to apply different ballot styles
and cheating strategies, depending on the experiment.
For every ballot, the program randomly selected one race to manipulate. In most experiments,
selections could be changed in three ways: deselection in a voted-for race, selection in an unvoted-
for race, or changing a selection to a different candidate. We ensured that some alteration would
take place on every ballot. For example, in a vote-for-one race where the voter had made a selection,
the algorithm would choose uniformly from the set of unselected choices plus no selection. One
experiment used a different strategy, in which choices could only be deselected.
Both the voter’s original selections and the manipulated ballot were logged for later analysis.
Each voting session was associated with a unique tracking number, which was printed on the ballot
along with a timestamp and encoded as a barcode.
As the final step in the voting process, participants fed their printed ballots into an AccuVote
OS optical scanner, a device used to tabulate votes in parts of 20 states [234]. The scanner was
intended to add realism to the experiment, but AccuVote OSes are not capable of actually tabulating
the ballot styles we used. Therefore, we modified the scanner so that it simply fed each ballot into
the ballot box without counting it.
We mounted a barcode reader in a 3-D printed case above the scanner’s input tray and positioned
it so that it would detect the ballot’s tracking barcode. (This setup can be seen in Figure 4.3.) When
the barcode was read, a Raspberry Pi would activate the AccuVote OS’s feed motor to pull the ballot
into the ballot box. The Raspberry Pi also displayed the ballot tracking number so that poll workers
could associate the ballot with the participant’s exit survey response and the observer’s notes.
4.3.3 The Ballot
In order to ensure a realistic voting experience and increase participants’ psychological invest-
ment in the outcome of the mock election, we used races and candidates from the city’s actual ballot
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(a) Regular Ballot
(b) Summary Ballot
Figure 4.2: Ballot Styles. We tested two ballot styles: (a) a regular style, resembling a hand-marked
ballot; and (b) a summary style, listing only the selected candidates. Both had 13 races from the
city’s recent midterm election. In one race, determined randomly, the printed selection differed
from the voter’s choice.
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for the recent 2018 midterm election. For simplicity, we reduced the ballot to the first 13 races so
that ballots would not require duplex printing or multiple pages.
We tested two ballot styles, which are illustrated in Figure 4.2. One is a regular ballot that
shows the entire set of candidates in every race. The other is a summary ballot, which shows only
the voter’s selections or “NO SELECTION” if a choice is left blank. Most BMDs print ballots that
resemble these styles.
The specific visual designs we used mimic ballots produced by two models of BMDs manufac-
tured by Hart InterCivic, which also makes the voting equipment used in Ann Arbor. The regular
style is also the same design as the hand-marked paper ballots most Ann Arbor voters use, ensuring
that many participants found it familiar. These designs are used in jurisdictions that collectively
have over 10 million registered voters [234].
The model of laser printer we used, Brother HL-2340, is certified for use with Clear Ballot’s
ClearAccess BMD system [183], so we chose paper stock that meets the specifications for ClearAc-
cess [74]. Summary ballots were printed on regular weight 8.5×11 inch letter paper, while regular
ballots were printed on Vellum Bristol stock 67 pound 8.5×14 inch paper.
4.3.4 Participants and Recruitment
To gather subjects for our study, we approached staff at the Ann Arbor District Library (AADL),
who offered space for us to set up our mock precinct. We conducted a total of three days of
data collection in July and September 2019 at two library locations: the Downtown and Westgate
branches. The Downtown branch, where our study was held for two of the three days, is an official
polling location during real elections.
The AADL advertised our study through its social media feeds and offered incentives to
patrons for their participation, such as points for a scavenger hunt competition [13] and souvenir
flashlights [14]. We also set up a fourth voting machine outside of the mock precinct where kids
could vote in an election for mayor of the library’s fish tank.2 Results from that machine were not
2Mighty Trisha unexpectedly beat Creepy Bob, leading some Bob supporters to complain that the results were
fishy [12].
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used as part of this study, but it served as a recruitment tool for parents visiting the library with their
children. In addition, we verbally recruited patrons who happened to be at the libraries during our
study, using the script in Appendix 1.2.
Participants were required to be at least 18 years of age and to sign an IRB-approved consent
form. All data collected, including survey responses and behavioral observations, was completely
anonymous. We informed participants that they were not required to vote their political preferences.
4.3.5 Experiments
To explore what factors affect voter verification performance, we devised nine experiments to
run between subjects. In all experiments, for every participant, one selection that the participant
made on the BMD was not accurately reflected on the printed ballot. Every participant within an
experiment received the same instructions from the poll workers, following the script and variants
in Appendix 1.1.
The first three experiments were designed to measure verification in the absence of protective
interventions. They varied the ballot style and manipulation strategy:
E1: Regular ballots We used the regular ballot style and the default manipulation strategy, in
which a selection could be switched, deselected, or selected if left blank by the voter.
E2: Summary ballots We used the summary ballot style and the default manipulation strategy.
As discussed in Section 4.4, we found no significant difference in error detection between regular
ballots and summary ballots, so all subsequent experiments used summary ballots.
E3: Deselection only To assess the sensitivity of voters to the way their ballots were changed, we
limited the manipulation to deselecting one of the voter’s choices at random.
Four further experiments tested interventions to determine if they improved error detection. We
tried posting a sign and having poll workers give different instructions at various times:
E4: Signage A sign was placed above the scanner that instructed voters to check their printed
ballots, as shown in Figure 4.3. We designed the sign following guidelines from the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission [230].
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Figure 4.3: Warning Signage. One of the interventions we tested was placing a sign above the
scanner that instructed voters to verify their ballots. Signage was not an effective intervention.
E5: Script variant 1 During voter check in, the poll worker added this instruction: “Please
remember to check your ballot carefully before depositing it into the scanner.”
E6: Script variant 2 When the voter approached the scanner, the poll worker said: “Please keep
in mind that the paper ballot is the official record of your vote.”
E7: Script variant 3 When the voter approached the scanner, the poll worker said: “Have you
carefully reviewed each selection on your printed ballot?”
The final two experiments assessed whether reminding participants of their selections during
verification improved their performance. We gave voters a slate of candidates for whom to vote
that they could carry with them throughout the voting experience. While we refer to this as a slate,
a sample ballot that the voter filled in before voting could serve the same purpose. Every voter
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received the same slate (Appendix 1.3), which was randomly generated and contained an even mix
of parties.
E8: Slate with script variant 2 Voters were given the slate. Poll workers encouraged verification
with script variant 2.
E9: Slate with script variant 3 Voters were given the slate. Poll workers encouraged verification
with script variant 3.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Participant Demographics
We recruited 241 participants. Their demographics are shown in Figure 4.4. The vast majority
(220, 91%) indicated that they were native English speakers; 19 reported speaking twelve other
native languages, including Hungarian, Korean, and Arabic; and two subjects gave no response.
Participants who disclosed their age ranged from 18 to 84 years old, with a mean of 43.7 and a
median of 42; 15 subjects did not answer the question. The percentages that follow are out of the
total number of responses to each question: Respondents identified as male (84, 35%), female (152,
64%), or other (3, 1%); two did not respond. Subjects reported their ethnicity as Caucasian (187,
80%), Asian (17, 7%), African American (6, 3%), Mexican American/Chicano (5, 2%), and Other
Hispanic/Latino (9, 4%); others reported not having any of these ethnic backgrounds (2, 1%) or
were multiracial (9, 4%). Participants reported their level of educational attainment as some high
school (1, 0.4%), a high school diploma (4, 2%), some college (20, 8%), a two-year degree (10,
4%), a four-year degree (80, 33%), a master’s or professional degree (92, 38%), or a doctorate (34,
14%).
Most subjects indicated that they were registered to vote in the U.S. (220, 92%), had voted in a
previous election (216, 91%), and had voted in the November 2018 midterm election (209, 87%).
However, we note that, historically, 38–45% of non-voters have been found to falsely report having
voted [38].
Compared to the population of Ann Arbor at the time of the 2010 census, our participant pool
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Figure 4.4: Participant Demographics Our participants largely reflected the demographics of Ann
Arbor: they were well educated, mostly white, and mostly women.
overrepresented Caucasians (∆ = 7.6%) and underrepresented African Americans (∆ = −4.4%)
and Asians (∆=−8.7%) [229]. The study population also overrepresented females (∆= 13%) and
underrepresented males (∆=−16%) [240]. In other reported aspects, participants’ demographics
resembled the population of Ann Arbor voters (the city is among the most highly educated in the
U.S.) [147].
4.4.2 Verification Performance
To quantify verification performance, we collected three data points for each participant, which
are summarized in Table 4.1. First, an observer noted whether the subject appeared to examine the
printed ballot for at least two seconds. Second, the exit survey asked, “Did you notice anything odd
about your ballot?”, and we recorded whether the subject’s response corroborated the discrepancy
(i.e., correctly articulated which race was changed). Third, we recorded whether subjects reported the
ballot modification to a poll worker. Most experiments saw more participants identify discrepancies
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Experiment N Were observed
examining ballot
Reported error
on exit survey
Reported error
to poll worker
Without interventions:
E1: Regular ballots 31 41.9% 6.5% 6.5%
E2: Summary ballots 31 32.3% 6.5% 6.5%
E3: Deselection only 29 44.8% 10.3% 6.9%
Subtotal/Mean 91 39.7% 7.8% 6.6%
With interventions:
E4: Signage 30 13.3% 3.3% 6.7%
E5: Script variant 1 30 46.7% 13.3% 6.7%
E6: Script variant 2 25 92.0% 16.0% 16.0%
E7: Script variant 3 31 38.7% 19.4% 12.9%
E8: Slate with script variant 2 13 100.0% 38.5% 38.5%
E9: Slate with script variant 3 21 95.2% 71.4% 85.7%
Subtotal/Mean 150 64.3% 24.0% 27.8%
Table 4.1: Verification Performance for Each Experiment. Without interventions, participants’
verification performance was remarkably poor: only 7.8% noted on an exit survey that their ballots
had been altered, and only 6.6% informed a poll worker (averaged across experiments). The various
interventions we tested had widely different effects, ranging from no significant improvement (E4,
E5) to a large increase in verification success (E8, E9).
in the survey than were reported to poll workers, but these differences were not statistically
significant. Where applicable, we refer to participants who by some means reported detecting the
discrepancies as “noticers” and those who did not as “non-noticers”.
4.4.2.1 Performance without interventions (E1–E3)
With no interventions, we found verification performance to be consistently poor. The three ex-
periments involved 91 participants, and, averaged across the experiments, only 40% of participants
examined their ballots, only 7.8% noted the error on the exit survey, and only 6.6% reported it to
a poll worker. We did not find significant differences in performance between regular and summary
ballots or between the tested attack strategies.
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4.4.2.2 Effectiveness of interventions (E4–E9)
The tested interventions resulted in a wide range of effect sizes. Neither signage (E4) nor poll
worker instructions issued before the participant began voting (E5) yielded a statistically significant
improvement to any aspect of verification performance. In contrast, poll worker instructions issued
after the ballot was printed (E6 and E7) did have a positive effect, boosting reporting rates to 20%
on the exit survey and 14% to poll workers (averaged across the experiments).
The largest performance gains occurred when participants were directed to vote using a slate
of candidates (E8 and E9). However, only E9 produced a statistically significant difference in
reporting rates (Fisher’s exact p < 0.001).3 Averaged across both experiments, reporting rates
increased to 55% on the exit survey and 62% to poll workers. E8, in which participants were
directed how to vote using a slate of candidates, saw detection and reporting rates of 39%, which is
similar to results for DRE review screen performance found by Campbell et al. [58] and Acemyan
et al. [6], in studies that similarly directed participants how to vote. With script variant 3, the use of
a slate produced a significant difference (comparing E7 and E9, Fisher’s exact p < 0.02) for both
review and report, but it did not produce a significant difference using script variant 2 (comparing
E6 and E8). This indicates that voters may be sensitive to the specific instructions they receive
about reviewing their ballots.
4.4.3 Correlates
4.4.3.1 Reviewing the ballot
Reviewing the ballot at all was significantly correlated with error reporting (two-sample permu-
tation test p < 0.001 with 10k repetitions). Some interventions do seem to promote reviewing: E6,
E8, and E9 saw significant increases (Fisher’s exact p < 0.004), although E7 did not.
This seems to support the notion that voters are capable of detecting errors if they review their
ballot. Indeed, while our baseline rate was only 7%, 19% of voters who reviewed their ballot
detected problems in the non-interventions conditions. 41% of participants who were observed
3All p-values were computed with a Bonferroni correction at a family-wise error rate of 0.05.
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reviewing their ballots in our intervention conditions detected issues, and this comports with
forthcoming work by Kortum et al. who found similar results [132] with a different sample. While
this observation may appear trite, it does directly refute an earlier hypothesis about the cognitive
abilities of voters [86].
4.4.3.2 Time to ballot submission
Careful verification takes time, so one might expect that participants who noticed discrepancies
took more time to cast their ballots. As an upper bound on how long subjects spent verifying, we
calculated the time from ballot printing to ballot submission. (Due to clock drift on one of our
machines, data from the third day of experiments was unusable, and consequently E4 and E7 are
excluded from our timing analysis.) As expected, we find that noticers took an average of 121 s
between printing and ballot submission (median 114 s), compared to only 43 s for non-noticers
(median 32 s). This difference is statistically significant (two-sample permutation test p < 0.004,
10k iterations).
We compared the submission times for two sets of experiments: ones with extra instructions
to the voter (E5, E6, E8, and E9; N = 84) and ones without (E1, E2, and E3; N = 91). The
distributions of submission times are shown in Figure 4.5. The experiments that asked participants
to review their ballots saw significantly more time spent between ballot printing and submission
(two-sample permutation test p < 0.004, 10k iterations), an average of 83 s (median 72 s) compared
to 50 s without (median 33 s).
Notably, participants who were given a slate of candidates to vote for had much higher submis-
sion times (two-sample permutation test p< 0.004, 10k iterations). Noticers in the slate experiments
took an average of 119 s (median 111 s) and non-noticers averaged 55 s (median 52 s). This might
be partly attributed to voters having to select unfamiliar candidates and wanting to check their work.
4.4.3.3 Demographics
Comparisons of detection rates across demographic groups revealed that a strong indicator for
verification performance was voting experience. Subjects who reported being registered to vote
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Figure 4.5: Ballot Submission Times for Different Instructions. Histogram showing the time from
ballot printing to ballot submission for two sets of experiments: ones where participants were
given instructions designed to increase verification and ones where participants received standard
instructions. Participants in the former group took longer: 83 s on average vs. 50 s for those who
received no special instructions. Voters that received extra instructions but who were not given a
slate took an average of 62 s.
(N = 220) detected errors with their ballots 19% of the time, while their those who did not (N = 21)
detected errors 4.8% of the time. Those who reported voting previously (N = 216) caught ballot
discrepancies in 19% of cases, again performing better than those who reported not voting before
(N = 25), who detected an error in 4.0% of cases. If someone reported voting in the 2018 midterm
election (N = 209), they detected problems with their ballot 20% of the time, whereas if they did
not (N = 32), they detected problems 3.1% of the time. This may indicate that familiarity with the
midterm ballot we used caused participants to feel more invested in the accuracy of their votes;
however, we did not establish this to statistical significance.
Other demographic factors, such as age, education, ethnicity, and gender, had no correlation
with detecting manipulation.
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4.4.3.4 Ballot position
Noticing was correlated with ballot position (Pearson’s of −0.64), indicating that discrepancies
in more prominent races are more likely to be noticed. (Race 0 was the first race on the ballot,
so the number of noticers decreases as the race position increases, hence the negative correlation
coefficient.) On our ballot, the first five races (Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, U.S.
Senator, and Representative in Congress) were prominent partisan contests with a high likelihood
of name recognition. In the experiments with no intervention (E1–E3), 37 participants had one of
these races manipulated, and five reported the error on the exit survey, a rate of 14%. Kortum et al.
actually observed the opposite of this effect, although neither our results nor theirs could establish an
effect with statistical significance [132]. Additional experiments are necessary to establish whether
this effect exists.
4.4.3.5 Undervotes
A metric that may inform voters’ ability and willingness to verify their ballot is how much care
they take in filling out the ballot. There are two metrics we use to examine this: whether a participant
voted in every contest on the ballot, and whether the participant voted in every available position on
the ballot (e.g., in a vote-for-two contests, the participant selected two choices). Table 4.2 shows
the rates of voting in every race and every position on the ballot, with E8 and E9 removed as they
directed participants to vote in every position. Voters who noticed discrepancies voted in every
race or every position at a higher rate than those who did not, but not significantly so (likely due
to our small sample size). Since these undervotes are visible to malware running on a BMD, this
correlation could be exploited by an attacker to focus cheating on voters who are less likely to
carefully verify, provided future work more firmly establishes this link.
Overall Noticers Non-noticers
Every race 64.3% 73.9% 63.0%
Every position 43.0% 47.8% 42.4%
Table 4.2: Participant Attentiveness. Voters who noticed the discrepancy tended to vote in every
race and ballot position more often than those who did not.
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4.4.3.6 Partisanship
To assess the role partisanship plays in detection rates, we scored each ballot with a partisanship
score, where a vote for a Democratic candidate was scored−1 and a vote for a Republican candidate
was scored 1, and we take the absolute value of the sum. There were 11 opportunities to vote in a
partisan way, so a participant who voted straight-party for either major party would achieve a score
of 11. Excluding E8 and E9, where voters were directed how to vote, the mean partisanship score
for our participants was 8.3, and the median was 11. Although our BMD did not offer an automatic
“straight-party” voting option, 105 participants achieved the maximum partisanship score.
Intuitively, a voter expecting every selected candidate to be from the same party might be more
likely to notice a selection from a different party. Looking at only these straight-party voters, 15 out
of 105 detected the errors. Of those, nine had a partisan race swapped to a different candidate of a
different party, and six of those participants wrote in the survey that they had detected the change
based on party. For example, one participant wrote, “voted GOP for governor / lieutenant governor
but Libertarian was actually selected on the paper ballot.”
This suggests that choosing a uniform set of candidates may help voters detect when something
has gone wrong on their ballot, although more work is needed to establish that this is indeed the
case, especially in more politically diverse populations. If this positive effect holds, it could be
further promoted with ballot designs that prominently display the party, which could help voters see
the information that is important to them while they review the ballot. On the other hand, BMD
malware could be designed to counter this effect by focusing cheating on voters who do not cast a
straight-party ballot.
4.4.3.7 Slate voting
34 participants were assigned an intervention which asked them to vote for a preselected slate of
candidates (with a partisanship score of 0). Of these, only 26 participants voted exactly as directed.
Of the eight participants who did not, four voted a straight Democratic ticket (partisanship score
of 11), one voted a heavily Democratic ticket (score of 9), two voted slightly Democratic tickets
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(scores of 3 and 5), and one voted a non-partisan ticket (score of 0), which only deviated from the
slate in five positions. Of the eight participants who deviated from the slate, no participant deviated
by fewer than five positions, indicating that either the deviation was deliberate or our instructions to
vote the slate were unclear. Only one deviating participant managed to notice the discrepancy on
their ballot, leaving participants who deviated from the slate a 13% notice rate compared to the 73%
notice rate for those who did not deviate.
4.4.3.8 Network effects
One potential feature of a live polling place environment is a network effect: will a voter who
is voting at the same time as a noticer be more likely to notice a problem on theirs? However, the
number of people who notice in a given experiment is a confounding factor: voters are more likely
to overlap with a noticer if there are more noticers. To interrogate this, we ran partial hypothesis
tests for each intervention using Fisher’s exact tests with permutations of overlapping with a noticer
and noticing, and then combined using Fisher’s combining function. We found that the effect of
overlapping with a noticer did not significantly impact whether a participant noticed. This suggests
that our interventions were more important than overlapping.
4.4.3.9 Signage
One feature that did not correlate with improved verification performance was the signage we
tested (E4). Our observer noted that 11 of 30 participants in the signage experiment did not notice
the sign at all. Only two participants in this experiment detected the modification of their ballot and
reported it, and only one accurately noted the discrepancy in their survey, suggesting that passive
signage alone may be insufficient to capture voters’ attention and shape their subsequent behavior.
4.4.4 Participant Comments
Participants had two free-response sections in the exit survey. The first asked about anything
“odd” they had noticed about the ballot. The second invited any additional comments. Of the 241
participants, 114 responded to at least one of these prompts. We note several features of their
responses.
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4.4.4.1 Discrepancy reports
In total, 44 participants (18%) noted in the free response section of the survey that they had
identified some discrepancy on their paper ballot. Of these, 31 correctly identified the change, 12
gave no detail (e.g., “At least one of my choices did not match who I picked”), and one incorrectly
identified the change (but did report that there was a mistake). We omitted this last participant from
our “noticers” category where applicable.
Of the 44 participants who reported a change on their ballot in the survey, five added that they
thought it could have resulted from a mistake they made. For example, one participant reported: “I
don’t remember voting for the member of Congress and there was a vote. I very well may have but
just don’t remember.”
4.4.4.2 Attitudes about verification
Twelve participants mentioned either that they would only be comfortable voting on a paper
ballot or that they were comforted by the fact that a paper trail was created. Only three of these 12
participants noticed that their ballot had been modified, despite the fact that they recognized that the
paper ballot was an important tool for ensuring election integrity.
Several participants seemed to realize after casting their vote that the evaluation of their paper
ballot was important; 13 participants mentioned in the survey that they did not review or that they
should have reviewed the ballot, although we did not ask them about it. This concern may have
been triggered by our survey question about what they had noticed about the paper ballot, but it also
might be an indication that our interventions did cause voters to think about the risk—albeit too
late. This would comport with Bravo-Lillo et al.’s findings about the ways novice users respond to
warnings: after the fact [51].
The free responses also indicate that some participants assumed that the vote was completed
and submitted on the BMD, rather than the paper ballot being the official record of their vote. One
participant wrote, “I was surprised to still have a paper ballot, after using the touch system. I was
expecting the results to be registered electronically.” This assumption may discourage voters from
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verifying the selections on their paper ballot. Similarly, another participant, prompted by script
variant 3 (“Have you carefully reviewed each selection on your printed ballot?”), responded to a
poll worker, “I checked it on the screen, it better be right.”
Three participants expressed concern that they would not know what to do if they noticed a
problem with their paper ballot during a real election. One person wrote, “Having the printout be
incorrect was confusing and it’s not clear how that would be handled in an election environment.”
4.4.4.3 Feedback on the BMDs
We told participants that the experiment was a study about a new kind of voting system, and
many left feedback about the interface and appearance of the machines. In Michigan, where we
conducted the study, BMDs are available in every precinct, but voters must request to use them. The
vast majority of voters use hand-marked paper ballots, so study participants were likely unfamiliar
with BMD voting. In their comments, 21 participants expressed liking the system, while only three
disliked it. Although merely anecdotal, this reflects previous findings that voters like touch-screen
voting equipment [96].
4.5 Security Model
We are primarily motivated by the threat of undetected changes to election outcomes due to
BMD misprinting attacks. Prior work has shown that such attacks cannot be reliably ruled out by
pre-election or parallel testing [218], and we seek to answer whether voter verification can be an
effective defense.
If a voter reports that their printed ballot does not reflect their on-screen selections, what
should election officials do? Unfortunately, there is not yet a practical way to prove that the BMD
misbehaved during voting. From officials’ perspective, it is possible that the voter is mistaken, or
even lying, and in a large voter population, there will always be some rate of spurious problem
reports, even when BMDs are working correctly. In principle, voters can vote on the BMD in front
of an official to demonstrate the error and provide evidence that the machine is misbehaving. This
does not necessarily violate the voter’s secret ballot, so long as the ballot they vote to demonstrate
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the problem is not cast. However, it seems unlikely that this will appear to voters as if they are not
disclosing for whom they wish to vote and thus may be of little comfort.
For these reasons, problem reports from voters can serve only as evidence that something
might be wrong with the BMDs. If the evidence exceeds some threshold, officials could invoke
contingency plans. For instance, they could remove reportedly misbehaving BMDs from service to
minimize further damage, perform forensic investigations in an attempt to uncover the cause, or
even rerun the election if outcome-changing fraud cannot be ruled out.
Any of these responses would be costly (and none is foolproof), so the threshold for triggering
them should not be too low. Moreover, attackers could exploit a low threshold by recruiting voters
to fraudulently report problems, in order to disrupt or discredit the election. On the other hand, if
the threshold is too high, outcome-changing fraud could be ignored.
To better understand how verification performance affects security in this setting, we construct a
simple model. We assume, optimistically, that the attacker has no way to guess whether a particular
voter is more likely than average to detect the alteration, and so chooses voters to attack at random.
Based on our findings, this assumption seems reasonable given the available evidence. We further
assume that whenever voters detect problems, they are able to remedy them and cast a correct vote
by hand-marking a ballot. Except where noted, the model assumes that all voters cast their votes
using BMDs.
Number of problem reports Let d be the fraction of misprinted ballots that voters detect, report,
and correct. Suppose a contest had n ballots cast, and the reported fractional margin of victory was
m. To have changed the outcome, the attacker would have had to successfully modify at least nm2
cast ballots. However, since some modifications would have been corrected, the attacker would have
had to induce errors in a greater number of printouts: n m2(1−d) . Under our optimistic assumptions, if
the attack changed the outcome, we would expect the fraction of voters who reported problems, a,
to exceed:
a > m
d
2(1−d) .
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The model shows that the security impact of verification is non-linear, because every voter who
corrects an error both increases the evidence that there is a problem and forces the attacker to cheat
more in order to overcome the margin of victory. Figure 4.6 illustrates this effect.
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Figure 4.6: BMD security is highly sensitive to human performance. Given a 0.5% margin of victory,
we plot the percentage of voters who report a problem during the minimal outcome-changing attack
as a function of the rate at which errors are detected and corrected. This model implies that using
BMDs safely for all voters requires dramatically improved verification performance or very sensitive
attack detection thresholds.
With the 6.6% error detection rate from our non-intervention experiments and a close election
with a 0.5% margin (the margin that causes an automatic recount in many states) a successful attack
would cause as few as 0.018% of voters—less than 1 in 5000—to report a problem. Small changes
in verification performance around our base rate cause relatively little change in the amount of
evidence. More than doubling the error detection rate to 14% (the rate we found for prominent
races) only increases the fraction of voters who report a problem to 0.039%. However, larger
improvements have an outsized effect: with the 86% error detection rate from our most successful
experiment, at least 1.5% of voters (1 in 67) would report problems.
Required detection rate Suppose election officials activate a countermeasure if the fraction of
voters who report problems exceeds a threshold a∗. For a given margin, the countermeasure will be
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triggered by minimal outcome-changing fraud when:
d >
2a∗
m+2a∗
.
An expensive countermeasure, like rerunning an election, will require a high trigger threshold—
say, 1% of voters reporting a problem—to avoid false positives. With a 0.5% margin, reaching a 1%
trigger threshold would require an error detection rate exceeding 80%. A less expensive counter-
measure, such as an investigation, might be triggered by a lower threshold—say, 0.1%. Reaching
this lower threshold in an election with a 0.5% margin would require an error detection rate greater
than 29%. This suggests that using BMDs securely for all voters will require large improvements to
verification performance or extremely low thresholds for triggering countermeasures.
Minimizing BMD voting helps dramatically Securing against misprinting attacks is far easier if
only a small fraction of voters use BMDs than if all in-person voters do. This is because an attacker
would be forced to cheat on a much larger fraction of BMD ballots in order to achieve the same
change to the election results. Moreover, if the population of BMD voters is smaller than half the
margin of victory, it is impossible for a BMD misprinting attack to change the outcome.
Let b be the fraction of voters who use BMDs. We can replace m in the expression above with mb
and let a∗ be the fraction of BMD voters that must report a problem to trigger the countermeasure. In
Maryland, which uses hand-marked paper ballots but makes BMDs available to voters who request
them, 1.8% of voters use BMDs [149]. With a 0.5% margin, as in the previous example, Maryland
would reach a complaint threshold of 1% of BMD voters with an error detection rate of only 6.7%.
If 5% of voters use BMDs, the error detection rate would need to be 17%.4 Our results suggest that
these more modest rates of verification likely are achievable, in contrast to the far greater accuracy
required when all voters use BMDs.
This model overestimates security An attacker might use any number of features (including
4Maryland has since updated their policy to offer both hand-marked and BMD ballots to every voter [102].
Approximately 10% of voters now vote on BMDs. For the same setup, approximately 30% of BMD voters would need
to detect and correct problems, which is attainable given our experimental results.
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several of the correlations we observed) to focus cheating on voters who are less likely to successfully
catch errors. For instance, an attacker could preferentially modify ballots that have undervotes or a
mix of selections from different parties. Attackers could also selectively target voters with visual
impairments, such as those who use large text or an audio ballot. Other features, such as how long
voters spend inspecting the candidate review screen, might also prove to be predictive of verification
success. For these reasons, our simplified model is likely to overestimate the effectiveness of
verification against sophisticated attackers.
We also note that some attackers may merely seek to cast doubt on election results by causing
highly visible errors or failures—which are also possible with hand-marked paper ballots. However,
in general, BMDs are vulnerable to all classes of computer-based attacks that affect hand-marked
paper ballots and to others, such as the misprinting attack discussed here, to which hand-marked
paper ballots are not susceptible.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Limitations
It is challenging to capture real-world voter behavior in a mock election. However, our study
followed established best practices [174], and we strived to create as realistic a polling environment
as we could. It is impossible to know exactly how well we succeeded, but the effect seems to have
been convincing: several people approached us to ask whether there was a real election taking place
that they had not heard about. Our participants also seemed engaged in the study; many expressed
strongly held political preferences in our survey (so much so that some refused to vote according to
our slate), and a large majority reported voting in the 2018 midterm. On the other hand, the election
used a ballot that was more than nine months old, which may have reduced participant motivation,
and we had a few participants who reported that they did not vote in our state or were otherwise
unfamiliar with our ballot. It is also possible that our results were skewed due to selection bias and
observer effect.
Another limitation of our work is that we drew participants from a population that is locally but
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not nationally representative. Our participants tended to be younger, significantly better educated,
more liberal, more likely to be female, and more likely to be Caucasian than the average voter in the
United States [229]. Future work is needed to validate our study in more diverse and representative
populations.
Although our results suggest that certain interventions can boost verification performance, the
data is too sparse to provide a high-fidelity understanding of the magnitude of the improvements.
In addition, due to time constraints, we were unable to test the interplay of all combinations of
interventions, and some interventions appear to be sensitive to small changes (e.g., the difference in
phrasing between script variants 2 and 3). Further study is needed to better characterize what makes
interventions work and how they interact before we can confidently conclude that any particular
set of procedures will be effective in practice. It is worth noting that most of our results have been
replicated in a more recent work [132], which is encouraging.
4.6.2 Discussion of Findings
Our study provides the first concrete measurements of voter error detection performance using
BMDs in a realistic voting environment. At a high level, we found that success rates without
intervention are very low, around 6.6%. Some interventions that we tested did not significantly
impact detection rates among participants, although others improved detection drastically and may
serve as a roadmap for interventions to explore in further research. We discuss those interventions
here.
4.6.2.1 Verbal instructions can improve verification
Notably, all interventions that involved poll workers verbally encouraging verification between
the BMD and the scanner—those in E6–E9—resulted in higher ballot reviewing and error reporting
rates. This, coupled with the fact that reviewing the printout was highly correlated with error
detection across all of our results, suggests that interventions focused on causing the voter to
review the ballot carefully may be helpful. On the other hand, instructions at the beginning of the
voting process (E5) and passive signage (E4) had no significant effect on error reporting. This
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pattern of effects is supported by findings from the usable security literature, which suggest that
post-completion errors can be mitigated with timely interruptions that encourage individuals to
take defensive steps [55]. It is also some comfort to notions of evidence-based elections [214],
software independence [194], and cast-as-intended to know that while the existence of evidence is
not enough, there are simple policy interventions that make usage of the evidence robust.
It is worth noting that we also found that these interventions caused participants to take longer
to submit their ballots, on average about twice as long. This could cause longer lines at polling
places if these interventions are implemented without complementary procedural considerations,
such as having adequate space for voters to stop and review their ballots.
4.6.2.2 Effectiveness of slates
Directing participants to vote for a provided slate of candidates, combined with verbally prompt-
ing them to review their printouts, resulted in strongly increased rate of error detection: 74% of
participants who were given a slate and did not deviate from it noticed the errors. This finding may
suggest that encouraging voters to write down their preferences in advance can boost verification.
However, the slates we used functioned quite differently from slates likely to be used in practice.
The choices we provided were randomly generated and had no basis in the subject’s preferences—in
a real election, slates would reflect for whom the voter intended to vote, most likely created by the
voter or their political party [123]. It is possible that the success rate we observed was primarily due
to participants carefully attempting to follow our instructions and vote for unfamiliar candidates.
Further study is needed with more realistic slate conditions (i.e., asking subjects to write down their
preferences) in order to assess whether slates really do help voters catch errors. We note that this
potential flaw also exists in more recent work that relied on prescribed slates [132], however it is a
best practice for the research setting [174].
4.6.3 Recommendations
Since BMDs are widely used today, we recommend several strategies for improving voter
verification performance. While we are unable to conclude that these strategies will enhance error
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detection to the point that BMDs can be used safely in close or small elections, our findings indicate
that they can help. These interventions are designed to be lightweight and relatively easy to drop
into existing election policies and practices, and they have been implemented in jurisdiction across
the United States, including the state of North Carolina [25]. They support my overall thesis that
secure election technologies only work if they accommodate the real world.
4.6.3.1 Design polling places for verification
Polling place layout and procedures should be designed with verification in mind. As we have
discussed, voters need time and space to verify their ballots. If tables or areas to stand out of the way
are provided, voters will be able to carefully verify without causing lines to form or slowing polling
place throughput. The presence of such a “verification station” might also encourage verification.
Another practical concern is privacy. Several of our participants expressed discomfort with the
fact that we did not provide a privacy sleeve for their ballots (a requirement in Michigan), and that
the scanner accepted the ballots face-up only, with one participant stating, “I feel like inserting
the ballot face up in the scanning machine will make people uncomfortable.” Voters may not feel
comfortable reviewing their ballots in front of poll workers but may be unsure where to go to review
them privately.
4.6.3.2 Incorporate post-voting verbal instructions
As all of our script-based interventions that took place after the ballot was printed (E6–E9)
showed an increase in verification performance, we recommend that poll workers interrupt voters
after their ballot has printed but before it is scanned and ask them to review it. Signage with a similar
message to our scripts placed at the optical scanner (E4) or instructions before the participants
voted (E5) did not result in significant differences in error detection; nevertheless, further study
with additional variations is prudent before ruling out such strategies.
4.6.3.3 Encourage personalized slate voting
Although our study tested randomized slates, rather than personalized slates, the effect size was
so large that we tentatively recommend encouraging the use of personalized slates by voters. In our
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experiments (E8 and E9), participants who were directed to vote using a randomized slate (and did
not deviate) reported errors at a rate of 73%. If voters prepare their own slates at home (or use a
printed slate prepared, for instance, by a political party or other organization), they can use them to
check each selection on the BMD printout. We note that, since we did not directly test the use of
personalized slates, further research is necessary to ascertain whether large performance gains are
actually achieved. Furthermore, even if personalized slates are effective, the gain will be limited to
the fraction of voters who can be induced to use them.
Slates have potential downsides and should be used with care. They have the potential to
compromise ballot secrecy, so we recommend providing a closed trash can, paper shredder, or other
means for voters to privately dispose of them before leaving the precinct. Coercion is also a threat,
but voters could be advised to prepare multiple different slates as a defense.
4.6.3.4 Help voters correct errors, and carefully track problems
Verification-promoting interventions will be of little use if action cannot be taken to remedy
misbehaving BMDs—something that even our participants expressed concern about.
First, it is crucial that polling places have a procedure for voters who want to correct their
printed ballots. Several subjects commented that they would not know what to do if something was
wrong with their ballot in a real election, indicating that this problem is present in current election
procedures.
Second, detailed records should be kept about which BMD the voter used and what the specific
issue was, including the contest and candidates involved (to the extent that the voter is willing
to waive ballot secrecy). Problems should be treated as potentially serious even when the voter
believes they are at fault—we note that several participants in our study believed they had made a
mistake even though the BMD actually was programmed to be malicious. Problem reports should
be centrally reported and tracked during the election, so that issues affecting multiple precincts can
be identified as rapidly as possible.
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4.6.3.5 Prepare contingency plans
What to do in the event that BMDs are known or suspected to be misbehaving is a more difficult
question. If an elevated number of voters have a problem with a single machine, it should be
taken out of service, provided there are other BMDs available for use (especially for voters with
disabilities, who may have no alternative).
If widespread problem reports occur—particularly problems focused on a tightly contested race
or significantly exceeding the rate reported in past elections—officials could consider taking most
BMDs out of service and encouraging all remaining voters who can to use hand-marked ballots.
This raises logistical challenges: polling place would need to have enough ballots available for
hand-marking, or the ability to print ballots on demand, and votes already cast on the BMDs would
be suspect.
After the election, forensic analysis of the BMDs could be performed to attempt to determine the
cause of reported errors. Unfortunately, such analysis cannot in general rule out that a sophisticated
attack occurred and left no digital traces. Even if programming errors or attacks are uncovered,
they may be impossible to correct if officials are unable to determine whether the effects were large
enough to change the election outcome. The only recourse might be to re-run the election.
Our findings show that, in the event of an actual error or attack, the rate of reported problems
is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg. In our non-intervention experiments, undetected errors
outnumbered reported problems by almost twenty to one. Our results further suggest that an attacker
who cleverly focused cheating on voters who were less likely to verify could achieve an even higher
ratio of undetected errors. An effective response requires either being very sensitive to reported
problems—which increases the chances that an attacker could trigger false alarms—or achieving
very high error correction rates.
4.6.3.6 Educate voters about BMD operations and risks
Like in other human-in-the-loop security contexts, greater education could boost voters’ aware-
ness of the importance of careful verification and boost error detection and reporting rates.
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To this end, we recommend educating voters that the paper, rather than what the BMD screen
shows, is the official record of their votes. Several of our participants said they realized after
scanning that they should have, but did not, review their printouts. Others stated that they had
checked the review screen on the machine and that they trusted the paper to be correct. It is likely
that many participants incorrectly assumed that the BMDs, rather than the paper and scanner,
tabulated their votes.
We also recommend educating voters about the possibility of BMD malfunction. Many of our
participants seem not to have even considered that the machine might have changed their votes, as
indicated by the voters who blamed themselves for the misprinted ballots. Raising threat awareness
could help motivate voters to carefully inspect the paper, as well as give them greater confidence
to report any discrepancies they detect. Jurisdictions like Johnson County, Kansas appear to have
taken these recommendations to heart [122] with a new social media campaign.
4.6.3.7 Consider the needs of voters with disabilities
Further research is needed to specifically examine verification performance among voters with
disabilities, but we offer some initial recommendations here. Detecting errors in printed ballots may
be especially challenging for voters with impaired vision. Designing BMD ballots for maximum
legibility might help, and so might encouraging voters who use text-to-speech devices to bring
them to the polls for use during verification. Jurisdictions could also provide air-gapped accessible
devices to read the ballot back to voters, in case voters do not have their own text-to-speech devices.
These steps would have the added benefit of reinforcing the message that the content of the paper
ballots is what gets counted. If BMDs are to live up to the promise of better and more accessible
voting, enabling all voters to verify their printed ballots is a must.
4.6.3.8 Require risk-limiting audits
Even perfectly verified paper ballots are of little use for security if they are not rigorously
audited to confirm the results of computer-based tabulation. Fortunately, risk-limiting audits [143]
(RLAs) are gaining momentum in the United States. Colorado, Nevada, and Rhode Island mandate
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statewide RLAs, and states including Michigan, Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, and Pennsylvania have
begun pilots [80]. RLAs and effective verification are both necessary in order for paper to provide
a strong defense against vote-stealing attacks, and we recommend that efforts to achieve both be
pursued vigorously. More discussion of RLAs is provided in the next two chapters.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented results from the first empirical study of how well voters using BMDs
detect errors on their printed ballots, which is a limiting factor to the level of security that a BMD-
based paper trail can provide. Based on the performance of 241 human subjects in a realistic polling
place environment, we find that, absent specific interventions, error detection and reporting rates
are dangerously low. Unless verification performance can be improved dramatically, BMD paper
trails, particularly when used by all in-person voters, cannot be relied on to reflect voter intent if the
machines are controlled by an attacker. This represents a failure of an election security technology,
voter-verified paper, in the face of real world challenges.
Nevertheless, we also find that procedural interventions can improve rates of error detection
and reporting, potentially increasing the security offered by BMDs. The interventions we tested
should serve as examples of what is and is not likely to be effective, and we hope they will point
the way for further research and experimentation. These findings add to the broad literature of
human-in-the-loop security results and recommendations, and they provide additional examples of
what does and does not work in human-centric security.
Our results should not be read as demonstrating that BMDs can be used securely. Further work
is needed to explore the potential for attackers to predict which voters will verify, and additional
human-subjects testing is necessary to confirm whether sufficient rates of verification success can
be achieved in practice. The cost of implementing interventions and contingency plans may also be
prohibitive. Nevertheless, BMDs do offer advantages, including uniform accessibility and ease of
administration. We hope our work will help election officials make better informed choices as they
weigh these benefits against the security risks of using BMDs for all voters.
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CHAPTER V
Modeling Post-election Audits
5.1 Introduction1
As we have observed so far, no method for counting votes is perfect, and methods that rely
on computers are particularly fragile: errors, bugs, and deliberate attacks can alter results. The
vulnerability of electronic voting was confirmed in two major state-funded studies, California’s
Top-to-Bottom Review [48] and Ohio’s EVEREST study [155]. More recently, at the 2017 and
2018 DEFCON hacking conferences, attendees with little or no knowledge of election systems were
able to penetrate a wide range of U.S. voting machines [40, 41]. Given that Russia interfered with
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election through an “unprecedented coordinated cyber campaign against
state election infrastructure” [232], national security demands we protect our elections from nation
states and other advanced persistent threats.
There is no way to secure a software system perfectly, which is why we need software-
independent voting systems [194]. A voting system is software-independent if an undetected
change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.
The most practical way to achieve software independence is by using voter-verifiable paper records
(as just discussed, a non-trivial requirement), and manually auditing them to check whether reported
outcomes based on electronic tallying are correct. Risk-limiting audits give a criterion for the mini-
1This section has is based on “Bernoulli Ballot-Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits” in
conjunction with Kellie Ottoboni, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, and Philip B. Stark that appeared in Proceedings
of the 4th Annual Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting
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mal amount of scrutiny the ballots must receive: at least enough to establish, with high confidence,
that the reported winner or winners of a contest really won.
The outcome of an election contest is the winning position(s) or candidate(s), not the numeric
vote totals. An election outcome is correct if it is the outcome that would be found by a correct
application of the social choice function to voter intent manually ascertained from the voter-verifiable
marks on all ballots validly cast in the election.
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) of an election contest using a trustworthy record of voter intent2 is
a procedure with two possible endpoints:
1. Declare that the election outcome (i.e., the set of winners) is correct.
2. Declare that there should be a full manual tally of the record to determine the correct outcome.
The risk limit of an RLA is the chance that the audit ends by declaring the outcome to be correct,
when in fact the election outcome is incorrect for any reason (including human error, software bugs,
and malicious hacking).
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) were introduced in 2007 [215] as a mechanism for detecting and
correcting outcome-changing errors in vote tabulation, whatever their cause—including hacking,
misconfiguration, and human error. RLAs have been tested in practice in California, Colorado,
Indiana, Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Denmark. Colorado started con-
ducting routine statewide RLAs in 2017 [141], and Rhode Island passed a law in 2017 requiring
routine statewide RLAs starting in 2020 (RI Gen L § 17–19–37.4), as has Nevada. RLA legislation
is under consideration in a number of other states, and bills to require RLAs have been introduced
in Congress.
The American Statistical Association has endorsed risk-limiting audits as best practice, as have
the Presidential Commission on Election Administration, the League of Women Voters, the Verified
Voting Foundation, Common Cause, and other election integrity organizations [140].
2The trustworthiness of the audit trail needs to be established by a compliance audit. See, e.g., [30, 214].
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However, many lessons have been learned in the practical implementation of RLAs, and it has
become apparent that certain features like the total number of ballots likely to be hand-tabulated are
not as important to election officials considering adopting RLAs as previously thought. Empirical
data gathered from pilots in Rhode Island [108] and Michigan [1] has shown that while audits in the
abstract do not take much time, other factors, like a desire to finish in one round, are most important.
Questions of financial cost are often cited as important decision factors, and to date there is not a
robust way to provide cost estimates for any kind of post-election auditing technique that is not a
fixed audit. Comparisons between RLA techniques are also difficult to make for policy makers, as
doing so requires wading into complex statistics to provide apples-to-apples comparison.
In this chapter I present a workload estimation function that can be used to directly compare
various post-election auditing methods. This function is derived from empirical data collected in
Rhode Island during pilots of RLAs, and validated against subsequent RLAs performed in Rhode
Island, Michigan, and Colorado. This workload estimate enables an apples-to-apples comparison of
various RLA techniques, revealing some previously-unknown details, for example that ballot-polling
RLAs become less efficient than batch comparison RLAs for close margins. The estimator also
reveals and quantifies something that was previously known but not rigorously examined: audits are
highly parallelizable.
The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows: in the next section I provide more detailed back-
ground on RLAs than I have up to now. In Section 5.3 I develop my workload estimation function,
and in Section 5.4 I discuss how post-election audits are highly parallelizable. In Section 5.5 I
validate my parallelized workload model against real-world data. In Section 5.6 I use the function
to compare three popular RLA techniques, and I discuss the limitations of this comparison in
Section 5.7. I conclude in Section 5.8 and setup a discussion for an improved form of ballot-polling
RLAs based on these observations about parallelizability, which I present in the next chapter.
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5.2 What is a risk-limiting audit?3
There are two general approaches to risk-limiting audits:
• comparison audits, which compare the machine interpretation to a manual interpretation of
randomly selected ballots or batches of ballots, and
• ballot-polling audits, which rely only on a manual interpretation.
Both methods rely on the existence of a ballot manifest that describes how the audit trail is
stored. Selecting the random sample can include a public ceremony in which observers contribute
by rolling dice to seed a PRNG [79].
Ballot-polling audits examine random samples of individual ballots. They demand almost
nothing of the voting technology other than the reported outcome. When the reported outcome is
correct, the expected number of ballots a ballot-polling audit inspects is approximately quadratic
in the reciprocal of the (true) margin of victory, resulting in large expected sample sizes for small
margins.
Comparison audits compare reported results for randomly selected subsets of ballots to manual
tallies of those ballots. Comparison audits require the voting system to commit to tallies of subsets
of ballots (“clusters”) corresponding to identifiable physical subsets of the audit trail. Comparison
audits have two parts: confirm that the outcome computed from the commitment matches the
reported outcome, and check the accuracy of randomly selected clusters by manually inspecting the
corresponding subsets of the audit trail. When the reported cluster tallies are correct, the number of
clusters a comparison audit inspects is approximately linear in the reciprocal of the reported margin.
The efficiency of comparison audits also depends approximately linearly on the size of the clusters.
Efficiency is highest for clusters consisting of individual ballots: individual cast vote records. To
3Text in this section was borrowed from “Public Evidence from Secret Ballots”, work in conjunction with Josh
Benaloh, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Philip B. Stark, Vanessa Teague, Poorvi L. Vora, and
Dan S. Wallach that appeared in Proceedings of the 2nd International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting [35] and
“Bernoulli Ballot-Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits” in conjunction with Kellie Ottoboni, J.
Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, and Philip B. Stark that appeared in Proceedings of the 4th Annual Workshop on
Advances in Secure Electronic Voting [175], as well as some new text.
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audit at the level of individual ballots requires the voting system to commit to the interpretation of
each ballot in a way that is linked to the corresponding element of the audit trail.
In addition to RLAs, auditing methods have been proposed with Bayesian [191] or heuristic [196]
justifications.
All post-election audits implicitly assume that the audit trail is adequately complete and accurate
that a full manual count would reflect the correct contest outcome. Compliance audits are designed
to determine whether there is convincing evidence that the audit trail was curated well, by checking
ballot accounting, registration records, pollbooks, election procedures, physical security of the
audit trail, chain of custody logs, and so on. Evidence-based elections [214] combine compliance
audits and risk-limiting audits to determine whether the audit trail is adequately accurate, and if so,
whether the reported outcome is correct. If there is not convincing evidence that the audit trail is
adequately accurate and complete, there cannot be convincing evidence that the outcome is correct.
As we saw in the last chapter, the paper trail must also be verifiably correct as a representation of
the voters’ selections; if the paper trail does not reflect the will of the voters, no amount of auditing
can prevent fraud.
5.2.1 Audits in Complex Elections
Generally, in traditional and complex elections, whenever an election margin is known and
the infrastructure for a comparison audit is available, it is possible to conduct a rigorous risk-
limiting comparison audit. This motivates many works on practical margin computation for
IRV [45, 63, 148, 202]. Recent breakthroughs have been made by Blom et al. [43, 44].
However, such an audit for a complex election may not be efficient, which motivates the
extension of Stark’s sharper discrepancy measure to D’Hondt and related schemes [220]. For
Schulze and some related schemes, neither efficient margin computation nor any other form of
RLA is known (see [115]); a Bayesian audit [68, 191] may nonetheless be used when one is able
to specify suitable priors, as discussed by Vora et al. [159, 237]. Stark has also recently reframed
RLAs as sets of half-averaged nulls, leading to still more efficient audits for simpler and complex
elections [219]. Ottoboni et al. also developed RLAs for stratified samples, in cases where one type
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of audit could be performed over one set of ballots but not over the whole set [176].
5.2.2 Audit Units
RLAs work with one of two types of unit: batches and ballots. A batch is a collection of ballots
corresponding to some level of results reporting. For example, all of the votes in one polling location
may constitute a batch, or all the votes in a vote-tabulation district [53]. While a batch typically also
corresponds to a physical container where its ballots are located, occasionally multiple batches can
be stored in one container, or one batch can be stored in multiple containers. For the purposes of
our discussion below, we will assume each batch gets its own container. Batch-level audits typically
select a sample from the set of batches, and then every ballot in each of those batches is tabulated
for the audit.
Ballot-level audits are similar to batch audits, except rather than counting every ballot in a batch,
only certain ballots from certain batches will be selected. Typically, ballot-level audits are much
more efficient than batch audits, as the number of ballots that they audit is much smaller, though as
we shall see this is not always the case.
5.2.3 A general RLA
An RLA A has several inputs: the risk-limit, α , the reported outcome for the particular race R, x,
the random seed used for generating random samples, the ballots B and batches P that are being
audited, the test statistic T , and the hypothesis test H. We can write an audit as a function of these
variables, A(α,R,x,B,P,T,H).
RLAs typically have a sample size estimation function EA, that produces an expected number
of samples needed to satisfy the RLA requirements. EA can depend on the risk-limit, the reported
outcome of the election, ballots, batches, test statistic, and prior sample S′: EA(α,R,B,P,T,S′)
RLAs also have a sampling function SA, that can be defined in myriad ways. It depends on
the random seed, sample size, as well as the batches and ballots, and returns a set of batches
and ballots that should be audited, S = {PA,BA}. The sampling function is thus SA(x,B,P, |S|).
Random sampling may rely on a variety of techniques, such as consistent sampling [193], geometric
91
Algorithm 1 RLA Procedure
1: procedure RISK-LIMITING AUDIT(α , R, B, P, T, H)
2: x← RandomString . Initialize x with random data, usually from rolling dice
3: |S| ← EA(α,R,B,P,T, /0) . Figure out the initial sample size
4: S← SA(x,B,P, |S|) . Draw the sample
5: loop
6: if TA(α,R,B,P,T,H,S)< α then
7: return True . The audit has confirmed the outcome to risk-limit α
8: else if |S| ≥ |B| then . The audit has escalated to a full hand-recount
9: if Winner(R) 6=Winner(S) then . If sample has different winner than reported. . .
10: return False . . . . it found the winner didn’t actually win
11: else
12: return True . The audit confirmed the outcome
13: end if
14: else . We don’t have enough information yet
15: |S|′← EA(al pha,R,B,P,T,H,S) . Compute a new sample size
16: S← SA(x,B,P, |S|′) . Draw the new sample, and repeat the test
17: goto loop
18: end if
19: end loop
20: end procedure
skipping [176], or others [195].
Finally, RLAs have an testing function TA that, given an audited sample of ballots, either
confirms the outcome or requires the sampling of more ballots. TA depends on the risk-limit, the
reported outcome, the ballots, the batches, the test-statistic, the hypothesis test, as well as the sample
generated by SA.
A general form of an RLA is shown in Algorithm 1.
5.2.4 Mechanics of an RLA
In addition to the abstract steps required to complete an RLA, there is a fair degree of admin-
istrivia. To generate the random seed, typically twenty 10-sided dice are rolled by attendees to the
RLA who are selected at random. Once the seed and contest information has been finalized, the
RLA rounds can begin. At the start of each round, a sample is drawn based on a ballot manifest, a
listing of all of the ballot containers and how many ballots are contained in each. To draw a sample,
RLA software selects uniformly at random from a list of ballots constructed from the manifest. For
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example, if “Batch A” contains 150 ballots, then “Batch A, Ballot 1” through ‘Batch A, Ballot 150‘
would be appended to the list of ballots.4
Once the sample is drawn, the list of sampled ballots is typically broken up across teams of two
or three people called audit boards. The audit boards are the people who locate and open ballot
containers and count through the stack of ballots to find the selected ballots to audit. For the ballots
that have been selected for audit, a placeholder is usually inserted in the ballot’s place in the stack,
and the selected ballot is labeled and set aside.
Once all of the selected ballots have been pulled out of their batches, the audit boards inspect
the marks on each one and “audit” the ballots. In a ballot-polling or a batch-comparison audit, this
simply consists of tallying up the votes across all ballots in the sample, which audit boards can
record on a paper spreadsheet or enter into the audit software directly. Votes for all choices are
tallied, as well as undervotes and invalid votes.
For ballot comparison audits, once a ballot is found its corresponding cast vote record (CVR) is
located. The CVR is the record of how the ballot was tabulated by the scanner on election day. The
audit board directly compares the paper ballot in front of them with the CVR, recording whether
there is a discrepancy between them. Discrepancies can include one-vote misstatements, where
either the physical ballot shows a vote for the winning choice(s) but the CVR shows no vote (a
one-vote understatement), or the CVR shows a vote for the winning choice(s) and the physical
ballot does not (a one-vote overstatement). Additionally, if the physical ballot shows a vote for a
losing choice but the CVR shows a vote for the winning choice, this is a two-vote overstatement
(and a two-vote understatement for the inverse case).
Once all of the ballots in a round have been sampled, the sample results are compared with the
reported results. For ballot-polling audits, this means comparing the totaled votes in the sample
against the reported vote totals. For batch comparison, this means comparing the tallied results in
each batch with the reported results for each sampled batch. For ballot comparison, this requires
examining the total number of misstatements discovered by the audit. Once this data is collected,
4For RLAs that rely on cast-vote records, like ballot comparison audits, ballots may also have a unique identifier
per-ballot to ease in CVR lookup.
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the data is input to a hypothesis test, and if the resulting p-value is beneath the selected risk-limit,
the audit can terminate. Otherwise, the audit will proceed to another round, until the risk-limit is
met in one of the proceeding rounds or all of the ballots are audited.
5.3 Workload Estimation
An important first step in our examination of various RLA techniques is a robust definition of
workload. One of the key features of RLAs is that they can provide high statistical confidence for
a fraction of the work of a full hand recount. However, to date there is no universally applicable
estimator of workload functions that applies across RLAs, so we define one below.
To construct such a function, we will rely on workload data from the Rhode Island RLA working
group’s report on RLA pilots [108]. To our knowledge, this is the only data set with robust timing
measurements for the three major kinds of risk-limiting audit. However, the data reported in it
do suffer some drawbacks. Sample sizes were small, so mean and median reporting times may
not be accurate. Batches were small, with the largest batch containing only 324 ballots. However,
despite these shortcomings, we believe that the overall results reflected in the data still provide
useful information about the proportion of work involved in each step of a risk-limiting audit. We
see later on the model we construct using this data does appear to be fairly true to reality based on
experiences with other risk-limiting audits around the country. Further discussion of this is provided
in Section 5.5.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
An RLA is performed over a set of ballots B contained in a set of containers P. It involves
finding and opening containers containing paper ballots selected for audit, finding those ballots
within the containers, and auditing them by recording the marks that appear on them. We assume
both ballots and batches are well ordered according to the following rules, borrowing notation
from [215]:
1. Ballots are in order (b(i))Bi=1 such that b1 is the first ballot in a batch, b2 is the second, and so
on.
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2. Batches are also in order, (p(i))Pi=1, so that p1 is the first batch, and so on.
For an audit A over batches P and ballots B, we define the following functions:
s(p), the time to locate a batch in storage:
s(p)≡ 15s (5.1)
While there is not much extant data on how long it takes to retrieve a batch on average, the Rhode
Island RLA Working Group [108] report collected timing data for the time to retrieve a ballot from
a new batch, including the time it takes to find the batch, open it, and find the ballot for a ballot
comparison. The RIRLA report indicates this took 61s on average, and it took 31s to find a ballot in
a batch that was already opened. Taking the difference, we obtain the time to find and open a batch
at 30s, which we split evenly between s(p) and o(p) (see below).
Note that using the RIRLA data in this way is imperfect, however, as we shall see later, tuning
our model this way still leads to informative results. It is quite possible that in other audits, if
batches are well ordered and stored, it may take less time to find any given batch. Similarly, if
batches are not well stored, for example if some batches are in the warehouse across town, then
finding batches may take more time.
o(p), the cost of opening a batch:
o(p)≡ 15s (5.2)
Opening a batch for auditing requires some amount of work: cutting a seal, unzipping or unlocking
the container, and doing some bookkeeping for chain of custody like writing down the seal number.
As discussed above, while we do not have high fidelity data about how long this process takes in the
course of an audit, we will again use the RIRLA report as a guide.
As before, this function may be significantly different depending on the specifics of an election,
jurisdiction, and audit. If the batch is split up into multiple containers, as can happen if absentee
ballots are sorted into their own container or if there are too many ballots to fit in one container, pi
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may correspond to multiple physical containers that need to be opened and their ballots combined.
h(b), the time of handling the physical paper that corresponds to ballot b:
h(b)≡

6s, in a batch comparison audit
31s, in a ballot comparison audit
77s, in a ballot polling audit with countdown
61s, in a ballot polling audit with k-cut
50s, in a ballot polling audit with ruler
10s, in a ballot polling audit with scales
(5.3)
Certain audit types will require handling more ballots than others, as will certain methods of
finding the ballot. The RIRLA report studied the three major categories of RLA, batch comparison,
ballot polling, and ballot comparison. The reported recorded both handling and interpretation times
for both methods. They found that organizing the ballots for interpretation and counting in a batch
audit was much more efficient than in a ballot-level audit.
For ballot polling, the median time to retrieve and evaluate a ballot from an already open
container using the countdown method was 104s, and the average time to evaluate and count one
contest on a ballot that had already been pulled was 25s. Taking the difference, we obtain a time
of 77s per ballot per contest using the countdown method. Of note, this time may be a bit inflated
due to training difficulties and sample size (only eight ballots were audited using countdown).
RIRLA also evaluated three other methods of sampling ballots in ballot polling: scales, rulers, and
k-cut [212]. Times reported above were similarly calculated by taking the differences of the retrieval
and evaluation time and the mean retrieval time. Again, this data is imperfect, since evaluation
times were pooled across methods, but once ballots have been drawn, there should be relatively few
differences in interpretation time.
Finally, the ballot comparison method took on average 31s to find a ballot in an already opened
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container.5
t(b), the time to audit a ballot b
t(b)≡

7s, in a batch comparison audit
25s, in a ballot polling audit
25s, in a ballot comparison audit
(5.4)
For audited ballots, there is some cost to recording what is on them for the audit. For non-audited
ballots, there isn’t. The cost may be different depending on the audit method, the number of pages
each ballot consists of, the number of races being audited, the number of candidates in the race, or
the social choice function of the given election (e.g. methods like ranked-choice voting may take
more time to record information for).
The Rhode Island report showed a 7s time to audit a ballot (that is, to interpret and record the
marks that appear on it) in a batch comparison audit. The other two audit types took on average 25s.
The assumptions baked into these preliminary functions are not hard and fast, and can be
tailored to a particular jurisdiction’s ballot storage procedures, chain of custody regulations, election
specifics, and so on. However, for simplicity, we will use the values defined above in our analyses
that follow as they are some of the only available empirical data.
5.3.2 The Workload Function
Now that we have captured costs for the discrete steps of sampling and auditing the ballots in
an RLA, we can define a function W that captures the overall workload that a given RLA method
entails. We will assume that all steps are taken linearly, without parallelization (see Section 5.4),
so that each ballot in the sample is drawn one after another in sequence. While this is not how
RLAs function in the real world (typically there are multiple audit boards that pull a subset of the
sample at the same time), we choose it here for simplicity and for ease of comparing audit methods.
5The RIRLA report also noted that their batches were contained in folders within containers, and reported a time to
find a ballot in an already opened container but in a different folder. However, since we are assuming that each batch is
contained within a container, we take the minimum time available.
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Section 5.5 discusses the validity of this assumption in greater detail.
W (S)≡ ∑
p∈PS
[s(p)+o(p)+ ∑
b∈BSp
(h(b)+ t(b))] (5.5)
Our workload equation depends on the set of ballots B, the set of batches P, and the specific
sampling function for the audit. It measures the amount of work performed in audit A over the
batches that are selected for the audit in sample S, PA, as well as the ballots in those batches BP.
Note that the inner summation is performed up to the last ballot in the batch that is in the sample.
For batch audits, this will be the last ballot in the batch. For ballot-level audits, this will be the
highest-index ballot that is to be sampled. For example, in a batch of 100 ballots, if ballots 7, 15,
and 56 were being sampled, the summation would count up to 56.
5.3.3 Estimating Workload
S is a necessary input for this function. However, S cannot be known for any particular audit
a priori, as it is typically generated using a random seed that is not determined until the audit.
Fortunately, most extant RLA techniques have sample-size estimation functions that can be used to
get a sense of how many and which ballots will be audited. Using these estimation functions, we
can assume some average characteristics about the samples that each technique will draw:
1. Batch draws will on average be from the middle of the set of batches if drawn at uniform
random.
2. Ballot draws will also on average be from the middle of the batch of ballots.
3. Batch sizes may vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as will the distribution of
their sizes. Some jurisdictions may have one large batch and several smaller ones, or roughly
even sized batches, etc. Precinct sizes are usually regulated so as to be roughly similar to each
other, however small variations may still be present (see [165] for example).
The sample-size estimators for the various audit methods typically do not estimate the total
number of samples that will be taken in the audit overall, as such calculation would require
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knowledge of what the samples can contain. Rather, they are estimates for the first round of the
audit. For some methods, like ballot and batch comparison, if no discrepancies are found in the
sample, these estimates are reliable predictors of how many samples the audit will need. In others,
like ballot polling, these estimates may not confirm the outcome in the first round even if the sample
reflects a situation very similar to the reported outcome, especially in elections with closer margins.
Therefore, for most results we assume the best-case scenario for audits: that the sample drawn in
the first round of the audit is sufficient to meet the risk-limit. This assumption is limiting, and is
discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.
For workload calculations, we will construct an “average” sample as follows. For ballot-level
audits, as the estimators return a number of ballots, we will find the average distribution of batches
occupied by those ballots PA and take its size to obtain the number of batches that will be opened
on average. If there are |P| batches of uniform size and |BA| ballots to audit, the expected number
of batches to open is the chance that any batch will contain at least one ballot multiplied by the
number of batches, as shown Equation 5.6.
|PA|= |P| ∗ (1− (1− 1|P|)
|BA|) (5.6)
However, since batches are rarely of the same size, we modify Equation 5.6 by constructing a
set of fake batches P∗ of size |B|. We partition P∗ into |P| parts, where each partition p∗i is of size
pi, the size of the batch it corresponds to. We then assign ballots as in Equations 5.6 to P∗, and map
the resulting audited batches P∗A back into P to give PA.
We then assume that the ballots are spread evenly in those batches, iterating over a faux list of
ballots to be audited and assigning each one to the batch that has the least number of ballots at each
step. Finally, we construct our average sample S.
S = {PA,BA} (5.7)
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5.3.4 An example workload comparison
To demonstrate how our workload function applies to various audit types, imagine a jurisdiction
that has just held an election with 100,000 ballots cast in 100 batches. This jurisdiction performs a
ballot-polling risk-limiting audit based on the method described in Lindeman et al. [143], selecting
a risk-limit of 10% and drawing ballots using the countdown method. For a margin of 40%, the
expected sample size of the audit is 31 ballots. Using Equation 5.6, we see that the expected number
of batches to open is 27. Using the method described above, we populate these 27 batches with the
first four containing two ballots and the remaining 23 containing one ballot each.
The first two terms of the workload equation s(pi) and o(pi), summed over all batches selected
for audit, are 15×27 = 405. The third term, h(bi), is 77 for batches with one ballot and 144 for
batches with two, yielding 77∗23+144∗4 = 2,387. The final term t(bi) is 25 for batches with
one ballot and 50 for batches with two, 25∗23+50∗4 = 775. Summing these terms, we obtain
a workload of 3,972s, meaning that a ballot polling audit, performed linearly as described above,
would take a little over an hour to complete. Table 5.1 shows these calculations for a few other
margins of this audit, and audit-specific workload calculations are performed in Section 5.6.
5.4 Parallelizing the work
As shown in Table 5.1, the workload for an audit can expand fairly quickly as the number of
audited ballots and batches increases. However, our model in Equation 5.5 is slightly incomplete.
Since the contents of one batch have no bearing on the contents of another, it is entirely possible
(and in fact desirable) to parallelize the work, such that batches are opened and ballots are audited
simultaneously. The amount of speedup achievable by doing this depends on the number of auditors
who can work simultaneously, but in the best case (each batch gets audited simultaneously with
every other batch), the workload for a given audit is simply the batch that requires the most work.
Put another way, a parallelized version of Equation 5.5 is
Wparallel(S)≡ max
a∈AB ∑
p∈PSa
[s(p)+o(p)+ ∑
b∈BSp
(h(b)+ t(b))] (5.8)
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Margin |S| |PA| ∑|PA|i=1 s(pi) ∑|PA|i=1 o(pi) ∑|PA|i=1∑
|BAP
i=1 f (bi) ∑
|PA|
i=1∑
|BAP
i=1 t(bi) W (S)
40% 31 27 405 405 2,387 775 3,972
20% 119 70 1,050 1,050 9,163 2,975 14,238
10% 470 100 1,500 1,500 36,190 11,750 50,940
5% 1,861 100 1,500 1,500 143,297 46,525 192,822
1% 46,151 100 1,500 1,500 3,553,627 1,153,775 4,710,402
Table 5.1: Workload Calculations for a Ballot-Polling Audit, in Seconds—This table shows
the workload calculations for a ballot-polling audit with a 10% risk-limit using the countdown
method. Since handling the ballots is the most expensive part of auditing in this way, the f (bi) term
dominates the workload as the number of ballots increases.
Margin W (S) Wmin(S)
Max
Speedup W10(S)
Speedup
with 10 ABs
40% 3,972 234 16.97 498 7.98
20% 14,238 234 60.85 1,434 9.93
10% 50,940 540 94.33 5,094 10.00
5% 192,822 1,968 97.98 19,374 9.95
1% 4,710,402 47,154 99.89 471,132 10.00
Table 5.2: Parallelization of a Ballot-Polling RLA—Here we show the workloads achievable if
every batch can be opened and its ballots audited simultaneously. Speedup depends on the total
number of batches (hence our speedup here approaching 100) as well as the number of available
auditing teams. W10 shows the workload if ten audit boards are working simultaneously, achieving
a speedup of around 10.
Wmin(S)≡max
p∈PS
[s(p)+o(p)+ ∑
b∈BSp
(h(b)+ t(b))] (5.9)
This can dramatically reduce the workload for an audit. Table 5.2 contains parallelized workload
results for the example in Section 5.3.4, showing that the speedup in the work is linear in the number
of auditors simultaneously auditing batches and ballots.
5.5 Validating the Model
Given that our model has made several assumptions, we now seek to validate it using data from
other RLAs.
Colorado The state of Colorado was the first U. S. state to roll out RLAs statewide in 2017. The
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Audit |S| AuditBoards |PA|
Expected
Workload
Observed
Workload % Error
St. Joseph County 453 10 26 4,752 6,421 35.1%
Rhode Island 128 2 3 7,476 8,961 19.9%
City of Lansing 375 4 178 10,836 12,041 11.1%
Table 5.3: Data from December 2019 Pilots—Here we show data from three ballot-polling pilots
conducted in December 2019 in Rhode Island, Lansing, and St. Joseph County Michigan. The error
in our model’s workload prediction for each of these audits is relatively small, on the order of 20
minutes or so for each audit. This is accounted for by the fact that the model does not include setup
times for the audit, lunch breaks, etc.
Colorado Secretary of State has compiled data from their RLAs on their website, including data
from five elections that have been audited since [77]. This data includes timestamps for each audited
contest on each ballot as it was evaluated, 427,496 timestamps for audited contests in total. This
data is only available for Colorado’s ballot comparison audit, which is the technique used for the
vast majority of Colorado counties.
The timestamps in this data set only refer to when information for a ballot was entered for
comparison. However, we can still use this data to construct durations, by taking the difference in
the timestamps for two successively audited ballots. This time will include all steps of our workflow
above, from locating and opening the container to recording ballot data. The mean time per contest
per ballot is 133 seconds, with a median time of 65 seconds. Our model sees a time of 86 seconds
for auditing a ballot in a new batch, which fits roughly in this range. For ballots in an already-opened
batch, our model counts 56 seconds per ballot. Therefore, our model appears to be within range of
real world data, even in a different jurisdiction, for ballot comparison audits.
Michigan The state of Michigan began piloting risk-limiting audits in 2018, relying almost
exclusively on ballot-polling audits [157]. While data from these audits are not publicly available,
we obtained timing information collected at four recent Michigan audits in the Muskegon County,
Washtenaw Independent School District, St. Joseph County, and the City of Lansing. In total, we
obtained 294 measurements corresponding to the duration between when an audit board started
pulling ballots from a batch and when they finished using the countdown method. Michigan saw a
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mean time of 79s for pulling ballots in a ballot-polling audit, which is very close to the 77s reported
by RIRLA.
We have included data for two of these audits in Table 5.3. The other two were excluded due to
the fact that we did not have end-to-end times recorded for them, only per-ballot measurements.
While the model has error on the order of about half an hour in these audits, it is strikingly accurate
considering it was developed using data from a completely different jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
differences are likely due to unaccounted delays in the auditing process, like lunch breaks or the
time it takes to print out and distribute ballot retrieval lists.
Rhode Island Rhode Island conducted another set of RLAs in December of 2019 [190], where
they performed a ballot-polling and batch-polling audit. We were able to obtain the total duration,
the sample sizes, and the ballot retrieval list for the ballot polling audit. With this information, we
ran our model based on the sample that was taken. Table 5.3 displays the data from the ballot-polling
audit.
Based on available data, it appears that our model provides a reasonable picture of audits in
the real world. Now that we have validated it, we turn our attention to using it to examine extant
risk-limiting audit schemes.
5.6 Comparing RLA Techniques
Now that we have a validated RLA model, we turn our attention to examining some commonly
used RLA methods. For now, we limit our discussion to the three types of RLA that have been
piloted in Rhode Island, and note that these have also been used in Colorado, Michigan, and many
other places as well. These techniques are the ballot-polling and ballot comparison audits presented
by Lindeman et al. [143], and the batch comparison technique presented by Stark [216].
We examine how the workload changes for each of these three methods in Figure 5.1. As the
figure shows, the parallelization of the audit methods is strictly linear, largely preserving proportions.
Batch is the only method to have its shape changed, because the workload of auditing batches in
parallel is just the workload of auditing one batch, whereas in a linear audit the workloads for each
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Figure 5.1: Workload estimates for three types of RLA—The workloads for ballot-polling, ballot
comparison, and batch comparison RLAs with a risk-limit of 10%, 100,000 ballots cast, and 1,000
ballots per batch, by margin. The graphs on the left and the right show the linear and parallel
workloads, respectively. The key differences are the scale, and that batch comparison is completely
flat in parallelized audits, since all batches are treated equally.
of the batches sum.
Unsurprisingly, ballot comparison is far and away the most efficient method, even with relatively
small margins. Ballot polling also does not perform too poorly, although it degenerates much
more rapidly than the other two methods as the margins get smaller. Figure 5.2 shows that for
margins in the 2 to 3% range and below, ballot-polling audits actually are less efficient than batch
comparison. This is because the per-ballot workload of auditing a batch is much lower than the
other two methods, although a lot more ballots are audited by batch earlier on. Once ballot polling
starts to examine many more ballots, the cost of sorting through the stacks of ballots to find each
ballot becomes severe. Due to this finding, it is safe to say that if election officials are choosing
between a ballot-polling or batch comparison audit, they should choose a ballot-polling audit only
if the true margin is likely to be more than 2 or 3%, depending on the risk-limit. Otherwise, batch
comparison, by that point a full hand recount, is more efficient.
Notably, ballot comparison audits also eventually succumb to the inefficiency of random
sampling, but margins must be below 0.18% before that occurs. Likewise with our ballot-polling
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Figure 5.2: Crossover point for batch comparison and ballot polling— Ballot-polling audits become
less efficient than batch comparison audits when the margins dip below 2 to 3% in elections with
100,000 ballots cast and a batch size of 1,000, depending on the risk-limit as depicted here.
rule of thumb, margins this small are better off just doing a full hand recount.
5.6.1 Election Size
As RLAs rely solely on the margin of an election, and not its size, one might expect that the
efficiency would scale with the size of the election. However, as shown in Figure 5.3, this is not
quite so. The smaller an election gets, the more efficient batch comparison becomes in contrast to
ballot-level methods, because it is so much more efficient at counting ballots. At the other end of
the spectrum, the larger an election gets, the more efficient ballot comparison and ballot-polling
audits become, because their sample sizes become a smaller fraction of the overall ballots at a faster
rate than the batch audit scales. Because batch audits become full recounts always at a fixed point,
the ballot-level audits can make up ground. This finding has implications for the types of election
audit policies put into practice: it may not be worth it to try to do an RLA of a small election or in a
small jurisdiction; however, it will always be worth performing an RLA at larger scales.
Interestingly, the size of the election also has an impact on when a ballot-polling audit becomes
less efficient than a batch comparison audit. For large elections, the crossover point is highly
dependent on batch size, and can range from as much as 5% down to less than 1%.
105
0250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
W
or
kl
oa
d 
(s
)
100 Ballots per Batch
Ballot Comparison Ballot Polling Batch Comparison
1,000 Ballots per Batch 10,000 Ballots per Batch
10,000 Ballots Cast
0
2,500,000
5,000,000
7,500,000
10,000,000 100,000 Ballots Cast
0.0%2.5%5.0%7.5%10.0%
0
25,000,000
50,000,000
75,000,000
100,000,000
0.0%2.5%5.0%7.5%10.0% 0.0%2.5%5.0%7.5%10.0%
Margin
1,000,000 Ballots Cast
Figure 5.3: The effect of election and batch size on efficiency—The relative workloads for ballot-
polling, ballot comparison, and batch comparison RLAs vary widely depending on the size of the
election (shown here with a risk-limit of 10%). For smaller elections, batch comparison beats out
ballot polling with relatively wide margins. The efficiency of ballot comparison audits scales well,
however, and its sample sizes and therefore workloads are relatively small regardless of election
size. Batch sizing also has essentially no effect on ballot-polling and -comparison audits, but smaller
batch sizes do make batch compraison more efficient.
5.6.2 Batch Size
Figure 5.3 also depicts the effect that batch sizing can have on an RLA. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
the more batches there are, the more efficient batch comparison audits become. As this was largely
the insight that led to ballot-level audits, it is good that our model accurately captures this behavior.
Perhaps more interestingly, batch size does not appear to have much effect on ballot-level audits.
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This is likely due to the fact that the times to retrieve and open batches, at a per-ballot level, are
strongly dominated by the time it takes to find a ballots. There does not appear to be any advantage,
from a workload perspective, of dividing ballots into more or fewer batches. There may be other
reasons to batch differently, for example splitting a batch up may make it easier for chain of custody
as a smaller stack of ballots gets moved around the audit, or the front end cost of splitting batches
may not make it worth it to have smaller batches.
5.6.3 Escalation
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Figure 5.4: Escalation of a ballot-polling RLA—Escalation can cause the workload for ballot-
polling to explode rather quickly, even in elections with wide margins. Here we depict the additional
workload of escalating a sample if the first round sample shows a tie between the winner and the
runner up, in an election with 100,000 ballots and a batch-size of 1,000. Interestingly, even for
elections with wider margins, it becomes much more efficient to switch to a batch-comparison audit
rather than continue ballot polling.
One of the key features of RLAs is that they can escalate their samples based on available
evidence. The degree to which escalation impacts the overall workload can be severe, as in the case
with a ballot-comparison audit, where even a handful of misstatements will require the next round
of the audit to perform a full hand recount. Ballot-polling audits are more forgiving, however there
are still strong penalties for not finding sufficient evidence in one round. Indeed, it may be the case
frequently that if the audit does not terminate after one round, it is most efficient to switch over to a
batch comparison audit than escalate the sample by more ballot polling. Figure 5.4 shows that even
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in races where margins indicate a tied sample is plausible, the workload explodes to the extent that
it becomes less efficient than a batch comparison audit.
5.7 Limitations
In this chapter, we have only examined RLAs through a fairly narrow lens. RLAs are known to
break down if more than one contest is targeted for the audit, and this will certainly have an effect
on the amount of time it takes to audit each ballot. Because we do not have any data about that, we
elected to not attempt to model audits of more than one race. Similarly, more complex elections
with more than two candidates, more than one winner, more than one vote allowed in the contest, or
election methods other than first-past-the-post also have an impact on the samples that the RLA
methods we have examined draw, and therefore the workload analysis.
Another caveat to our model is that it assume that workloads scale linearly. This may not be
well founded, as one could conceive of auditors becoming tired and slowing down the rates at which
they audit ballots. Conversely, auditors may face a start-up cost of learning or relearning the process,
after which they may process ballots more rapidly. This model is only meant to be a jumping off
point, and needs further validation against real world data.
Our work has also only concerned itself with three types of RLA, when there are many more.
We chose these methods because they are the most commonly adopted, but more recent technologies
like SHANGRLA [219] or risk-limiting Bayesian audits [237] may improve the workloads. In
particular, these two methods can supported more complex elections, and may also be more efficient
in the workloads they produce.
Finally, though we have examined workload in terms of wall-clock time, this is not the only
way to account for workload. We chose it because there was available data on which to base a
model. In a parallelized audit, though, the cost of running an election likely would not be affected
by parallelism, as the same amount of work-per-auditor is being performed. We would present cost
estimates, but this is difficult to characterize, as different jurisdictions have different pay scales for
different situations. However, since we have evaluated based on time, it should be fairly easy to take
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an hourly rate of any given jurisdiction and multiply it by our workload estimates to get a ballpark
figure.
5.7.1 Future Work
More work is needed to validate this method of analyzing the estimated workload of an audit.
For example, in a state like Colorado where two races must always be audited, our estimates may
not be accurate without modification. As jurisdictions become more comfortable with auditing and
recounting, it is entirely likely that the per-ballot auditing times come down. Finally, we have only
focused on time; other dimensions of workload should be examined as well.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we constructed a model for estimating the workloads of post-election audits.
We made several novel observations by applying our model, for example that parallelism really
does have a significant effect on the amount of real-world time an audit can take, that ballot-polling
audits are only really efficient in specific circumstances, and that escalation has a significant effect
on the efficiency of an audit. In the next chapter, we will apply one of these lessons to a real-world
setting, and examine how to make an audit parallelizable to the fullest extent possible in a live
election environment.
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CHAPTER VI
A Manifest Improvement on an Existing RLA Technique1
6.1 Introduction
As RLAs are adopted more widely, it is helpful to have methods suitable for different equipment
and different election logistics. For instance, jurisdictions vary widely in whether votes are predom-
inantly cast in person or through the mail, in how (and how well) they secure and track physical
ballots, and in whether their equipment creates and exports data about how it interpreted individual
ballots.
Ballots to be manually checked are drawn in a simple random sample, with or without replace-
ment. Extant methods for both ballot-level comparison audits and ballot-polling audits require a
ballot manifest, a description of how the physical ballots are organized and stored, so that ballots
can be put in a canonical order. With a ballot manifest, it makes sense to say, for instance, “retrieve
and inspect the 127,954th ballot cast in the contest.” The ballot manifest determines the sampling
frame.
As we have just seen, sampling at random is a laborious task, and frequently requires hundreds
if not thousands of man-hours to do so for close election margins. Sampling in parallel offers a
significant improvement in terms of real-time election auditing, which may be especially salient in
elections with tight certification deadlines or suspicious outcomes. While improving the speed of an
1This chapter is based on “Bernoulli Ballot-Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits” work in
conjunction with Kellie Ottoboni, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, and Philip B. Stark that appeared in Proceedings
of the 4th Annual Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting [175]
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audit in real-time is certainly desirable, it has limits. Most RLA methods require a full accounting
of all ballots before the audit can begin, which limits the amount of real-time saving that can be had
to after the manifest is prepared. Fully parallelizing an audit is also resource intensive and requires
a significant amount of coordination among a large group of people who serve as audit board
members. In order to fully take advantage of the parallelism potential in RLAs, these constraints
must be reckoned with.
In this chapter, we present an RLA method based on Bernoulli random sampling. With simple
random sampling, the number of ballots to sample is fixed; with Bernoulli sampling, the expected
sampling rate is fixed but the sample size is not. Conceptually, Bernoulli ballot polling (BBP)
decides whether to include the jth ballot in the sample by tossing a biased coin that has probability
p of landing heads. The ballot is included if and only if the coin lands heads. Coin tosses for
different ballots are independent, but have the same chance of landing heads. (Rather than toss a
coin for each ballot, it more efficient to implement Bernoulli sampling in practice using geometric
skipping, described in Section 6.6.3.)
The logistical simplicity of Bernoulli sampling may make it useful for election audits. Like all
RLAs, BBP RLAs require a voter-verifiable paper record. Like other ballot-polling RLAs [142,143],
BBP makes no other technical demands on the voting system. It requires no special equipment,
and only a minimal amount of software to select and analyze the sample—in principle, it could
be carried out with dice and a pencil and paper. In contrast to extant ballot-polling RLAs, BBP
does not require a ballot manifest (although it does require knowing where all the ballots are, and
access to the ballots). BBP is inherently local and parallelizable, because the decision of whether to
include any particular ballot in the sample does not depend on which other ballots are selected, nor
on how many other ballots have been selected, nor even on how many ballots were cast. We shall
see that this has practical advantages.
Bernoulli sampling is well-known in the survey sampling literature, but it is used less often
than simple random sampling for a number of reasons. The variance of estimates based on
Bernoulli samples tends to be larger than for simple random samples [201], due to the fact that
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both the sample and the sample size are random. This added randomness complicates rigorous
inferences. A common estimator of the population mean from a Bernoulli sample is the Horvitz-
Thompson estimator, which has a high variance when the sampling rate p is small. Often, P-values
and confidence intervals for the Horvitz-Thompson estimator are approximated using the normal
distribution [75, 146, 222], which may be inaccurate if the population distribution is skewed—as it
often is in auditing problems [177].
Instead of relying on parametric approximations, we develop a test based on Wald’s sequential
probability ratio test [239]. The test is akin to that in extant ballot polling RLA methods [142, 143],
but the mathematics are modified to work with Bernoulli random samples, including the fact that
Bernoulli samples are drawn without replacement. (Previous ballot-polling RLAs relied on sampling
with replacement.) Conditional on the attained sample size n, a Bernoulli sample of ballots is a
simple random sample. We maximize the conditional P-value of the null hypothesis (that the
reported winner did not win) over a nuisance parameter, the total number of ballots with valid votes
for either of a given pair of candidates, excluding invalid ballots or ballots for other candidates. A
martingale argument shows that the resulting test is sequential: if the test does not reject, the sample
can be expanded using additional rounds of Bernoulli sampling (with the same or different expected
sampling rates) and the resulting P-values will still be conservative.
A BBP RLA can begin in polling places on election night. Given an initial sampling rate to be
used across all precincts and vote centers, poll workers in each location determine which ballots
will be examined in the audit, independently from each other and independently across ballots, and
record the votes cast on each ballot selected. (Vote-by-mail and provisional ballots can be audited
similarly; see Section 6.6.2.) Once the election results are reported, the sequential probability ratio
test can be applied to the sample vote tallies to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that
the reported outcome is correct.2 If the sample does not provide sufficiently strong evidence to attain
the risk limit, the sample can be expanded using subsequent rounds of Bernoulli sampling until
either the risk limit is attained or all ballots are inspected. Figure 6.1 summarizes the procedure.
2The current method uses the reported results to construct the alternative hypothesis. A variant of the method does
not require the reported results. We do not present that method here; it is related to ClipAudit [192].
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BBP has a number of practical advantages, with little additional workload in terms of the number
of ballots examined. Workload simulations show that the number of ballots needed to confirm a
correctly reported outcome is similar for BBP and the BRAVO RLA [142]. If the choice of initial
sampling rate (and thus, the initial sample size) is larger than necessary, the added efficiency of
conducting the audit “in parallel” across the entire election may outweigh the cost of examining
extra ballots. Using statewide results from the 2016 United States presidential election, BBP with a
1% initial sampling rate would have had at least a 99% chance of confirming the results in 42 states
(assuming the reported results were in fact correct). A Python implementation of BBP is available
at https://github.com/pbstark/BernoulliBallotPolling.
Procedure for a Bernoulli ballot-polling audit
1. Set initial sampling rate. Choose initial sampling rate p0 based on pre-election polls or
set at a fixed value. If p0 is selected based on an estimated margin, use the ASN heuristic
in Section 6.5.
2. Sample ballots and record audit data. Use geometric skipping (below) with rate p0
to select ballots to inspect. Record votes on all inspected ballots.
3. Check attained risk. Once the final election results have been reported, for each contest
under audit and for each reported (winner, loser) pair (w, `):
• Calculate Bw, B`, and Bu from the audit sample.
• Find the (maximal) P-value from Bw,B`,Bu using the test in Section 6.3.
4. Escalate if necessary. If, for any (w, `) pair, the P-value is greater than α , expand the
audit in one of the ways described in Section 6.4.
Procedure for geometric skip sampling
1. Set the random seed. In each polling place, use a cryptographically secure PRNG, such
as SHA-256, with a seed chosen using true randomness.
2. Sample ballots. Following Section 6.6.3, for each batch of ballots: Set Y0 = 0 and set
j = 0.
• j← j+1
• Generate a uniform random variable U on [0,1).
• Yj←
⌈
ln(U)
ln(1−p)
⌉
.
• If ∑ jk=1Yj is greater than the number of ballots in the batch, stop. Otherwise, skip
the next Y j−1 ballots in the batch, and include the ballot after that one (i.e., include
ballot ∑ jk=1Yj)
Figure 6.1: Bernoulli ballot-polling audit step-by-step procedures.
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6.2 Notation and Mathematical Background
We consider social choice functions that are variants of majority and plurality voting: the
winners are the k ≥ 1 candidates who receive the most votes. This includes ordinary “first-past-the-
post” contests, as well as “vote for k” contests.3 As explained in [142], it suffices to consider one
(winner, loser) pair at a time: the contest outcome is correct if every reported winner actually re-
ceived more votes than every reported loser. Auditing majority and super-majority contests requires
only minor modifications.4 Section 6.3.2 addresses auditing multiple contests simultaneously.
Let w denote a reported winning candidate and ` denote a reported losing candidate. Suppose
that the population contains Nw ballots with a valid vote for w but not `, N` ballots with a valid vote
for ` but not w, and Nu ballots with votes for both w and ` or for neither w nor `. The total number
of ballots is N = Nw+N`+Nu. Let Nw` ≡ Nw+N` be the number of ballots in the population with a
valid vote for w or ` but not both. For Bernoulli sampling, N may be unknown; in any event, Nw,N`,
and Nu are unknown, or the audit would not be necessary.
If we can reject the null hypothesis that N` ≥ Nw at significance level α , we have statistically
confirmed that w got more votes than `. Section 6.3 presents a test for this hypothesis that accounts
for the nuisance parameter Nw`. We assume that ties are settled in a deterministic way and that if
the audit is unable to confirm the contest outcome, a full manual tally resulting in a tie would be
settled in the same deterministic way.
6.2.1 Multi-round Bernoulli Sampling
A Bernoulli(p) random variable I is a random variable that takes the value 1 with probability
p and the value 0 with probability 1− p. BBP uses Bernoulli sampling, which involves independent
selection of different ballots with the same probability p of selecting each ballot: I j = 1 if and only
if ballot j is selected to be in the sample, where {I j}Nj=1 are independent, identically distributed
(IID) Bernoulli(p) random variables.
3The same general approach works for some preferential voting schemes, such as Borda count and range voting,
and for proportional representation schemes such as D’Hondt [220]. We do not consider instant-runoff voting (IRV).
4For instance, for a majority contest, one simply pools the votes for all the reported losers into a single “pseudo-
candidate” who reportedly lost.
114
Suppose that after tossing a coin with probability p0 of landing heads for every item in the
population, we toss a coin with probability p1 for every item (again, independently), and include an
item in the sample if the first or second toss for that item landed heads. That amounts to drawing a
Bernoulli sample using selection probability 1− (1− p0)(1− p1): an item is in the sample unless
its coin landed tails on both tosses, which has probability (1− p0)(1− p1). This extends to making
any integral number K of passes through the population of ballots, with pass k using a coin that has
chance pk of landing heads: such “K-round” Bernoulli sampling is still Bernoulli sampling, with
P{I = 1}= p = 1−∏K−1k=0 (1− pk).
6.2.2 Exchangeability and Conditional Simple Random Sampling
Because the N variables {I j} are IID, they are exchangeable, meaning their joint distribution is
invariant under the action of the symmetric group (relabelings). Consider a collection of indices
S ⊂ {1, . . . ,N} of size k, 0≤ k ≤ N. Define the event
IS ≡ {I j = 1,∀ j ∈S , and I j = 0,∀ j /∈S }.
Because {I j} are exchangeable, PIS = PIT for every set T ⊂ {1, . . . ,N} of size k, since every
such set T can be mapped toS by a one-to-one relabeling of the indices.
It follows that, conditional on the attained size of the sample, n = ∑Nj=1I j, all
(N
n
)
subsets of
size n drawn from the N items are equally likely: the sample is conditionally a simple random
sample (SRS) of size n. This is foundational for applying the SPRT to Bernoulli samples.
6.3 Tests
Suppose we draw a Bernoulli sample of ballots. The random variable B is the number of ballots
in the sample. Let Bw denote the number of ballots in the sample with a vote for w but not `; let B`
denote the number of ballots in the sample with a vote for ` but not w; and let Bu denote the number
of ballots in the sample with a vote for both w and ` or neither w nor `, so B = Bw+B`+Bu.
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6.3.1 Wald’s SPRT with a Nuisance Parameter
We want to test the compound hypothesis that Nw ≤ N` against the alternative that Nw = Vw,
N` =V`, and Nu =Vu, with Vw−V` > 0.5 We present a test based on Wald’s sequential probability
ratio test (SPRT) [239].
The values Vw, V`, and Vu are the reported results (or values related to those reported results;
see [142]). In this problem, Nu (equivalently, Nw` ≡ Nw +N`) is a nuisance parameter: we care
about Nw−N`, the margin of the reported winner over the reported loser.
Conditional on B = n, the sample is a simple random sample. The conditional probability that
the sample will yield counts (Bw,B`,Bu) under the alternative hypothesis is
∏Bw−1i=0 (Vw− i) ∏B`−1i=0 (V`− i) ∏Bu−1i=0 (Vu− i)
∏n−1i=0 (N− i)
.
If B` ≥ Bw, the data obviously do not provide evidence against the null, so we suppose that B` < Bw,
in which case, the element of the null that will maximize the probability of the observed data has
Nw = N`. Under the null hypothesis, the conditional probability of observing (Bw,B`,Bu) is
∏Bw−1i=0 (Nw− i) ∏B`−1i=0 (Nw− i)∏Bu−1i=0 (Nu− i)
∏ni=0(N− i)
,
for some value Nw and the corresponding Nu = N − 2Nw. How large can that probability be
if the null hypothesis is true? The probability under the null is maximized by any integer x ∈
{max(Bw,B`), . . . ,(N−Bu)/2} that maximizes
Bw−1
∏
i=0
(x− i)
B`−1
∏
i=0
(x− i)
Bu−1
∏
i=0
(N−2x− i).
5The alternative hypothesis is that the reported results are correct; as mentioned above, there are other approaches
one could use that do not involve the reported results, but we do not present them here.
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The logarithm is monotonic, so any maximizer x∗ also maximizes
f (x) =
Bw−1
∑
i=0
ln(x− i)+
B`−1
∑
i=0
ln(x− i)+
Bu−1
∑
i=0
ln(N−2x− i).
The second derivative of f is everywhere negative, so f is convex and has a unique real-valued
maximizer on [max(Bw,B`),(N−Bu)/2], either at one of the endpoints or somewhere in the interval.
The derivative f ′(x) is
f ′(x) =
Bw−1
∑
i=0
1
x− i +
B`−1
∑
i=0
1
x− i −2
Bu−1
∑
i=0
1
N−2x− i .
If f ′(x) does not change signs, then the maximum is at one of the endpoints, in which case x∗ is
the endpoint for which f is larger. Otherwise, the real maximizer occurs at a stationary point. If the
real-valued maximizer is not an integer, convexity guarantees that the integer maximizer x∗ is one
of the two integer values that bracket the real maximizer: either bxc or dxe.
A conservative P-value for the null hypothesis after n items have been drawn is thus
Pn =
∏Bw−1i=0 (x
∗− i) ∏B`−1i=0 (x∗− i) ∏Bu−1i=0 (N−2x∗− i)
∏Bw−1i=0 (Vw− i) ∏B`−1i=0 (V`− i) ∏Bu−1i=0 (Vu− i)
.
Wald’s SPRT [239] leads to an elegant escalation method if the first round of Bernoulli sampling
does not attain the risk limit: simply make another round of Bernoulli sampling, as described in
Section 6.4. If the null hypothesis is true, then Pr{infk Pk < α} ≤ α , where k counts the rounds
of Bernoulli sampling. That is, the risk limit remains conservative for any number of rounds of
Bernoulli sampling.
6.3.2 Auditing Multiple Contests
The math extends to audits of multiple contests; we omit the derivation, but see, e.g., [143]. The
same sample can be used to audit any number of contests simultaneously. The audit proceeds to
a full hand count unless every null hypothesis is rejected, that is, unless we conclude that every
winner beat every loser in every audited contest. The chance of rejecting all those null hypotheses
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cannot be larger than the smallest chance of rejecting any of the individual hypotheses, because the
probability of an intersection of events cannot be larger than the probability of any one of the events.
The chance of rejecting any individual null hypothesis is at most the risk limit, α , if that hypothesis
is true. Therefore the chance of the intersection is not larger than α if any contest outcome is
incorrect: the overall risk limit is α , with no need to adjust for multiplicity.
6.4 Escalation
If the first round of Bernoulli sampling with rate p0 does not generate strong evidence that the
election outcome is correct, we have several options:
1. conduct a full hand count
2. augment the sample with additional ballots selected in some manner, for instance, making
additional rounds of Bernoulli sampling, possibly with different values of p
3. draw a new sample and use a different auditing method, e.g., ballot-level comparison auditing
The first approach is always conservative. Both the second and third approaches require some
statistical care, as repeated testing introduces additional opportunities to wrongly conclude that an
incorrect election outcome is correct.
To make additional rounds of Bernoulli sampling, it may help to keep track of which ballots
have been inspected.6 That might involve stamping audited ballots with “audited” in red ink, for
example.
Section 6.2.1 shows that if we make an integral number of passes through the population of
ballots, tossing a pk-coin for each as-yet-unselected item (we only toss the coin for an item on
the kth pass if the coin has not landed heads for that item in any previous pass), then the resulting
sample is a Bernoulli random sample with selection probability p = 1−∏K−1k=0 (1− pk). Conditional
on the sample size n attained after K passes, every subset of size n is equally likely to be selected.
Hence, the sample is conditionally a simple random sample of size n from the N ballots.
6Once ballots are aggregated in a precinct or scanned centrally, it is unlikely that they will stay in the same order.
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The SPRT applied to multi-round Bernoulli sampling is conservative: the unconditional chance
of rejecting the null hypothesis if it is true is at most α , because, if the null is true, the chance that
the SPRT exceeds 1/α for any K is at most α .
The third approach allows us to follow BBP with a different, more efficient approach, such as
ballot-level comparison auditing [143]. This may require steps to ensure that multiplicity does not
make the risk larger than the nominal risk limit, e.g., by adjusting the risk limit using Bonferroni’s
inequality.
6.5 Initial Sampling Rate
We would like to choose the initial sampling rate p0 sufficiently large that a test of the hypothesis
Nw ≤ N` will have high power against the alternative Nw =Vw,N` =V`, with Vw−V` = c for modest
margins c > 0, but not so large that we waste effort.
There is no analytical formula for the power of the sequential hypothesis test under this sampling
procedure, but we can use simulation to estimate the sampling rates needed to have a high probability
of confirming correctly reported election results. Table 6.1 gives the sampling rate p0 needed to
attain 80%, 90%, and 99% power for a 2-candidate race in which there are no undervotes or invalid
votes, for a 5% risk limit and a variety of margins and contest sizes. The simulations assume that the
reported vote totals are correct. The required p0 may be prohibitively large for small races and tight
margins; Section 6.7 shows that with high probability, even a 1% sampling rate would be sufficient
to confirm the outcomes of the vast majority of U.S. federal races without further escalation.
The sequential probability ratio test in Section 6.3 is similar to the BRAVO RLA presented
in [143] when the sampling rate is small relative to the population size. There are two differences
between BRAVO and BBP: BBP incorporates information about the number of undervotes, invalid
votes, or votes for candidates other than w and `, and Bernoulli sampling is done without (as opposed
to with) replacement. If every ballot has a valid vote either for w or for ` and the sampling rate is
small relative to the population size, the expected workload of these two procedures is similar. The
average sample number (ASN) [239], the expected number of draws required either to accept or to
119
Table 6.1: Estimated sampling rates needed for Bernoulli ballot polling for a 2-candidate race
with a 5% risk limit. These simulations assume the reported margins were correct.
sampling rate p to achieve . . .
true margin ballots cast 80% power 90% power 99% power
1% 100,000 55% 62% 77%
2% 100,000 23% 30% 46%
5% 100,000 5% 7% 12%
10% 100,000 2% 2% 4%
20% 100,000 1% 1% 1%
1% 1,000,000 10.4% 14.2% 24.2%
2% 1,000,000 2.9% 4.0% 7.5%
5% 1,000,000 0.5% 0.7% 1.3%
10% 1,000,000 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
20% 1,000,000 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
1% 10,000,000 1.15% 1.66% 3.11%
2% 10,000,000 0.30% 0.42% 0.84%
5% 10,000,000 0.05% 0.07% 0.13%
10% 10,000,000 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
20% 10,000,000 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
reject the null hypothesis, for BRAVO using a risk limit α and margin m is approximately
ASN≈ 2ln(1/α)
m2
.
This formula is valid when the sampling rate is low and the actual margin is not substantially smaller
than the (reported) margin used as the alternative hypothesis.
The ASN gives a rule of thumb for choosing the initial sampling rate for BBP. For a risk limit of
5% and a margin of 5%, the ASN is about 2,400 ballots. For a margin of 10%, the ASN is about
600 ballots. These values are lower than the sample sizes implied by Table 6.1: the sampling rates
in the table have a higher probability that the initial sample will be sufficient to conclude the audit,
while a sampling rate based on the ASN will suffice a bit more than half of the time.7 The ASN
multiplied by 2–4 is a rough approximation to initial sample size needed to have roughly a 90%
7The distribution of the sample size is skewed to the right: the expected sample size is generally larger than the
median sample size.
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chance that the audit can stop without additional sampling, if the reported results are correct.
The ASN formula assumes that Nu is 0; value of p0 should be adjusted to account for ballots
that have votes for neither w nor ` (or for both w and `). If r = NuN is the fraction of such ballots, the
initial sampling rate p0 should be inflated by a factor of 11−r . For example, if half of the ballots were
undervotes or invalid votes, then double the sampling rate would be needed to achieve the same
power as if all of the ballots were valid votes for either w or `.
6.6 Implementation
6.6.1 Election Night Auditing
Previous approaches to auditing require a sampling frame (possibly stratified, e.g., by mode
of voting or county). That requires knowing how many ballots were cast and their locations. In
contrast, Bernoulli sampling makes it possible to start the audit at polling places immediately after
the last vote has been cast in that polling place, without even having to count the ballots cast in the
polling place. This has several advantages:
1. It parallelizes the auditing task and can take advantage of staff (and observers) who are already
on site at polling places.
2. It takes place earlier in the chain of custody of the physical ballots, before the ballots are
exposed to some risks of loss, addition, substitution, or alteration.
3. It may add confidence to election-night result reporting.
The benefit is largest if p0 is large enough to allow the audit to complete without escalating.
Since reported margins will not be known on election night, p0 might be based on pre-election
polls, or set to a fixed value. There is, of course, a chance that the initial sample will not suffice
to confirm outcomes, either because the true margins are smaller than anticipated, or because the
election outcome is in fact incorrect.
There are reasons polling-place BBP audits might not be desirable.
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1. Pollworkers, election judges, and observers are likely to be tired and ready to go home when
polls close.
2. The training required to conduct and to observe the audit goes beyond what poll workers and
poll watchers usually receive.
3. Audit data need to be captured and communicated reliably to a central authority to compute
the risk (and possibly escalate the audit) after election results are reported.
6.6.2 Vote-by-mail and Provisional Ballots
The fact that Bernoulli sampling is a “streaming” algorithm may help simplify logistics compared
with other sampling methods. For instance, Bernoulli sampling can be used with vote-by-mail
(VBM) ballots and provisional ballots. VBM and provisional ballots can be sampled as they arrive
(after signature verification), or aggregated, e.g., daily or weekly. Ballots do not need to be opened
or examined immediately in order to be included in the sample: they can be set aside and inspected
after election day or after their provisional status has been adjudicated. Any of these approaches
yields a Bernoulli sample of all ballots cast in the election, provided the same value(s) of p are used
throughout.
6.6.3 Geometric Skipping
In principle, one can implement Bernoulli sampling by actually rolling dice, or by assigning a
U [0,1] random number to each ballot, independently across ballots. A ballot is in the sample if and
only if its associated random number is less than or equal to p.
However, that places an unnecessarily high burden on the quality of the pseudorandom number
generator—or on the patience of the people responsible for selecting ballots by mechanical means,
such as by rolling dice. If the ballots are in physical groups (e.g., all ballots cast in a precinct), it
can be more efficient to put the ballots into some canonical order (for instance, the order in which
they are bundled or stacked) and to rely on the fact that the waiting times between successes in
independent Bernoulli(p) trials are independent Geometric(p) random variables: the chance that
the next time the coin lands heads will be kth tosses after the current toss is p(1− p)k−1.
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To select the sample, instead of generating a Bernoulli random variable for every ballot, we
suggest generating a sequence of geometric random variables Y1,Y2, . . . The first ballot in the sample
is the one in position Y1 in the group, the second is the one in position Y1 +Y2, and so on. We
continue in this way until Y1 + · · ·+Yj is larger than the number of ballots in the group. This
geometric skipping method is implemented in the software we provide.
6.6.4 Pseudorandom Number Generation
To draw the sample, we propose using a cryptographically secure PRNG based on the SHA-256
hash function, setting the seed using 20 rolls of 10-sided dice, in a public ceremony. This is the
method that the State of Colorado uses to select the sample for risk-limiting audits.
This is a good choice for election audits for several reasons. First, given the initial seed, anyone
can verify that the sequence of ballots audited is correct. Second, unless the seed is known, the
ballots to be audited are unpredictable, making it difficult for an adversary to “game” the audit.
Finally, this family of PRNGs produces high-quality pseudorandomness.
Implementations of SHA-256-based PRNGs are available in many languages, including Python
and Javascript. The code we provide for geometric skipping relies on the cryptorandom Python
library, which implements such a PRNG.
While Colorado sets the seed for the entire state in a public ceremony, it may be more secure to
generate seeds for polling-place audits locally, after the ballots have been collated into stacks that
determine their order for the purpose of the audit. If the seed were known before the order of the
ballots was fixed, an adversary might be able to arrange that the ballots selected for auditing reflect
a dishonest outcome.
While the sequence of ballots selected by this method is verifiable, there is no obvious way
to verify post facto that the ballots examined were the correct ones. Only observers of the audit
can verify that. Observers’ job would be easier if ballots were pre-stamped with (known) unique
identifiers, but that might compromise vote anonymity.
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Figure 6.2: Simulated quantiles of sample sizes by fraction of votes for the winner for a two
candidate race in elections with 10,000 ballots and 1 million ballots, for BRAVO ballot-polling
audits (BPA) and Bernoulli ballot polling audits (BBP), for various risk-limits. The simulations
assume every ballot has a valid vote for one of the two candidates.
6.7 Evaluation
As discussed in Section 6.5, we expect that workload (total number of ballots examined) for
Bernoulli ballot polling to be approximately the same as BRAVO ballot polling. Figure 6.2 compares
the fraction of ballots examined for BRAVO audits and BBP for a 2-candidate contest, estimated
by simulation. The simulations use contest sizes of 10,000 and 1,000,000 ballots, each of which
has either a valid vote for the winner or a valid vote for the loser. The percentage of votes for the
winner ranges from 99% (almost all the votes go to the winner) to 50% (a tie). The methods produce
similarly shaped curves; BBP requires slightly more ballots than BRAVO.
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As the workload of BRAVO and BBP are similar, the cost of running a Bernoulli audit should
be similar to BRAVO. There are likely other efficiencies to Bernoulli audits, e.g., if the first stage
of the audit can be completed on election night in parallel, it might result in lower cost as election
workers and observers would not have to assemble in a different place and time for the audit. Even
if the cost were somewhat higher, that might be offset by advantages discussed in Section 6.8.
6.7.1 Empirical Data
We evaluate BBP using precinct-level data from the 2016 U.S. presidential election, collected
from OpenElections8 or by hand where that dataset was incomplete. If the reported margins are
correct, BBP with a sampling rate of p0 = 1% and a risk-limit of 5% would have a 99% or higher
chance of confirming the outcome in 42 states. The mean sample size per-precinct for this method
is about 10 ballots, indicating that if the audit is conducted in-precinct the workload will be fairly
minute. There is thus a large probability that if the election outcomes in those states are correct,
they would not have to audit additional ballots beyond the initial sample.
6.8 Discussion
Bernoulli ballot polling has a number of practical advantages. We have discussed several
throughout the paper, but we review all of them here:
• It reduces the need for a ballot manifest: ballots can be stored in any order, and the number of
ballots in a given container or bundle does not need to be known to draw the sample.
• The work can be conducted in parallel across polling places, and can be performed by workers
(and observed by members of the public) already in place on election day.
• The same sampling method can be used for polling places, vote centers, VBM, and provisional
ballots, without the need to stratify the sample explicitly.
• If the initial sampling rate is adequate, the winners can be confirmed shortly after voting
finishes—perhaps even at the same time that results are announced—possibly increasing voter
8http://openelections.net/, last visited 8/5/19.
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confidence.
• When a predetermined expected sampling rate is used, the labor required can be estimated in
advance, assuming escalation is not required. With appropriate parameter choices, escalation
can be avoided except in unusually close races, or when the reported outcome is wrong. This
helps election officials plan.
• If the sampling rate is selected after the reported margin is known, officials can choose a rate
that makes escalation unlikely unless the reported electoral outcome is incorrect.
• The sampling approach is conceptually easy to grasp: toss a coin for each ballot. The audit
stops when the sample shows a sufficiently large margin for every winner over every loser,
where “sufficiently large” depends on the sample size.
• The approach may have security advantages, since waiting longer to audit would leave more
opportunity for the paper ballots to be compromised or misplaced. Workers will need to
handle the ballot papers in any case to move them from the ballot boxes into long-term
storage.
Officials selecting an auditing method should weigh these advantages against some potential
downsides of our approach, particularly when applied in polling places on election night. Poll
workers are already very busy, and they may be too tired at the end of the night to conduct the
sampling procedure or to do it accurately. When audits are conducted in parallel at local polling
places, it is impossible for an individual observer to witness all the simultaneous steps. Moreover,
estimating the sample size before margins are known makes it likely that workers will end up
sampling more (or fewer) ballots than necessary to achieve the risk limit. While sampling too little
can be overcome with escalation, the desire to avoid escalation may make officials err on the side of
caution and sample more than predicted to be necessary, further reducing expected efficiency.
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6.8.1 Previous Work
Bernoulli sampling is a special case of Poisson sampling, where sampling units are selected
independently, but not necessarily with equal probability. Aslam et al. [19] propose a Poisson
sampling method in which the probability of selecting a given unit is related to a bound on the error
that unit could hide. Their method is not an RLA: it is designed to have a large chance of detecting
at least one error if the outcome is incorrect, rather than to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect
outcome per se.
6.8.2 Stratified Audits
Independent Bernoulli samples from different populations using the same rate still yields
a Bernoulli sample of the overall population, so the math presented here can be used without
modification to audit contests that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Bernoulli samples from different
strata using different rates can be combined using SUITE [176], which can be applied to stratum-
wise P-values from any method, including BBP. (This requires minor modifications to the P-value
calculations, to test arbitrary hypotheses about the margin in each stratum rather than to test for ties;
the derivations in [176] apply, mutatis mutandis.) If some ballots are tabulated using technology
that makes a more efficient auditing approach possible, such as a ballot-level comparison audit, it
may be advantageous to stratify the ballots into groups, sample using Bernoulli sampling in some
and a different method in others, and use SUITE to combine the results into an overall RLA.
6.9 Conclusion
Having identified an area for practical improvement with post-election audits, we presented a
new ballot-polling RLA based on Bernoulli sampling, relying on Wald’s sequential probability ratio
test to calculate the risk limit. The new method performs similarly to the BRAVO ballot-polling
audit but has several logistical advantages, including that it can be parallelized and conducted
on election night, which may reduce cost and increase security. The method easily incorporates
VBM and provisional ballots, and may eliminate the need for stratification in many circumstances.
Bernoulli ballot-polling with just a 1% sampling rate would have sufficed to confirm the 2016
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U.S. Presidential election results in the vast majority of states, if the reported results were correct.
The practical benefits and conceptual simplicity of Bernoulli ballot polling may make it simpler to
conduct risk-limiting audits in real elections.
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CHAPTER VII
Examining Coercion
7.1 Introduction
So far we have explored the nuances of two types of election security technology designed to
mitigate the risk that an election’s outcome could be compromised by malicious software misprinting
or miscounting votes. These two technologies, voter-verified paper and post-election audits, rely
on notions of software-independence and cast-as-intended verifiability to provide evidence for the
correctness of an election outcome. However, as discussed in Chapter II, the threat surface to
elections is broad, and there are other types of attacks that impact both an election’s correctness and
its verifiability, as well as other desirable properties like protecting voters from being coerced. Here
we turn our attention to some of these surfaces, and show that even a voting system that correctly
deploys voter-verified paper and post-election audits can be subverted if its other areas, like voter
authentication, are not protected.
The 2018 midterm elections in the United States saw numerous contentious races come down to
the wire as jurisdictions counted and recounted ballots. One of the biggest pressure points was that
of absentee ballots: in many states, there was intense litigation over which absentee ballots could be
counted in the totals. For example, Georgia saw a federal court overrule the policies in Gwinnett
County, where ballots from Asian-American voters were being rejected at significantly higher rates
than other voters [94]. Other states like Florida and Arizona saw similar issues [182, 223], and
North Carolina even saw an elaborate fraud scheme designed around “ballot harvesting”, a process
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in which voters’ ballots are collected before they are filled out, allowing the collectors to vote for
whomever they would like [42].
Five states in the U.S. have already moved to an all-vote-by-mail election model [171], and
more and more states are looking to ramp up their absentee voting capabilities in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic [172]. Indeed, states like Georgia and Michigan are already surpassing all-
time high turnout in ballots voted by mail [46, 91]. While there has been significant work on remote
voting in an Internet context [34,35,81], and in particular of coercion and coercion-resistance [134],
there is little existing work about vote-by-mail schemes.
Most VBM authentication today is done using voters’ wet-ink signatures on their ballot envelopes
(in the U.S.) or signature cards (in places like Switzerland [130]). Wet-ink signature validation is
often done by hand [163], though there are automated solutions available [207]. Both schemes have
inherent flaws, as wet-ink signatures change over time and often are not consistently reproduced
by the signer.1 Moreover, this relatively weak authentication scheme leaves ample room for fraud,
either via wet-ink signature forgery, ballot harvesting, or coercion. Wet-ink signatures can also be
omitted entirely, by mistake. Some difficulties are well documented in election worker training
manuals, such as [167] from Colorado.
Local regulations and election worker training may change between jurisdictions, so absentee
ballot rejection rates based on wet-ink signature validation can vary by several percentage points
even within one state [209]. All of these factors contribute to a need for a more robust method of
voter authentication for absentee ballots. Voter coercion in VBM voting schemes is also not well
understood. Anecdotes about coercion abound, as do reports of isolated coercion incidents like
those reported in North Carolina in 2018 [42].
In this chapter, we analyze a vote-by-mail scheme based on real-world elections, and explore
its security properties in the context of existing threat models like the coercion-resistance model
proposed by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [125]. We use JCJ as a framework to construct a security
model, and use our model to find that existing VBM schemes are severely lacking in two important
1The field of forensics has numerous studies about the failure of trained experts and automated systems to correctly
identify correct or forged wet-ink signatures, for example [39, 100, 114, 208].
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Figure 7.1: Absentee Ballot Envelope from Washington County, Oregon—An example of the
envelope a voter signs when mailing in their ballot [88].
areas: authentication and coercion-resistance. We then examine the effects of policy variations
on security, for example whether a jurisdiction allows voters to vote in person and override their
mailed-in ballot. We also propose a technical solution based on HMAC-based one time passwords
(HOTPs) that replaces wet-ink signatures and solves many of the authentications problems that
existing VBM schemes have.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 models VBM as a protocol
after [125]. Section 7.3 develops our approach, introducing HOTPs as a replacement for wet-ink
signatures and recommending that voters be allowed to revoke a submitted absentee ballot or re-vote.
Section 7.4 contextualizes our solution in the current technical and policy environment of U.S.
elections, and finally Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Modelling Vote-by-Mail
In order to better understand the security properties of VBM, we will construct a framework for
VBM after Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) [125]. While JCJ is not a perfect framework for
analysis, and many modifications have to be made to it to fit VBM (which we discuss later), it does
provide a good starting point for thinking about secure remote voting schemes. By examining VBM
within this framework, we show that it lacks the capability to adequately provide correctness and
coercion-resistance properties. Our modified framework also illuminates where improvements can
be made, and we use it later on in Section 7.3.3 to evaluate the performance of our improvements.
Remark: Most VBM schemes in the U.S. do not utilize cryptography in the traditional sense, if at
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all. Here, when we use SK and PK for election authorities, the best analog is the keys used in the
certificates authenticating election officials’ websites, which are frequently where voter registration
takes place [173]. Thus, when we say that a voter roll or tally is signed, we mean that it is published
on a website authenticated with TLS. While some election websites do not currently use TLS, they
are becoming less and less common due to major pushes by CISA [83], so we will assume for our
protocol that TLS is used.
7.2.1 Functions
We adopt the same primitives at the JCJ scheme, including registrarsR, talliers T , voters V ,
candidate slate C , specified by nC , and tally vector X. However, as the functions performed in a
VBM scheme are slightly different, we modify the four protocols in JCJ as follows and add another
protocol, authenticate:
• Registering: The function register(SKR , i,sigi,L)→ {0,1} takes the registrar’s secret key,
the voter’s information i,2 and the voter’s wet-ink signature sigi, adds the voter to the voter
roll L and outputs 1 if the registration was successful, otherwise, outputs 0.
• Voting: The function vote(sig,PKT ,nC ,β )→ b takes in the voter’s wet-ink signature, tal-
lier’s public key, the slate of candidates, and the voter’s choices and produces a sealed paper
ballot b for tallying.
• Authentication: The function authenticate(sig,b,L,BBVBM)→ {⊥,bopen} takes in the
voter’s wet-ink signature sig, their sealed ballot b, and the list of eligible voters L, and
determines if sig corresponds to a voter in L. If it does, then the ballot is opened and added to
the set of ballotsB for tallying, andBBVBM is updated to True for the voter. Otherwise,
the ballot is discarded.
• Tallying: The function tally(SKT ,B,nC )→ X takes in the tallier’s secret key SKT , the set
of opened ballotsB, and the candidate slate and produces the tally X, the vector of summed
2Voter information consists of a unique identifier associated with the voter that is maintained in the voter registration
database, and is not public.
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vote totals for each selection.
• Verifying: The function verify(PKT ,BBV BM,B,nC ,X)→ {0,1} takes the public key of
the talliers PKT , the bulletin boardBBVBM, the set of tallied ballotsB, the candidate slate
nC , and the tally X and outputs 1 if the result verifies as correct, 0 otherwise.
7.2.2 Setup
VBM deviates from the JCJ formulation of an election in a few key ways. There are no keys
generated or used in the process (except the TLS keys for the registration website and results
reporting website), so the setup phase simply consists of publishing the slate of candidates.
Registration is two steps in VBM: voters register to vote and obtain a credential with which to
vote (in the form of a wet-ink signature on file in the clerk’s office, loosely akin to the secret key in
JCJ). Once the voter has mailed in their ballot, the clerk compares the wet-ink signature included
with the ballots with the one on file to verify that it matches, and if it does the vote is counted (akin
to “permitting participation in the election”).
As votes have no commitments when they are submitted, there is also no bulletin board in the
traditional sense. This means that tallying simply consists of counting the plaintext paper ballots.
Additionally, the lack of a bulletin board means that that voters cannot individually verify
that their ballots were received and correctly included in the tally during the verification phase.
However, voters can query clerks to determine that their ballots were received, and there is not
usually authentication of the voters identity [166, 168, 169]. We model this as a bulletin board
BBVBM consisting of the list of registered voters and a boolean value for each voter. BBVBM is
initialized with the list of eligible voters and False for every voter, and when ballots are received
and authenticated the boolean corresponding with that voter is changed to True. Importantly, once
a ballot has been received for a voter andBBVBM for that voter is set to True, the ballot cannot be
revoked. Voters in our model are not allowed to re-vote once they have voted by mail, a constraint
that is required by many VBM schemes within the U.S. We consider schemes where voters may
mutate their ballot after initial submission outside of scope for now, but we discuss the implications
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of this later on.
Similarly, the lack of a traditional bulletin board means that the tally cannot be recomputed
by summing and decrypting its contents. However, weaker properties, like ensuring the tally
corresponds to the number of voters who voted are still verifiable. Furthermore, a post-election
audit, like a risk-limiting audit [215] can provide a statistical degree of verifiability, while not
achieving full universal verifiability. We will assume that an RLA is performed.
Finally, talliers and registrars are typically the same people: local clerks are responsible for
both determining who is eligible to vote as well as counting the ballots after the election. While we
distinguish above,R and T are identical and could be substituted for one another.
7.2.3 Assumptions
Our setup phase requires no assumptions. Adversaries in VBM may coerce voters prior to the
registration phase, requiring that they register and request a ballot. This may include having the
voter’s ballot mailed to the adversary or registering a signature chosen by the adversary.
The merging of the talliers and registrars constrains the requirement during registration that the
adversary cannot corrupt the registrars, since the scheme VBM also fails to provide for the other
two registration phase assumptions, leading to a simulation attack as described in JCJ (discussed
further below). However, we will assume that the adversary cannot impersonate the voter during the
registration phase, only that they can seize their credentials once registered. This is reasonable, as
registration typically requires fairly thorough verification of the voter’s identity that goes beyond
what an adversary may be able to obtain from the voter (see [170] as an example of the information
needed).
VBM needs stronger assumptions on the anonymous channel on which voters can cast votes.
As with JCJ, we assume the channel faithfully transmits the vote that was submitted to it, i.e. that
the postal service is honest. We term this the honest postal system hypothesis.
If an attacker has corrupted the talliers, it is possible that ballots will not be adequately separated
from their outer envelopes, revealing the vote for each voter. For our purposes, we will assume
that the attacker cannot corrupt the talliers in this way—that is, that the anonymity of the ballot
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is maintained by the tallier. An analogy for this assumption is that votes contained in envelopes
are encrypted and the opening of the envelopes preserves anonymity through a mixnet (where the
outer envelopes are discarded and unable to be tied to the inner envelope). We term this the honestly
processed envelope hypothesis.
This hypothesis holds provided that anyone can observe the opening and processing of VBM
ballots in person and detect if the talliers were tying ballots to voters or throwing ballots into the
trash. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require a party balance in their elections offices, such that
two workers of opposing parties must complete tasks like opening and counting ballots together
(see, e.g., [236]). This limits the possibility of one party seeking an advantage by cheating, and
we take this practice as an assumption to our model as well. Note that these assumptions do not
preclude the adversary for corrupting the talliers and producing a fraudulent election outcome.
On the other end of the voting channel, standard VBM schemes typically allow for the filling
out of the ballot in the clerk’s office, and therefore VBM in theory satisfies the assumption that
voters can cast their ballots out of sight of the coercer. We term this the private voting hypothesis.
In practice, this assumption may not hold, as in the case where the coercer can prevent the voter
from going to a public location or if the voter cannot reasonably travel to the clerk’s office due to
distance or barriers to mobility. Therefore, we cannot assume that VBM satisfied the private voting
hypothesis.
Most VBM schemes typically only allow each voter to “cast” their vote once: once the ballot is
in the mail, the voter cannot do anything to cast another ballot or cancel out their vote. We term this
the unique ballot submission hypothesis.
7.2.4 Examining VBM
JCJ requires that a voting scheme have three properties: correctness, verifiability, and coercion-
resistance.
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7.2.4.1 Correctness
Adopting the JCJ definition of correctness with our modified VBM protocols, we find that
VBM does prevent double-voting (a voter submitting more than one ballot). However, the attacker
has a method of defeating the election’s correctness: ballot forging. Wet-ink signatures, of the
type used in VBM to authenticate ballots, are a very poor form of authentication. A significant
amount of discussion of the ease with which these signatures can be forged exists in forensics
literature [39, 114]. Signature verification is a known imperfect process, with numerous incidents
occurring over the years that have unduly disenfranchised voters or otherwise hindered election
process [94, 163, 223]. Furthermore, signature accept and reject rates vary widely even within the
same state [209]. An attacker can take advantage of these weakness to mount a ballot forging
attack, which allows them to submit a fraudulent ballot by forging the voter’s signature. This could
cause a ballot from a voter not under the adversary’s control to appear in the final tally. As our
verify function would find that the reported outcome agrees with the paper trail and BBVBM, a
ballot forging attack could defeat the correctness of our election.
7.2.4.2 Verifiability
VBM under the JCJ definition of verifiability is not verifiable, as an attacker can craft an election
in which the reported tally of the election may not be exactly identical to the actual tally computed
on the paper ballots. However, as verify relies on risk-limiting audits to provide verifiability, it is
not possible that the attacker could craft a tally in which the outcome reflected by the paper ballots
differs from the reported result without detection and correction. Therefore, we adopt the definition
of verifiability provided by RLAs:
Definition 11. An election is verifiable if the adversary cannot forge a tally with a different outcome
than the tally computed overB.
Because RLAs preclude the ability of the attacker to forge an election result that is not statistically
supported by the set of paper ballots, VBM achieves this definition of verifiability.
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7.2.4.3 Coercion-resistance
As VBM does not preserve an anonymous channel in which to cast a ballot, it cannot provide
coercion-resistance. An attacker can perform the following attacks under our model to win the
coercion-resistance experiment specified in [125]:
• Ballot harvesting—an attacker can force a voter to sign their envelope and surrender their
unmarked ballot, enabling the attacker to vote in place of the voter. This allows an attacker to
mount a simulation attack.
• Ballot seizure—an attacker can force the voter to surrender their voted, sealed ballot, mount-
ing a forced-abstention attack.
• Blackmail—an attacker can threaten or pay the voter to abstain, and verify they have done so
by checkingBBVBM.
7.2.5 Realistic Coercion Mitigation
We note that while coercion of any voter should not be permitted by any voting system, it is
often impossible to achieve coercion-resistance in real-world voting systems. Therefore, we propose
a weaker definition, coercion-hardness.
Definition 12. A voting scheme is coercion-hard if the adversary must corrupt a significant fraction
of voters F to alter the outcome of the election.
Assuming a real-world adversary, the degree of tampering required to defeat this definition is
directly tied to the margin of the election. Formally, if cA is the coercer’s preferred choice that
would not win without coercion, m is the true margin in an election in votes (the difference between
the votes for the least-vote-getting winner cW and cA , if there was no coercion), a coercer would
need to change at least F = m2 votes for cW to cA to change the outcome. This can be done if
the coercer can identify at least m2 voters who would otherwise vote for cW and submit forged
ballots for them before they can vote, or if they can force abstention by at least m voters who would
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vote for cW and ∑Ni=1 mi voters who voted for other losing candidates that got more votes than cA ,
where mi is the margin between those candidates and cA respectively. In a forced-abstention attack,
F =m+∑Ni=1 mi. We propose that a reasonable definition of F is F ≡m, such that the attacker must
corrupt at least m voters to sway the election outcome.
In the worst case, the attacker would prefer the runner up, the candidate with the most votes that
did not win. This would minimize F . However, except in unusually close or small elections, F is
likely to be at least hundreds of votes, if not thousands or more. This means that an adversary who
has not corrupted the talliers will have to do significant amount of work in a coordinated fashion
to violate the correctness property. VBM’s reliance on paper ballots and one-time voting makes
widespread coercion arduous, if not flat out infeasible. Moreover, VBM is not usually the only
means of voting available to voters, and an attacker wishing to change the result of the election
by only attacking VBM will have to do even more coercion of VBM voters to compensate for
votes they cannot coerce in the non-VBM modes of voting. For our purposes, we will assume that
VBM is the only mode of voting, and that the attacker’s candidate is the most vote-getting loser for
worst-case analysis.
Because the adversary in VBM can perform simulation attacks, VBM is not coercion hard. We
propose a mechanisms to prevent corruption of the talliers and simulation attacks in Section 7.3,
proposing a VBM scheme that is correct, verifiable, and coercion-hard.
7.3 Improving VBM
It is clear that vote-by-mail as implemented in the U.S. is a fairly insecure system. Not only
does it permit coercion, but it also cannot guarantee correctness. These failings stem from several
places: the weak, wet-ink signature-based authentication model, a lack of individual verifiability,
and a lack of an anonymous voting channel. In this section, we present modifications to VBM as
described above that can dramatically improve these issues.
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7.3.1 Improving Authentication
In order to improve VBM authentication, we propose implementing HMAC-based one-time-
pads (HOTPs) [235] to replace voters’ wet-ink signatures on their ballot envelopes. A shared secret
between the voter and the registrars is established during the registration phase, and can be derived
from data that the registrar gets from the voter (above, the i passed into register). The key can be
downloaded by the voter from the voter registration website during the registration phase, or it can
be made available offline by the registrar via mail or in-person transaction.
The key can then be used by the voter and the registrar to generate HOTPs. For the registrar,
new HOTPs can be generated in the election management software each time a ballot is mailed to
the voter, and stored until the voter mails their ballot back. The voter can generate a new HOTP
each time they receive a ballot to vote using an app provided by the registrar.
Implementing HOTPs inherits their strong authentication properties, significantly improving
the security of VBM. Combining authentication with HOTPs and trustworthy policies concerning
election officials, VBM can satisfy the correctness property we specified in Section 7.2.4.1, as well
as the one specified in [125]. Because an attacker can no longer forge a ballot for a voter not under
their control, and ballots cannot be destroyed once received by the election officials, it is infeasible
for the attacker to affect the tally by simulating a voter not under their control.
7.3.2 Improving the Voting Channel
Now that we can guarantee that our election scheme is correct, we turn our attention to coercion.
A major issue with VBM as it stands is that voters only have one opportunity to submit their
ballot, and once their ballot is submitted (and authenticated) the vote is counted. Some states, like
Michigan, allow voters to submit their ballots multiple times, cancelling out previously received
ballots. Implementing this policy dramatically improves voters’ access to an anonymous channel,
and significantly weakens the coercer’s ability to determine if a coerced voter voted in the way they
wanted.
Even if re-voting cannot be permitted, our HOTP scheme can be used to revoke a submitted
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ballot, which in the worst case reduces all attacks to forced abstention attacks. As we discuss above,
if the adversary cannot change the coerced voter’s vote, but can only discard it, it at least doubles
the amount of work they need to do to change the election outcome. To revoke a submitted ballot, a
voter would simply have to iterate their HOTP to a different value than was written on the envelope.
This functionality can be supported on the election website, and could require multiple HOTP
codes to be generated for authentication to prevent spurious iterations. When the ballot is received,
because the HOTP value will not longer match what is on the ballot, the ballot can be discarded.
Since we are still only allowing one vote attempt per voter in this scheme, a revocation need not
causeBBVBM to reset for a voter. This way, an attacker can also no longer tell if their vote was
counted, further weakening their ability to coerce voters.
7.3.3 VBM Improved
Now that we have identified several areas where VBM can be improved, we present VBM-
Improved, which implements our suggested changes. First, we need to modify our existing functions
to include our improvements. We introduce H to correspond to a keyed-HMAC, where the first
positional argument corresponds to the key and the second to the data to be hashed. The functions
tally and verify remain the same as before.
• Registering: The function register(SKR , i,L)→ {⊥,(Ki,Ci)} takes the registrar’s secret
key and the voter’s information i, and returns a shared secret key Ki and counter Ci if the
registration was successful, and adds the voter to the roll L. Otherwise, the registration returns
nothing.
• Voting: The function vote(i,H(Ki,Ci),PKT ,nC ,β )→ b takes in the voter’s information
i, the HMAC-based one-time-password computed over the shared secret K and counter C,
tallier’s public key, the slate of candidates, and the voter’s choices and produces a sealed
paper ballot b for tallying.
• Authentication: The function authenticate(i,H(Ki,Ci),b,L,BBVBM)→ {⊥,bopen} takes
in the voter’s information i, the one-time-password based on the voter’s key Ki and counter Ci,
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a sealed ballot b, the list of eligible voters L andBBVBM . It computes H(KRi,CRi) using the
key and counter held by the registrar corresponding to the voter in L, and if it matches, then
the ballot is opened and added to the set of ballotsB for tallying, andBBVBM is updated to
True for the voter. Otherwise, the ballot is discarded.
Next, we need to introduce two new functions, revoke and revote, which will allow voters to
either revoke their already-cast ballot, or to vote a new one.
• Revoking: The function revoke(H(Ki,Ci))→⊥ takes in a one-time-password and the voter’s
information and removes the corresponding ballot, if it exists, from the set of ballots to be
tallied.
• Re-voting: The function revote(H(Ki,Ci),PKT ,nC ,β )→ b takes in a new one-time-password
derived from the voter’s shared secret and new ballot. This function removes any other bal-
lots corresponding to this voter from the set to be tallied, and then includes the new ballot
submitted by this function.
With these new constraints of our authenticate function, it is no longer possible for the attacker
to add or remove ballots from voters not under their control. While we assume thatR and T are
honest, systems on which they rely, like ballot scanners, may not be. However, verify will correct
incorrect outcomes produced by malicious scanner software and the like. Therefore, with this set of
assumptions VBM-Improved satisfies the correctness definition set out in [125] and our modified
definition of verifiability from above.
A non-trivial risk with any HOTP-based system is leakage of the shared secret. Such a leakage
would result in an attacker gaining the ability to forge ballots for voters outside of their control,
reducing the benefits of HOTPs back to written signatures. However, provided that best-practices
laid out in [235] are followed by the election officials and the HOTP scheme is implemented
securely, we believe this risk to be fairly minimal.
Another issue with the HOTP scheme is if an attacker can force a voter to surrender their device
or access to the HOTP codes, the attacker could in principle forge votes for this voter. However,
141
this is essentially the same as the attacker controlling the voter, and does not violate the correctness
property.
The addition of revote and revoke also strengthen the anonymity of the vote-casting channel.
Even though we can still not assume that one exists, voters now have more options for behaving
in ways that can defeat the coercer. BecauseBBVBM is not updated when a ballot is revoked or
re-voted, the adversary no longer can tell whether a voter has voted the ballot they chose. The
adversary can still perform forced-abstention attacks, but their capability to sway the election
outcome in this way has been reduced by at least half, as forced abstention attacks require at
least twice as much coercion as simulation attacks. Because of this, VBM-Improved achieves the
property of coercion-hardness, in addition to being verifiable and correct.
Figure 7.2 shows a comparison between VBM and VBM-Improved.
7.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss some properties of our scheme, suggest where it can be applied, and
discuss some future work.
7.4.1 Related Work
A significant amount of work that has been done on coercion resistance has focused on Internet
voting schemes, and solutions typically involve fairly heavy-weight cryptographic solutions which
also require specialized hardware [134]. Because the United States has no unified identification
card, unlike, for example, Estonia [211], solutions that rely on national identification do not work.
Moreover, no individual state or jurisdiction has smart-card enabled IDs, so providing the public
key infrastructure required by most existing coercion-resistant schemes like those in [17, 64, 71, 72,
125, 136, 145, 178, 199] is likely not feasible.
Analyses of the security of a few vote-by-mail schemes do exist [130,189], however they do not
examine VBM schemes through the lens of coercion resistance as canonically defined.
Although the coercion guarantees provided by VBM-Improved may not be as strong as those
provided in many systems in the existing literature, we believe its light weight and compatibility
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VBM Voting Scheme
1. Setup: The candidate slate C for the election is published by the registrars with appro-
priate integrity protection.
2. Registration: The identities and eligibility of would-be participants in the election are
verified byR. Given successful verification, an individual becomes a registered voter,R
stores their signature, and mails them a ballot. Previously registered voters may not need
to re-register or request a ballot. R publishes a voter roll L and initializedBBVBM .
3. Voting: Referring to the candidate slate C , registered voters use their credentials to cast
ballots. They place their ballots into a sealed envelope, sign the envelop with the same
signature thatR has on file, and mail the ballot back.
4. Authenticating: OnceR receives the ballot, they compare the signature with the one on
file. If it matches, the ballot is opened and included in the tally, and flip that voter’s bit
to true onBBVBM . Otherwise, they may communicate to the voter that the signature
does not match.
5. Tallying: The authority T processes the contents of the the set of ballots so as to
produce a tally vector X specifying the outcome of the election.
6. Verification: Any player, whether or not a participant in the election, can queryBBVBM
to ascertain if a voter’s ballot was received, as well as summingBBVBM to ensure that
the number of voters is greater than or equal to the sum of X. A post-election audit is
performed on the ballots in a public ceremony to confirm the outcome.
VBM-Improved Voting Scheme
1. Setup: The candidate slate C for the election is published by the registrars with appro-
priate integrity protection.
2. Registration: The identities and eligibility of would-be participants in the election are
verified byR. Given successful verification, an individual becomes a registered voter,R
generates a key Ki and counter Ci, and mails them a ballot. Previously registered voters
may not need to re-register or request a ballot. R publishes a voter roll L and initialized
BBVBM .
3. Voting: Referring to the candidate slate C , registered voters use their credentials to cast
ballots. They place their ballots into a sealed envelope, generate a one-time-password
using H(Ki,Ci) and write it on their envelope, and mail the ballot back.
4. Re-voting and revoking If a voter wishes to vote again or to revoke the ballot they have
already submitted, they invoke revote or revoke respectively. They can do this until the
election ends.
5. Authenticating: OnceR receives the ballot, they compute H(KRi,CRi) and ensure that
the value matches the one written on the ballot. If it matches, the ballot is opened and
included in the tally, and flip that voter’s bit to true onBBVBM . Otherwise, they may
communicate to the voter that the value does not match.
6. Tallying: The authority T processes the contents of the the set of ballots so as to
produce a tally vector X specifying the outcome of the election.
7. Verification: Any player, whether or not a participant in the election, can queryBBVBM
to ascertain if a voter’s ballot was received, as well as summingBBVBM to ensure that
the number of voters is greater than or equal to the sum of X. A post-election audit is
performed on the ballots in a public ceremony to confirm the outcome.
Figure 7.2: Comparison between VBM procedure and VBM-Improved procedure
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with existing schemes more than make up for this. Furthermore, it is not as if there are no guarantees
of coercion prevention: the scheme does require significantly more effort on the part of the coercer
to affect an election outcome.
7.4.2 Usability
As VBM-Improved relies on existing technical infrastructure, namely HOTPs, it inherits their
usability properties, for better or for worse. HOTPs are most commonly deployed in two-factor
authentication settings, and much work has been done about the user experience and usability
of these systems. Several studies have examined a multitude of 2FA apps which use one-time
passwords as their authentication mechanism [7, 76, 135, 188, 243, 244], in general noting wide
ranges of attitudes and abilities to successfully use one-time-passwords.
Unlike the context of existing usability work on one-time passwords, those in VBM-improved
must be correctly transcribed onto the ballot envelope. This may present another usability issue:
human transcription of many-digit numbers is not well studied.3. If this does present an issue, other
kinds of signature codes may be generated. Following after some of the usable password work [47],
signatures codes may be random sentences constructed based on the output of the signature code
function. This provides a neat property: even if the voter makes a mistake, it is unlikely that the
mistake will make their signature code unverifiable: a typo in one word of a sentence does not
obscure the content of teh sentence.
Further work is needed to establish what impact our scheme has on the usability of absentee
voting. Better understanding how accurate humans are at transcribing numbers is paramount to
making our scheme work. Moreover, requiring voters to perform an additional step in the process
voting may have negative affects on voters’ ability to vote successfully, and this also needs further
study. However, we note that VBM-Improved is completely backwards compatible with existing
VBM scheme, so voters who do not wish to use HOTPs or who have difficulty doing so can always
default back to their established behavior patterns when voting by mail.
3 [144] provides some discussion of handwriting recognition, that’s somewhat unrelated. There has also been some
work on CAPTCHAs, which is a similar task [54]
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7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined how even voting systems that deploy best-practices can still fall
short in terms of security. We presented a remedy to the problem of absentee ballot signature
validation. Signature validation will only become a more pressing problem as absentee voting
expands in the United States and elsewhere. This work is a step towards solving voter authentication
for remote voting, and we hope that future work will illuminate better mechanisms to solve this
problem.
145
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion
In this work, I have presented an argument that simply knowing how to improve election security
is not enough. If security solutions are not adapted to specific local environments, if they do not
form part of a fabric of security solutions covering the whole of an election system, or if there are
even seemingly insignificant mistakes in their deployment, they may not provide enough security to
defeat a motivated adversary. This last idea is worth emphasizing: we have seen motivated attackers
present in the election space for the past few years, attempting to subvert election systems through a
variety of means. Because of this, it is no longer sufficient to merely say “you should do X” when
asked about election security. The devil is in the details.
As we have seen with voter-verified paper, slight deviations in the means of deployment can
have disastrous effects. An attacker could hack software designed to support auditing images of
paper ballots or the machines that produce those paper ballots. These attacks are not limited to
the devices and systems I have discussed here; attacks on ballot printers in hand-marked solutions,
on machines that facilitate postal voting or remote voting otherwise, or on software designed to
facilitate risk-limiting audits are also possible and not well studied.
Risk-limiting audits present several challenges to their feasibility in many jurisdictions. By and
large, the lack of expertise in the underlying statistics of RLAs and the software the supports them
has proven a significant hindrance to their use. Fitting an RLA to a specific jurisdiction’s needs
is critical, as some jurisdictions simply cannot perform some kinds of audits because of technical
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or legal constraints. Even meeting these places where they are introduces drawbacks: while it is
possible to conduct a perfectly parallelized ballot-polling audit on election night without a ballot
manifest, does the cost to transparency and the risk of tired poll workers making mistakes outweigh
the benefits?
One need only to look at the state of Virginia for an example of how an attempt to cope with
the local environment and still run an “RLA” can fail spectacularly. Virginia’s RLA law requires
that jurisdictions be drawn from a hat and perform an RLA once every five years. The RLA must
be performed after certification and cannot have an impact on the outcome of the election that is
audited. Furthermore, no election in Virginia is wholly contained within one jurisdiction, so unless
all jurisdictions containing an election are drawn at once (which is higly improbable), no audit could
be valid for any race. While I maintain that it is important for technologies be adapted to the needs
of the places using them, it is not always unreasonable to require that some places adapt to their
technologies. In either case, the nuance of both the place and the technology must be understood
for things to work.
Finally, even in systems that are widely regarded as doing everything right, high levels of
security are not readily attained. The state of Colorado is frequently held up as the pinnacle of
election security in the United States, as it relies almost exclusively on hand-marked, vote-by-mail
ballots and performs ballot-comparison RLAs, the most efficient kind. But as we have seen in the
last chapter, even this system can be subject to attack in a variety of ways. While I only addressed
wet-ink signature forging, it is not hard to imagine a hack of a signature verification machine, or of
the voter registration database that could put the entire election system in chaos overnight.
Nevertheless, none of these things exists in a vacuum. Since the 2016 election a wide variety
of other security technologies not discussed here have been deployed in the U.S. End-point
monitoring, intrusion detection systems, encrypted email, multifactor authentication, and many
other technologies have been deployed in addition to an increased use of voter-verifiable paper and
post-election audits to provide greater election security. To my knowledge, there is not much work
in the academic literature examining how these technologies perform in the election setting, nor
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how they interplay with other technologies to improve election security.
8.1 Future Work
While I have mentioned a few areas for future work above, here I set aside some space for
specific work and questions that I have in mind.
More work on verifiability. While more and more work is being done on the topic of what makes
a voting system verifiable, much more work is needed. A lot of the current discussion focuses
exclusively on ballot marking devices, while hand-marked paper is assumed to be verifiable. This
is not always so; one can imagine an attack on the printer that produces the paper ballots wherein
some small fraction of paper ballots is misprinted so that it will not scan correctly, or that two
candidates’ names are flipped so that voters will think they are voting for one person but actually
vote for the other. This type of attack is also possible on a BMD, of course, but there is not much
evidence about hand-marked paper. Even a replication of the Everett et al. study examining error
rates with hand-marked paper would do a great deal to provide vital evidence to the discussion [95].
Risk-limiting audits. As auditing pilots have picked up across the U.S. and the world, a good deal
of data has been produced about which auditing practices work and which don’t. Work is needed
that reckons with these experiences, as well as new audit practices that build on the knowledge
gained. For example, my impression from having participated in dozens of audits at this point
is that workload is not as big a deal as once thought. Other factors, like how the sample sizes
degenerate as margins get small, or how to provide likelihood of finishing in one round seem to be
the prevailing concerns with election officials. Work that takes this into account would be useful for
future auditing technology.
Coercion and remote voting. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, more and more jurisdictions
are seeking to broaden the set of voters that uses vote-by-mail or even online voting. The actual
rates of coercion in remote voting is not well understood, and will indeed be a difficult thing to
measure. However, it ought to be possible to do so, following best practices established in fields
like the study of stalkerware and intimate partner violence.
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Other election systems. Russia penetrated two voter registration systems in 2016. How secure
are these systems? What about election night reporting? How likely is an attack where state ENR
systems are taken out and replaced with fakes?
Complex system externalities. Many of the systems that elections rely on are much more complex
than just voting. One only has to read the software load out on a voting system to see that it isn’t just
marking and counting, but formatting and mailing and testing and so on. How likely is it that some
obscure piece of software present in a voting system provides a point of entry for malware? Postal
voting relies on a communication channel that is not well understood in terms of computer security:
the post office. Most mail interfaces with dozens of computers in the course of its traversal, but how
well secured are those systems? What potential attacks could be carried out on the post office?
8.2 Looking Ahead
So there is a great deal of work to do. The ideas I have presented here merely scratch the
surface of what is possible and what we have seen in terms of attacks on elections the world over.
Moreover, I have largely disregarded the political and sociological dimensions of examining these
technologies. Integrity, verifiability, coercion, correctness, etc. are all malleable, and the choices
of their definitions and how they are modelled are necessarily political. It is all well and good
to say that a voting system has eligibility verifiability, but this completely belies the moral and
ethical questions about who should be allowed to vote in the first place. It is all well and good to
employ technologies like hand-marked paper that are thought to provide software-independence
and cast-as-intended verifiability, but what does it matter if this necessarily excludes vulnerable
populations like voters who have difficulty marking paper by hand or do not have an address to
which a vote-by-mail ballot can be delivered? It is all well and good to decry the insecurity of
voting by mail and the potential for fraud that it creates, but if the alternative is forcing voters to
risk their lives and show up to vote during a disease outbreak, is defending against an exceptionally
rare threat really that important?
The overall point is that while this protracted document has supported the notion that election
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security is difficult and involves significantly more nuance and care than obvious at first blush,
even that is somehow an understatement. There is a tremendous amount of future work needed
in the technical space to explore the oft-wielded claims about the security of hand-marked paper,
risk-limiting audits, etc., but also work about disinformation, how voting systems impact psychology
and sociology, how secure systems can embed equity into their operation, and so on.
My hope is that the approach I have taken here can influence work to those ends. Security is not
something achieved, it is something improved. There is no magic bullet; there is no black-and-white
in this space. In order to truly make gains and improve security in elections, it is absolutely crucial
to understand the finer details of the solutions that are suggested and the places to which they can
be applied. It is exactly these details that make election security harder than you think.
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Appendix A
Voter-verified Paper
1.1 Poll Worker Script
Our poll workers followed four versions of the script below: a baseline version, and three
variants that each add one line.
VARIANT 1: Before the voter begins using the BMD, a poll worker asks them to check their ballot
before it is scanned.
VARIANT 2: Before the voter deposits the ballot, a poll worker informs them that it is the official
record of the vote.
VARIANT 3: Before the voter deposits the ballot, a poll worker asks whether they have carefully
reviewed each selection.
When Subject Arrives (POLL WORKER A)
Hello! Before you begin, please fill out this Institutional Review Board consent form. [Point to
form and pen.] If you have any questions, feel free to ask.
You are about to participate in a study about the usability of a new type of voting machine. You will
be using one of these voting machines to make selections on your ballot, which will be a truncated
version of the Ann Arbor 2018 midterm ballot. Once you are finished, your ballot will be printed
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from the printer beneath the machine, and you can review your ballot and deposit it in the ballot box
over there. [Point out ballot box.] Feel free to vote your political preference or not; no identifying
information will be collected that could match you with your votes. If you would like to quit at any
time during the study, just say so.
VARIANT 1: Please remember to check your ballot carefully before depositing it into the scanner.
You may begin at any time.
Before Subject Deposits Ballot (POLL WORKER B)
VARIANT 2: Please keep in mind that the paper ballot is the official record of your vote.
VARIANT 3: Have you carefully reviewed each selection on your printed ballot?
After Subject Deposits Ballot (POLL WORKER B)
Thank you for participating! You are now finished with the study, and should fill out the exit survey.
[Point to debrief survey computers.]
After Subject Completes Exit Survey (POLL WORKER B)
Thank you for your participation! You are now finished. If you have any questions about this study,
you may ask them now, although I am unable to answer some questions due to the nature of the
research. Here is a debrief form. [Hand subject a debrief form.] If you think of anything after you
leave, you can reach [me/the principle investigators] through the information on the debrief form.
If you know anyone who might like to participate, please refer them here; we will be here [remaining
time].
Thank you again for participating!
1.2 Recruitment Script
An investigator used the following script to recruit library patrons to participate in the study:
Hello, do you have 10 minutes to participate in a study about a new kind of voting machine that
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is used in elections across the United States? This study will consist of voting using our voting
machine and depositing a printed paper ballot into a ballot box, and then filling out a survey about
the experience. If you would like to participate, we will need you to first sign a consent form. We
will provide a flyer at the end of your participation with information about the study. We cannot
make all details available at this time, but full details and research results will be made available
within six months of the conclusion of this study. We thank you for your consideration and hope
you choose to participate!
1.3 Slate of Candidates for Directed Voting Condition
We randomly generated a slate of candidates and provided a printed copy to voters in certain
experiments. The handout voters received is reproduced below:
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 Race Candidate(s) 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor Bill Gelineau and Angelique Chaiser Thomas 
Secretary of State Mary Treder Lang 
Attorney General Lisa Lane Gioia 
United States Senator Debbie Stabenow 
Representative in Congress 12th District Jeff Jones 
Member of State Board of Education  
(Vote for 2) 
Tiffany Tilley 
Mary Anne Hering 
Regent of the University of MIchigan 
(Vote for 2) 
Jordan Acker 
Joe Sanger 
Trustee of Michigan State University  
(Vote for 2) 
Mike Miller 
Bruce Campbell 
Justice of the Supreme Court  
(Vote for 2) 
Megan Kathleen Cavanagh 
Kerry Lee Morgan 
Judge of Court of Appeals 3rd District 
Incumbent Position ​(Vote for 2) 
Jane Marie Beckering 
Douglas B. Shapiro 
Judge of Circuit Court 22nd Circuit 
Incumbent Position ​(Vote for 2) 
Timothy Patrick Connors 
Carol Kuhnke 
Judge of Probate Court Incumbent 
Position Darlene A. O’Brien 
Judge of District Court 14A District 
Incumbent Position Thomas B. Bourque 
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